Does the right to exclude violate the demands of moral equality? by Lim, Desiree Yuet Cheng
 
 
Does the right to exclude violate the 




Department of Philosophy 








Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy 
May 2016 
	   2 
Abstract 
This thesis draws on the principle of moral equality to develop a novel critique of a range of 
practices apparently licensed by the idea that the state has a right to exclude. The state’s right 
to exclude can be understood as consisting of three conceptually distinct rights: a right to 
exclude outsiders from its territory, a right to exclude them from settling within the territory, 
and a right to exclude them from acquiring citizenship status. It is widely acknowledged that 
the right to exclude has its limits. But on what grounds do we think the right to exclude must 
be limited, and how extensive are those limits? It is common to argue that the right to exclude 
must be constrained by the principle of moral equality: the idea that all persons are of equal 
moral worth, by virtue of their shared humanity. Indeed, in the existing literature, there has 
been one powerful attempt to show that the right to exclude always violates the requirements 
of moral equality, by distinguishing between citizens and non-citizens on the basis of a factor 
that is morally arbitrary: their nationality. According to that line of argument, there can be no 
right to exclude. In this thesis, I make a different move. I argue that we need to pay attention 
to the ways in which exercises of the right to exclude violate another key demand that 
emerges from the idea that we are all of equal moral worth. I focus on the idea of social 
equality, and on the relationship between this and the demand for respect. The central claim 
of my thesis is that borders do not just passively stand in the way, blocking people from 
pursuing the equal opportunities to which they are entitled. The exercise of the right to 
exclude also actively licenses disrespectful policies towards non-citizens, and in some cases, 
citizens as well. I examine three such examples: the detention and deportation of non-citizens, 
discrimination against low-skilled migrants, and the denationalization of citizens who are dual 
nationals, for the purposes of national security. In order to uphold the demands of moral 
equality, we need to rethink the existing social structures and institutional contexts that are 
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Introduction 
 
“It is clear, then, that some men are by nature free, and others slaves, and that for these latter slavery is both 
expedient and right.” (Aristotle, Politics I, 5 1255a) 
 
“Those who live in a cold climate and in [northern] Europe are full of spirit, but wanting in intelligence and skill, 
and therefore they keep their freedom but have no political organisation, and are incapable of ruling over others. 
Whereas the natives of Asia are intelligent and inventive, but they are wanting in spirit, and therefore they are 
always in a state of subjection and slavery.” (Aristotle, Politics VII, 7 1327b) 
 
 
As the above quotations show, Aristotle was surely not known for his egalitarian beliefs. He 
was a notorious proponent of “natural slavery” – the idea that the majority of human beings 
could be enslaved without injustice because they are slaves by nature (Heath 1). Specifically, 
he thought that natural slaves lacked the capacity to make reasoned judgments about what 
they ought to do consistently with their conception of the good life, even if they could be 
extremely intelligent in other ways (Heath 8). Furthermore, he deemed foreigners in particular – 
that is, non-Greeks – to be natural slaves, consequent on the dispositions that were produced 
by different climate conditions. Thus, his test for determining whether or not someone was a 
natural slave went like this: “if he is a native of an area to the north or east of Greece, he 
probably is; if he is a native Greek, he almost certainly is not” (Kraut 291).  
 
Of course, in the present context, these hypotheses have largely lost all appeal. In stark 
contrast, philosophers largely subscribe to the principle of moral equality – the fundamental 
belief that all persons are of equal moral status, which Deborah Hellman describes as a 
“bedrock moral principle” (6). Equal moral status is comprised of two secondary principles. 
Firstly, the worth or inherent dignity of persons necessitates that they be treated with respect. 
Secondly, such dignity and worth does not vary in accordance with their other features (ibid). 
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For example, it is believed that we are not endowed with more or less claim to equality as a 
result of our height, age, or intelligence. This widely shared commitment has played into 
philosophers’ convictions about how aspects of the political landscape ought to be designed, 
and has functioned as the yardstick that we use to judge the merits of competing conceptions 
of justice (Kymlicka 44-5).  
 
One influential example of a theory, where equality has played a significant role, is John 
Rawls’s theory of justice. For Rawls, moral equality primarily means that no persons should 
be subjected to arbitrary unequal treatment. Thus, while the demands of moral equality imply 
“justice as regularity” in the administration of institutions as public systems of rules, where 
similar cases must be treated similarly, it also applies to the substantive structure of institutions 
(1999, 441-2). Not only must institutions assign equal basic rights to all persons that are 
compatible with a similar scheme of rights for all, under the first principle of justice – the 
second principle also dictates that social and economic inequalities must be “attached to 
offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity”, and 
arranged to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged (Rawls 1999, 266). Thus, for Rawls, 
the abstract commitment to moral equality gives rise to two concrete claims: that no arbitrary 
distinctions should be made between persons during the assignment of basic rights and duties 
(1999, 5), and that distributive shares are not improperly influenced by factors (like one’s race, 
class, or gender) that are “arbitrary from a moral point of view” (1999, 63).  
 
Often, Rawls’s views are also contested not because of scepticism about moral equality, but 
diverging beliefs about how best to capture it. For example, several philosophers have argued 
that moral equality may demand a form of equality that goes beyond eschewing arbitrary 
differences in rights or material distributions. Elizabeth Anderson, for example, argues for a 
conception of social or relational equality. While Anderson, like Rawls, begins from the equal 
moral worth of persons (1999a, 312), she contends that the proper aim of egalitarian justice is 
“to create a community in which people stand in relations of equality to others (Anderson 
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1999a, 288-9). On this interpretation of the demands of moral equality, it is wrong for the 
state to treat citizens as if they are “inferior to others in the worth of their lives, talents, and 
personal qualities”, or to “express contemptuous pity” for those stamped as inferior, as well as 
for it to “stigmatize” and make “demeaning and intrusive judgments” about them (Anderson 
1999a, 289). Here, we can see that moral equality leads to the claim of social equality – that 
citizens ought to relate to each other as social equals, not as superiors and inferiors. Although 
some, including Anderson, have characterized the relational approach as in competition with 
the distributive one, we need not accept this to see the value and importance of the relational 
approach. Aristotle’s beliefs are not just troubling because of their material consequences for 
slaves, with regard to the rights or distributions they were accorded, but because they 
presuppose a social order where “from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for 
subjection, others for rule” (Politics I, 5 1254a), and particular groups are treated as social 
inferiors who are rightfully subjugated to others. So the normative force of moral equality can 
be said to transcend the demand for political or distributive equality; it also forbids the 
demeaning or humiliating treatment of citizens at the hands of the state.  
 
Moral equality and the claims of non-citizens 
 
At the same time, we have also progressed far beyond the view that foreigners are our 
inferiors – at least in the realm of philosophy. Any philosophical argument that relies on this 
premise would, I trust, be vigorously shouted down. As the discourse on equality within the 
purview of the state has shown, it is not enough that we believe non-citizens are our equals; we 
must also act in ways that duly reflect this fact. If we recognise that moral equality has serious 
implications for how citizens ought to be treated, it is no less imperative that we come to 
understand how the fact of non-citizens’ moral equality ought to structure and limit states’ 
actions towards them. In this thesis, I will be concerned only with the policies and actions that 
wealthy Western states have towards non-citizens. Importantly, we should avoid discussing 
non-citizens as though they are a monolithic group, when specific facts about different groups 
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are surely relevant to our conclusions. Firstly, we may look at considerations relating to their 
life-conditions. For example, states may owe duties of assistance to non-citizens who are 
suffering desperate poverty, or escaping civil wars, but not to non-citizens who live relatively 
comfortable lives. Secondly, we must also take into account the diverse political relationships 
they stand in to the states in question. For example, what a state owes to the citizens of its ex-
colonies could be very different to the citizens of a country that it has had virtually no 
interchange with. Bernard Boxill, for example, argues that reparation to colonial peoples is 
“required by the premise that every person is equal in worth and dignity” (118), while states 
do not violate moral equality in any way by failing to give similar amounts to citizens of 
countries they have no such involvement with. Likewise, a state may have very different duties 
to denizens who have settled in the state for some time, in comparison to those who are merely 
passing tourists. Thirdly, while non-citizens can stand in a particular relationship to a state 
because of past history, as in the case of colonial peoples, political relationships can also 
develop as a result of present interactions, whether they are institutional in origin (e.g. if a 
state decides to launch drone attacks on a particular group of non-citizens) or consequent on 
the individual actions of citizens and non-citizens alike (e.g. if citizens engage in economic 
exchange with non-citizens, or if large numbers of non-citizens arrive at the shores of a state, 
seeking refuge). In all these contexts, like in the domestic case, moral equality may serve as the 
grounding for a number of diverse claims on the part of non-citizens.  
 
In recent years, political philosophers have demonstrated significant interest in normative 
issues concerning a particular group of non-citizens: those who wish to migrate, or have 
migrated to the state. One particular question that has inspired vibrant debate is this: given 
the fact of moral equality, do states have the right to exclude immigrants? Before I proceed, 
some clarifications are in order. Firstly, my use of the term “immigrants” will encompass both 
immigrants who are already located on the state’s territory, as well as prospective immigrants, 
unless otherwise indicated. Secondly, throughout my thesis, I will restrict the scope of my 
discussion to the people who fall within the purview of what Sarah Fine and Andrea 
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Sangiovanni term the “pure case” (193). This means that I will refer only to non-citizens who 
are not refugees and do not suffer from severe economic deprivation; neither are they seeking 
to migrate in order to reunite with their families. Nevertheless, they have a strong interest in 
residing in the host state because they are seeking “significantly better job opportunities, 
greater scope for religious or social association, or more wide-reaching political affinities with 
residents and citizens than they would in their country of origin” (Fine and Sangiovanni 194). 
But why restrict the scope of my discussion in this way? Many theorists of immigration 
already acknowledge that the claims of refugees, or those who suffer from severe deprivation, 
or those who wish to reunite with their families, can place limitations on the right to exclude. 
For example, David Miller asserts that states have an obligation to admit refugees when 
“temporary solutions”, like temporary residence and the establishment of safety zones prove 
insufficient for the protection of their basic rights (2007, 225). However, it is also widely 
assumed, by proponents of the right to exclude, that states’ exclusion of immigrants who fall 
into the “pure” category is not subject to such constraints. Unlike the other groups mentioned 
above, they simply do not have claims that trump the state’s right to exclude. My thesis 
focuses on resisting this assumption, and defending the view that the principle of moral 
equality can also place constraints on states’ exclusion of immigrants in the “pure” case.   
 
Thirdly, I will assume that there are three possible modes of exclusion (Fine 2013, 255). 
Firstly, the right to exclude may refer to the state’s right to exclude outsiders from its territory; 
that is, refuse entry to non-citizens who wish to enter the territory. This may include rejecting 
their visa applications, refusing them entry at the physical border, or deporting people who 
have entered illegally. Secondly, it may also refer to the state’s right to exclude outsiders from 
settling within its territory. For example, non-citizens may enter on tourist passes that expire 
within a short period. However, while they are temporarily admitted to the territory, they are 
prohibited from taking up residence on a more permanent basis, and denied access to social 
goods that would facilitate residency (e.g. taking up a job, or having access to public funds). 
The same applies to guest workers who are granted admission on condition that they give up 
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their rights to apply for permanent residency, and must leave when their work visas expire. 
Finally, the state may have the right to exclude non-citizens from membership of the political 
community; that is, from obtaining citizenship. For example, a permanent resident may be 
denied citizenship on the grounds that they fail mandatory language tests, or because they 
have criminal records and are judged not to have “good moral character”. Interestingly, in 
the past and present, exclusion from membership has also been extended to existing members; 
some states claim the right to strip citizens of their membership. I address this point in a later 
chapter. Overall, exclusion may take place in one, two, or all three of these ways. For 
example, a person may be allowed entry to the territory, but barred from settling on it or 
obtaining membership. 
 
Some philosophers (e.g. David Miller, Christopher Heath Wellman, Ryan Pevnick) have 
defended the commonly-held assumption that states should have the right to exclude non-
citizens in at least one of these ways, even if they may disagree that states have all three 
exclusionary rights. For example, it would not be inconsistent to hold that states have the right 
to exclude non-citizens from entering the territory, while denying that they have the right to 
exclude resident non-citizens from obtaining citizenship. Linda Bosniak writes that citizenship 
is presumed to be “hard on the outside and soft on the inside” (4), where aliens within the 
state’s borders ought to be treated as members of society, but those outside its borders can be 
firmly excluded. In response, however, others (e.g. Joseph Carens, Phillip Cole) have sharply 
contested this assumption by asserting that the right to exclude non-citizens from entry is 
ultimately inconsistent with the moral equality of non-citizens, and that a policy of open 
borders would best express our commitment to moral equality. However, these criticisms have 
been levelled in a rather limited fashion.  
 
One underdeveloped area is the interpretation of moral equality that critics of the right to 
exclude have relied on. Following Rawls’s statement that domestic distributive shares ought 
not to be solely influenced by morally arbitrary factors, they have largely focused on the effect 
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that the right to exclude has on the global distribution of opportunity. It is no secret that, at 
present, there are far greater opportunities available to citizens of the global North than 
citizens of the global South. The elimination of border controls between the global North and 
South “would enable far larger numbers of people to travel from the poor world to the rich to 
take advantage of the opportunities there” (Seglow 327), thus closing the gap in opportunities 
between people from these two regions. However, as matters stand, the large-scale exclusion 
of citizens of the global South prevents them from equalizing their opportunities, and upholds 
a distributive order where their opportunities continue to be heavily influenced by their place 
of citizenship. It is claimed that blocking non-citizens from accessing the same opportunities 
as citizens amounts to arbitrary unequal treatment, because citizenship is a socially contingent 
feature, like class, gender, and race. For example, Joseph Carens has compared states’ 
restrictions on the entry of non-citizens to feudalism in the past, where “restrictions on the 
freedom of movement were an essential element in maintaining the limitations on the 
opportunities of those with talent and motivation but the wrong class background” (2013, 
228). Similarly, the right to exclude can be considered an “essential element” in maintaining 
limitations on the opportunities of those with the “wrong citizenship”. However, I believe that 
this tactic places critics of the right to exclude in a rather precarious position; it may simply be 
retorted that one’s citizenship is a non-arbitrary feature that reflects special relationships 
between citizens of a particular state. Therefore, the state does not necessarily treat non-
citizens arbitrarily by excluding them, and preventing them from equalizing their 
opportunities. As I will show, it remains to be seen that hinging the critique on the social 
contingency of citizenship is a convincing strategy. 
 
The second underdeveloped area is the scope of issues that moral equality has been applied to. 
As the above discussion suggests, the debate has largely revolved around whether states may, 
consistent with the moral equality of non-citizens, restrict them from entering the territory at 
all. In stark contrast to the varied dimensions of immigration policy that have garnered much 
attention in the mainstream media, there have been comparatively fewer attempts to ascertain 
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which limitations, if any, that moral equality may place on how the state may exercise its right to 
exclude, assuming that it has such a right. I believe that the second type of question is of equal 
importance to the first, if not more so, as regardless of whether or not there is a theoretical basis 
for the right to exclude, states in the real world continue to enforce morally problematic 
policies under its banner, and we do not need to deny the existence of the right to exclude to 
disapprove of these policies. For example, does the right to exclude non-citizens permit the 
use of controversial tools like detention and deportation? To what extent are states permitted 
to discriminate against non-citizens of their choosing? At the same time, the state’s right to 
exclude its own citizens has not been given much attention. For example, is it ever acceptable 
for states to exclude citizens by stripping them of their citizenship, due to national security 
concerns? Guided by the demands of moral equality, properly understood, we may be able to 
provide principled responses to such issues. 
 
As a whole, I have tried to show that, in order to pose a robust challenge to the right to 
exclude, we have good reason to broaden both the interpretation of moral equality, and the 
scope of its application, that we use in the present case. In the first case, we require a more 
robust argument from moral equality that can place restrictions on the right to exclude 
without being defeated by the argument that citizenship is a non-arbitrary feature. In the 
second case, we should investigate what moral equality has to say about how the state excludes 
non-citizens, which brings up a range of pressing issues, and not just whether or not it has the 
right to do so. My thesis rises to both these challenges. As I will demonstrate, moral equality 
can place serious limitations to the right to exclude, and it will do so by exposing the violations 
of moral equality inherent in some commonplace practices of exclusion. I will detail my 
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My strategy and structure 
 
I believe that we should approach moral equality from a different angle from the one chosen 
by Carens and Cole. Recall the earlier distinction I made between Rawls and Anderson’s 
approaches to equality. Instead of focusing on the arbitrary treatment of non-citizens, why not 
think about how the right to exclude may affect their social equality – that is, their ability to 
relate to citizens as moral equals?  
 
Significantly, while social equality is a familiar concept in discussions about the claims of 
fellow citizens, it has rarely been applied to the claims of non-citizens. Two welcome 
exceptions to the rule are Cecile Laborde and Rekha Nath, who have applied a relational 
approach to the problem of global inequality. Laborde, for example, notes that while 
relational egalitarianism is predominantly relevant to domestic politics, it has “hitherto 
neglected yet promising applications” in the global sphere (79). What is morally shocking 
about the current world order, she suggests, is “not so much distributive inequality per se, as 
the combination of the absolute destitution of the global poor with gross inequalities of power 
and resources between them and the better-off” (Laborde 77). To illustrate her point, she 
gestures at how the vulnerability that people from poor countries suffer, due to their lack of 
resources, is often worsened and exploited by powerful agents like wealthy Western states and 
multinational corporations, as well as to the fact that the benevolent power exercised by aid-
providing agencies may have disempowering consequences for the people they are supposed 
to help (Laborde 78). Like Laborde, Nath begins from the assumption that everyone in the 
global community should enjoy equal standing, but rather than drawing attention to non-
distributive forms of inequality, as Laborde does, she emphasises how global distributive 
inequalities have a serious impact on social relations between citizens and non-citizens of 
wealthy states. On this view, citizens of well-off countries have obligations to reduce global 
inequality that are grounded in the relationships in which they stand to worse-off foreigners, 
because it threatens the latter’s social and political standing (Nath 2011, 594). Specifically, it 
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renders the latter unable to equally shape the terms of cross-border interaction, and affects 
their ability to partake in the benefits of global associations (Nath 2011, 602-3).  
Refreshingly, Nath has also applied her global account of relational equality to the realm of 
immigration and the right to exclude.  In a different essay, she argues that the demands of 
social equality can place restrictions on states’ border control policies, including the 
requirement to grant long-term residents the opportunity for citizenship and its related 
privileges, as well as a prohibition on xenophobic discriminatory policies towards migrant 
workers (Nath 2015, 199-201). For others, relational equality disappointingly only warrants a 
relatively superficial mention. For example, Christopher Heath Wellman dismisses the claim 
that the right to exclude wrongfully prevents non-citizens from equalizing their opportunities 
by aligning himself with relational equality, which does not necessarily require distributive 
equality between persons. As he writes, “…equality demands that we address those 
inequalities that render people vulnerable to oppressive relationships. If this is correct, then 
the particular theory of equality required to motivate the egalitarian case for open borders is 
suspect and should be rejected in favour of a theory of relational equality” (Wellman 120). 
Here, Wellman acknowledges that achieving relational equality may be important enough to 
outweigh other values like self-determination (122), and that “one consequence of the 
emerging global basic structure is that virtually all of the world’s people now share some type 
of relationship” (123), so it seems that relational egalitarians may have reason to care about 
unequal relationships between persons in different countries. However, Wellman does not 
expand on the consequences of relational equality for the right to exclude, other than to use it 
for the purposes of fending off objections to the right to exclude like those by Carens and 
Cole.  
 
Following Nath’s lead, I will develop the idea that a relational account of equality is especially 
well-placed to provide illuminating insights about the constraints that moral equality ought to 
place on the right to exclude. In other words, I will chiefly be concerned with the social 
inequalities that states’ exercise of the right to exclude may create or exacerbate. While I will 
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be primarily concerned with social relations between citizens and non-citizens, it is also worth 
noting that the right to exclude also may have a similar effect on the social relations between 
different groups of citizens, and I will call attention to this. Concurrently, while I do not deny 
that the effects of the right to exclude on global inequalities are deeply relevant to normative 
analyses of it, I want to shine the spotlight on a different realm of issues. To re-iterate an 
earlier point, it is not just what states have the right to do, but how they do it; it is equally 
important to assess the processes through which states exclude non-citizens, and how they may 
contribute to social inequality. 
 
My thesis will be divided into two parts. Part I (Chapters One and Two) will be dedicated to 
laying out the groundwork of a relational theory of moral equality, and how it commits us to 
what I will call the comparative requirement of equal respect for non-citizens. Part II (Chapters 
Three, Four, Five, and Six) will analyse the application of relational equality to three areas of 
immigration policy: the detention and deportation of non-citizens, direct and indirect 
discrimination in immigrant selection, and the use of “culture” as a criterion for membership.  
 
The first claim that I develop in Chapter One is that the commitment to moral equality, read 
as the requirement not to treat non-citizens unequally for arbitrary reasons, does not seem to 
place limitations on the right to exclude. I begin by providing a brief overview of three 
influential accounts of the right to exclude. Next, I position these against one influential 
criticism of the right to exclude, which I call the Argument from Social Contingency. This 
critique claims that the right to exclude treats non-citizens unequally on the basis of a morally 
arbitrary feature, because our citizenship is socially contingent. However, I will show why this 
claim ultimately fails. Firstly, moral equality leaves room for the value of special relationships, 
which may continue to hold even if they are socially contingent. If the right to exclude is 
grounded in special relationships between citizens, it is not obvious that the right to exclude 
treats non-citizens arbitrarily. Furthermore, social contingency aside, I note that objections to 
exclusion can take a different form. Often, it seems that persons object to their exclusion from 
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various associations on the grounds that it is demeaning, and not because they are excluded for 
arbitrary reasons. 
 
Moving away from the idea of arbitrariness, Chapter Two lays out the groundwork for my 
own critique of the right to exclude. While I ground my critique in the commitment to of 
moral equality, I approach the concept from a very different angle. I point to how the 
demands of moral equality have a comparative aspect to them; chiefly, that we must refrain 
from treating persons as if they have a lower moral status to others. I go on to argue that the 
comparative requirement of moral equality requires states to uphold the social equality of those 
subjected to its power, which includes both citizens and immigrants. Aside from refraining 
from creating or maintaining policies that express disrespect for certain groups of citizens, or 
worsen social inequalities between different groups of citizens, they must also refrain from 
creating or maintaining policies that express disrespect for the equal moral status of 
immigrants, or foreseeably threaten to worsen the social inequalities between immigrants and 
citizens.  
 
In the next four chapters, I proceed to the practical application of my theory. In Chapter 
Three, drawing from the republican literature on border controls, I show that detention and 
deportation violate moral equality because they are dominating. However, domination cannot 
entirely account for the wrongfulness of detention and deportation, as it may lead to the 
unequal standing of certain groups, including people who are citizens, even if they are not, 
strictly speaking, dominated by those practices.  
 
In Chapter Four, I claim that states’ preference for highly-skilled migrants, in comparison to 
low-skilled migrants, is a form of wrongful direct discrimination. First, drawing from Deborah 
Hellman’s work, I sketch out a theory of wrongful discrimination. Specifically, I claim that 
discrimination is wrongful when it expresses a belief in the discriminatees’ inferior moral 
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status. Next, I argue that the preference for highly-skilled migrants does express disrespect for 
low-skilled non-citizens, because it reproduces demeaning stereotypes about them.  
 
Chapter Five is very much a continuation of Chapter Four. There, I claim that states’ 
preference for highly-skilled migrants is a form of wrongful indirect discrimination. After 
fleshing out my own theory of wrongful indirect discrimination, which I characterise as a form 
of negligence that worsens existing cultural stigma against particular groups, I show that the 
preference for highly-skilled migrants wrongfully indirectly discriminates against women by 
worsening existing stigma against them.  
 
While Chapters Three, Four, and Five are primarily concerned with the exclusion of non-
citizens, Chapter Six hones in on the state’s purported right to exclude existing citizens from 
membership by stripping them of their citizenship, which I term “denationalization”, as part 
of its national security program. It considers the question of whether states may permissibly 
denationalize citizens who are dual nationals, while refraining from denationalizing single 
nationals, on the grounds that it would make them stateless. Against this policy, I will argue 
that this distinction between dual citizens and single citizens is in violation of the state’s duty 
to uphold social equality between all persons on its territory. The denationalization of dual 
citizens in the current social context cannot be conceptually separated from the increased 
scrutiny of Muslim dual nationals. It expresses disrespect for Muslim citizens as a whole by 
portraying them as permanent outsiders or enemy aliens by virtue of their ethno-religious 
identity. 
 
Contributions of the thesis 
 
Due to my focus on the different forms of disrespect that may arise from states’ exercise of the 
right to exclude, I believe that my thesis makes a significant contribution in three ways. 
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Firstly, in asking whether or not the right to exclude is compatible with moral equality, I have 
adopted a social egalitarian perspective. My adoption of a relational egalitarian framework 
departs significantly from earlier attempts, which tend to interpret violations of moral equality 
as some form arbitrary treatment. This is important for two reasons. On one hand, I 
demonstrate that equality-based objections to the exercise of the right to exclude cannot be 
easily dismissed by the existing strategies that are used against them, which mainly seek to 
point out the special relationship that holds between citizens. On the other, as I have 
mentioned earlier, there is a disjuncture between the literature on the duties we owe to 
citizens, and the literature on the duties we owe to non-citizens. While relational equality has 
been taken seriously in the former, it is curiously largely absent from the latter, and my thesis 
addresses this gap by showing that relational egalitarians ought to have much to say about the 
right to exclude.  
 
Secondly, I have developed a set of social egalitarian principles that allow us to perform a neat 
normative analysis of three kinds of immigration policies that have proved controversial in 
recent years. To be sure, I am not the first to point out the ethical issues with detention and 
deportation, immigration discrimination, and denationalization. However, the social 
egalitarian framework I provide remains important, because it gives us clear and 
straightforward guidelines that separate morally permissible immigration policies from 
impermissible ones. At the same time, as later chapters will reveal, my conclusions are also 
significantly informed by recent empirical data relating to the exclusion of immigrants, which 
is often absent in the literature on the right to exclude. 
 
Thirdly, I emphasise that we do not need to deny the existence of the right to exclude to 
recognise serious limitations on it. I follow the strategy used by Carens in The Ethics of 
Immigration, where the assumption that his audience is motivated by the basic commitment to 
the equal moral worth of individuals (2013, 2) allows him to establish a “shared 
understanding” between those with a permissive attitude towards immigration, and those with 
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a considerably more restrictive view, rather than treating them as irreconcilable from the 
ground up (Carens 2013, 5). Similarly, my arguments, which problematize the various ways in 
which the right to exclude is currently exercised, are designed to appeal to everyone who is 
committed to the moral equality of persons, including those who are firmly convinced that 
states have the right to exclude. I believe that this is an important step in the right direction, as 
there are more issues at stake for the equality of immigrants, than simply the question of 
whether or not they can be permissibly excluded. When confronted with the degrading 
treatment non-citizens, and sometimes citizens face at the hands of some immigration policies, 
our shared belief in moral equality ought to unite us in condemning such treatment, more 
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Is the state’s right to exclude non-citizens consistent with their equal moral worth? If not, 
why? These two questions will be the focus of my thesis. In this chapter, as a starting point, I 
will critically evaluate one well-known response to this question, which focuses on the state’s 
purported right to exclude non-citizens from entering the territory. On this view, the right to 
exclude is incompatible with the equal moral worth of non-citizens, because it amounts to 
states’ subjection of non-citizens to arbitrary unequal treatment. Exclusion from wealthy states 
treats non-citizens from poorer countries unequally by denying them access to the wealth of 
opportunities that is available to citizens. At the same time, it does so arbitrarily. In blocking 
them from equalizing their life-prospects, it allows the opportunities of poor non-citizens to 
continue being profoundly affected by their place of citizenship, which is believed to be a 
socially contingent feature. I will call the claim that citizenship is socially contingent “the 
Argument from Social Contingency”.  
 
However, I am not convinced that this strategy, in particular, is an effective one. Firstly, the 
social contingency of citizenship by default does not make it a morally arbitrary feature, as we 
may point to the existence of special relationships between citizens, and hence the non-
arbitrariness of citizenship. Secondly, it is not obvious that the right to exclude is primarily 
objectionable because it prevents non-citizens from mitigating the impact of a socially 
contingent feature on their life-opportunities. As other examples show, claims can be voiced 
from the perspective that exclusion is demeaning. I conclude that arguments from moral 
equality, in order to place limitations on the right to exclude, will have to take a different 
route. Section 2 begins by providing an overview of three different bases for the right to 
exclude: cultural preservation, the freedom of association, and shared ownership. In Section 
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3, I explain the demands of moral equality, and how it places limits on the actions of states. I 
also offer an account of moral arbitrariness, and explain why states are prohibited from 
subjecting persons to arbitrary unequal treatment. In Section 4, drawing from arguments by 
Joseph Carens and Phillip Cole, I sketch out the Argument from Social Contingency. Finally, 
Section 5 will comprise two objections to the Argument from Social Contingency: first, that 
social contingency does not provide an adequate response to the fact of special relationships, 
and second, that states’ right to exclude non-citizens, like other some cases of exclusion, may 
instead disrespect non-citizens because it demeans them. I conclude this chapter, in Section 6, 
by briefly examining the implications of my arguments for the remainder of the thesis.  
 
2. The background to the right to exclude 
  
Many philosophers begin with the assumption that states have the right to exclude non-
citizens, in the ways I have previously described. In order to understand why states are widely 
believed to possess the right to exclude, it is necessary to refer to the conceptual backdrop 
behind it. Some have chosen to justify the right to exclude through developing the idea of self-
determination and its ancillary requirements. First, I will assume in this discussion that the 
right to self-determination means that the members of a state have a prima facie right to make 
their own decisions about the policies they live under (Pevnick 27). Secondly, while I noted 
earlier that the right to exclude comprises three conceptually distinct rights (the right to 
exclude non-citizens from entry, settlement, and political membership), the Argument from 
Social Contingency only targets the first. As such, I will focus exclusively on the justifications 
for states’ right to exclude non-citizens from entry. Thirdly, as I have also mentioned in the 
previous chapter, I will focus only on prospective migrants who are not suffering from 
desperate poverty, not in severe need of humanitarian assistance, and are not seeking to 
migrate for purposes of family reunion. 
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According to Sarah Fine, arguments that hinge on self-determination ordinarily take this 
form: 
  
P1. States possess the right to self-determination. 
P2. A fundamental constituent of the collective right to self-determination is exerting control 
over what the composition of the “self” is. 
P3. Therefore, as part of the right to self-determination, states must also possess the right to 
control the terms of membership. (2013, 258) 
  
One well-known argument from self-determination appeals to the strong interest that states 
have in maintaining a particular public culture or national identity. David Miller assumes that 
states “require a common public culture that in part constitutes the political identity of their 
members, and that serves valuable functions in supporting democracy and other social goals” 
(2005, 199). He defines a common public culture as a “set of ideas about the character of the 
community which also helps to fix responsibilities”, which are to some degree the result of 
political debate between citizens, and is disseminated by mass media (1995, 68). For example, 
the public culture of some states may attach more value to individual self-sufficiency, while 
others will emphasise the value of collective goods (1995, 69). Immigration may have a 
significant impact on the common public culture, as immigrants who are admitted may do so 
with different cultural values, including political values that differ from the public culture of 
the community that they are admitted to (Miller 2013, 199).  To see the force of this 
argument, we need not assume that immigrants will stubbornly cling to their own values and 
refuse to absorb those of the existing public culture. The point, rather, is that their presence 
may change the public culture in various significant ways (Miller 2013, 200), whether they 
intend to or not.  Take, for example, states’ interest in preserving national languages. Given 
people’s incentive to learn and use international languages (such as English) for economic and 
other purposes, national languages are in danger of eventually withering away, causing one of 
the community’s most important distinguishing characteristics to disappear (Miller 2013, 200). 
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The presence of immigrants who do not already speak the national language might serve to 
hasten this process, as they would likely communicate with natives in an international 
language, hence increasing their incentive to defect from use of the national language in 
everyday transactions (ibid).  
 
Miller acknowledges that public cultures “always change over time, as a result of social factors 
that are quite independent of immigration”, and change ought not to matter in itself as long 
as a viable public culture is maintained (2013, 200). So the threat of change, in itself, cannot 
serve as a sufficient reason to exclude immigrants.  But this is where the notion of self-
determination comes in. As Miller puts it, “the public culture of their country is something 
that people have an interest in controlling: they want to be able to shape the way that their 
nation develops, including the values that are contained in the public culture” (ibid); an 
important component of states’ self-determination is exerting control over their public culture. 
While there is no guarantee that they will succeed, they still have good reason to “try to 
maintain cultural continuity over time, so that they can see themselves as the bearers of an 
identifiable cultural tradition that stretches backward historically” (ibid). Consequently, in 
order to further the goal of preserving their public culture, states would be justified in limiting 
immigration, or sharply differentiating among immigrants who are able to speak the national 
language, and those who cannot (ibid). In a similar vein, Michael Walzer observes that “the 
distinctiveness of cultures and groups depends upon closure, and without it, cannot be 
conceived as a stable feature of human life”; acknowledging cultural distinctiveness as a value 
means permitting closure at some level, and it seems appropriate for sovereign states to “take 
shape and claim the authority to make its own admissions policy, to control and sometimes 
restrain the flow of immigrants” (1983, 39). Arguably, without the right to exclude, there 
could not be “communities of character”, which are historically stable, ongoing associations 
between persons who have a special commitment to one another and their shared life (Walzer 
1983, 42). 
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However, Christopher Heath Wellman contends that the state’s right to limit immigration 
is not contingent on its members sharing any distinctive ethnic, cultural, or national 
characteristics (Wellman 117-8). Instead, the “commonly prized value of freedom of 
association”, which is an important part of the right to self-determination, “provides the basic 
normative building blocks for a presumptive case in favour of each legitimate state’s right to 
exclude others from its territory” (119). He begins by identifying our shared conviction that 
we enjoy a “morally privileged position of dominion over our self-regarding affairs, a position 
which entitles us to freedom of association in the marital and religious realms” (110). For 
example, we assume that everyone has the right to choose their marital partner, or the people 
they practise their religion with (ibid). At the same time, the freedom of association includes 
the right to reject potential associations, as well as the right to disassociate (ibid). So I do not 
only have the right to decide with whom I want to form an association; I also have the right 
to not associate with particular individuals, or cease association with them should I so choose. 
Wellman contends that the state has an analogous right to the freedom of association: 
  
…just as an individual has a right to determine whom (if anyone) he or she would like to 
marry, a group of fellow-citizens has a right to determine whom (if anyone) it would like 
to invite into its political community. And just as an individual’s freedom of association 
entitles one to remain single, a state’s freedom of association entitles it to exclude all 
foreigners from its political community. (110-111) 
  
Thus, the freedom of association is “simply one component of the self-determination which is 
owed to all autonomous individuals and legitimate states” (Wellman 116). 
  
One obvious issue with Wellman’s argument is that there may be relevant differences between 
states and individuals; that individuals undeniably have the freedom of association need not 
entail that states enjoy a similar right. One version of this objection is to state that 
only individuals, not groups, enjoy such rights. Responding to this possibility, Wellman notes 
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that we do already posit at least a presumptive group right to the freedom of association (111). 
For example, even those who insist that associations like the Boy Scouts and the Augusta 
National golf clubs do not have free rein to exclude particular groups from joining (such as 
gay people and women) typically concede that there are weighty reasons in favour of 
permitting them to determine their own membership (Wellman 111). Importantly, we also 
already accept that states do have the right to associate with whomever they choose. For 
example, denying that they lack this right would have an unpalatable implication; it would 
mean that they would not be able to either accept or reject the terms of regional associations 
like NAFTA or the EU (Wellman 112). As Wellman puts it, “[n]o one believes that it would 
be permissible to force Canada into NAFTA or to coerce Slovenia to join the EU” – nor may 
these countries unilaterally insert themselves into those associations (ibid). 
  
A second way of resisting the argument from analogy is to draw attention to how the intimacy 
of marriage makes freedom of association far more important in the marital context, than the 
political sphere; as compatriots lack “intimacy” in the relevant sense, it is not clear why groups 
of citizens also have the freedom of association (Wellman 113). However, the case for states’ 
freedom of association does not rest on all such rights being equally valuable; Wellman points 
out that we do not consider the religious right to freedom of association to be equally 
important as the marital right to freedom of association, but this is no reason to disrespect the 
religious right to freedom of association (ibid). After all, control over membership in one’s 
state could be extremely important in its own right: “[t]he point is that people rightly care 
very deeply about their countries, and, as a consequence, they rightly care about those policies 
which will affect how these political communities evolve. And since a country’s immigration 
policy affects who will share in controlling the country’s future, it is a matter of considerable 
importance” (Wellman 115). 
  
However, Wellman’s argument seems to falter when confronted with the fact that 
membership is by-and-large involuntary; Ryan Pevnick notes that “as there is no obvious sense 
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in which citizens, born into membership, can be said to be freely associating with each other” 
(30). Consequently, it would be a mistake to defend immigration restrictions by reference to 
citizens’ claims of freedom of association when their association with each other is not freely 
entered into (ibid). At the same time, the freedom of association alone cannot explain why 
states may restrict movement, when it seems that other associations like interest groups or 
cities may not.  Pevnick is thus led to propose his own account of the right to exclude, which 
he believes can fulfil this role (ibid). He holds that a principle of self-determination can be 
justified by referring to the group’s ownership of goods that are produced through members’ 
labour and contributions (33). This idea draws from the “commonplace” intuition that groups 
may claim ownership over their collective institutions, because those could not exist without 
the contributions of members, and that ownership stakes supply group members with a prima 
facie claim to make future decisions regarding the shape and direction of those institutions 
(ibid), including decisions about who shares in these institutions. For example, a congregation 
may claim an ownership stake over its support group for widows or youth education 
programme, as those are created through the contributions of members (ibid). In support of 
this deeply-held intuition, Pevnick quotes this passage by A. John Simmons: 
  
There has been no more widespread of enduring intuition about property rights than 
that labour in creating or improving a thing gives one special claim to it. We feel that 
those who innocently work to discover, make, or usefully employ some unowned good 
ought to be allowed to keep it (if in so they harm no others)…it would be wrong for 
others to take it away. (Simmons 1992, 223) 
  
One significant benefit of Pevnick’s view is that it does not succeed only on one particular 
conception of property rights. As any plausible account of ownership will accommodate the 
intuition that “those who innocently work to make some good come to have a special claim to 
it” (Pevnick 33), it is consistent with a wide variety of different approaches (Pevnick 34). 
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The next challenge Pevnick addresses is how we can extrapolate from cases involving smaller-
scale groups. Unlike congregations, states have a typically non-
voluntary and intergenerational nature (Pevnick 35); “most of us are conscripted into citizenship 
and have laws enforced upon us” (36). At the same time, state institutions are historical 
projects that extend across generations and are passed from perished members to current 
generations (Pevnick 39). These differences, however, do not detract from the group’s 
ownership claims. Firstly, it seems that lasting claims of ownership can originate in non-
voluntary associations (Pevnick 35). After all, forced labour is still labour; we can imagine a 
case where political theorists are kidnapped and forced into recording a series of captivatingly 
original lectures, yet nevertheless have a right to the profits that result from the sale of the 
lectures, along with future rights to and control over the material (ibid). The fact that they 
were coerced into producing it does not mean that they do not own it. Secondly, collectively 
owned goods or institutions plausibly can be passed down to future generations, who obtain 
the rights to make decisions about them at a particular stage in time. For example, suppose 
that John’s family has a claim of ownership over a farm, and have the right to make decisions 
regarding its future – including “decisions about who will make such decisions in the future” 
(ibid). Once control of the farm has shifted to John, we would hardly hesitate to say that he 
has now the right to make such choices (Pevnick 38). If we accept these claims, it seems that 
the idea of associative ownership can be straightforwardly extended to states. 
 
3. Moral equality: a serious obstacle? 
 
While the right to exclude has been challenged on numerous grounds, I am most interested in 
a particular category of argument. It has been suggested that the most basic ethical question 
for theorists of immigration is whether or not it is consistent with our commitment to the 
equal moral worth of persons to restrict immigration at all (Blake 2003, 224). As Pevnick 
writes, “justice requires that all are treated as possessing an equal moral status”, and 
“recognizing this places bounds on the sovereignty of states” (21). In other words, the moral 
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equality of non-citizens may place serious limits on how states treat them. Thus, this question 
may be asked: does the right to exclude violate the demands that the moral equality of non-
citizens places on states? In order to answer this question, we first need to ascertain what the 
demands of moral equality are, and whether or not the right to exclude meets those demands. 
In this section, I will sketch out one influential interpretation of the demands of equality: that 
it imposes a duty on states not to treat non-citizens unequally for arbitrary reasons.  
 
a. The requirements of moral equality 
 
Following Stephen Darwall’s influential view, we can understand that the moral equality of 
persons demands that we show each person recognition respect, where “some fact or feature is an 
appropriate object of respect if inappropriate consideration or weighing of that fact of feature 
would result in behaviour that is morally wrong”, qua the fact or feature itself (40). Read this 
way, having recognition respect for someone qua their humanity is to “give appropriate weight 
to the fact that he or she is a person by being willing to constrain one’s behaviour in ways 
required by that fact” (Darwall 45). This means that “various ways of regarding and behaving 
towards others, as well as social arrangements that encourage those ways, are inconsistent 
with the respect to which they are entitled” (Darwall 36). In line with Darwall’s terminology, 
throughout my thesis, I will refer to actions that are prohibited by the principle of moral 
equality as instances of moral disrespect, or violations of equal respect.   
 
But which features of persons are appropriate objects of respect, and how do we act in ways 
that are consistent with those features? For Rawls, the answer lies in our possession of what he 
calls the two moral powers: the capacity for a sense of justice, and for a conception of the 
good. Firstly, we can rely on each other to understand and act in accordance with principles 
of justice (Rawls 1999, 125). Secondly, we are able “to form, to revise, and to pursue a 
conception of the good, and to deliberate in accordance with it” (Rawls 1993, 72). Individuals 
are therefore understood as self-authenticating sources of value who are able to give value to 
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plans and allegiances through freely exercising their moral abilities (Blake 2001, 271). 
Furthermore, while persons “each have, and view themselves, as having fundamental aims 
and interests in the name of which they think it legitimate to make claims on each other” 
(Rawls 1999, 475), they also have a “highest-order interest” in developing and exercising their 
moral powers, and securing the conditions under which they can further their determinate 
conceptions of the good, whatever they may be (Rawls 1993, 105-6). In short, as “equal moral 
persons”, we have valuable interests that stem from our individual conceptions of the good, 
coupled with a highest-order interest in cultivating and exercising our moral capacities, and our 
treatment of others must be constrained in recognition of these. As Rawls writes, “[m]utual 
respect is shown in several ways: in our willingness to see the situation of others from their 
point of view, from the perspective of their conception of their good; and in our being 
prepared to give reasons for our actions whenever the interests of others are materially 
affected” (Rawls 1999, 297). When circumstances call for it, we must address reasons to those 
concerned, “in good faith…that they are sound reasons as defined by a mutually acceptable 
conception of justice which takes the good of everyone into account” (ibid).  
 
Similarly, according to Ronald Dworkin, those in power must treat others as they treat 
themselves, but not in the sense of providing for them only the same bundle of goods and 
opportunities they take themselves, as “a masochistic tyrant could justly torture everyone 
along with himself” (357). Instead, we must attempt, as far as it is possible, to see the situation 
of each person defined through their ambitions and values, just as we must see our own 
situation defined through our own ambitions and values, in order to function as self-conscious 
beings with personal identities (ibid). So a further dimension of equal respect is that persons 
should not be treated merely as persons (Sangiovanni 52); we must engage with all persons as 
“beings with particular plans, commitments, aims, relations, and achievements that we want, 
for example, to promote, pursue, or reward” (Sangiovanni 53). Overall, very roughly, it seems 
that our treatment of persons must be justified by reasons that adequately take their unique standpoint 
into account. In Rawls’s words, respecting another as a moral person is “to try to understand his 
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aims and interests from his standpoint and to present him with considerations that enable him 
to accept the constraints on his conduct” (1999, 338).  
 
What, then, does this mean for the state? In order to demonstrate equal recognition-respect 
for each person who is subject to its power, Rawls believes that the exercise of political power 
must be constrained. Chiefly, it is “justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a 
constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the 
light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as rational and reasonable” (1993, 217). To 
sum up Rawls’s view, our moral powers endow us with valuable interests, goals, and values 
relating to our individual conceptions of the good, and a highest-order interest in cultivating 
and exercising those capacities. Thus, at least one important requirement of respect is to 
ensure that, when political power is exercised on persons, it must be justified by reasons that 
adequately address or engage with their good. This point is echoed by Carens, who suggests 
that “[i]t is never enough to justify a set of social arrangements governing human beings to say 
that these arrangements are good for us, without regard for [other persons]… We have to 
appeal to principles and arguments that take everyone’s interests into account or that explain 
why the social arrangements are reasonable and fair to everyone who is subject to them” 
(2013, 227). In short, states must justify the power they exert on people with reference to their 
good.   
 
b. Moral arbitrariness 
 
i. What is moral arbitrariness? 
 
Before I proceed to reconstruct the Argument from Social Contingency, it is important to get 
a firm grip on the concept of “moral arbitrariness”, which can be extremely slippery. The 
term, which often crops in the philosophical literature, seems to owe its inception to Rawls. As 
a starting point, Rawls’s concern for the justification of coercive power leads him to conclude 
	   33 
that states ought not to make arbitrary distinctions between persons; “conceptions of right 
have a certain content and exclude arbitrary and pointless principles” (1999, 130), whether 
they are morally arbitrary distinctions made between persons in the assignment of basic rights 
and duties, or allowing distributive shares to be improperly influenced by morally arbitrary 
factors. Here, arbitrary actions or principles seem to be instances of unequal treatment that 
are not justified by reasons of a particular sort. To be sure, we ought to differentiate between 
explanatory reasons and normative reasons. A racist tyrant can explain why he only accords basic 
rights to white people, but not to people of other races. His actions are explained by the fact 
that he believes that the white race is superior. But normative reasons do something more 
than mere explanation; they make it right to act in a particular way. Recall that our equal 
moral worth, as I have earlier explained, demands that the state treats us in accordance with 
reasons that take our unique good into account. Rawls contends that states must act on 
reasons that are the right ones insofar as they take the standpoint of each person subject to 
their coercive power into account. In contrast, principles or actions, like the racist tyrant’s, are 
arbitrary because they do not track the good of persons; by refusing to give his non-white 
subjects equal rights, he disregards and fails to recognise their good.  
 
According to Chris Armstrong, arguments from arbitrariness can take two distinct forms: the 
“no prior claim” and “anti-influence” objections (326). For the “anti-influence” variant, 
labelling a factor or consideration arbitrary is akin to “saying that we should object to (and 
hence either mitigate or neutralize) any influence it might have on specified distributive 
outcomes” (Armstrong 326). Firstly, what does it mean for the influence of a factor or 
consideration to be “objectionable”? According to Cara Nine, though Rawls’s use of the term 
“arbitrary” is rather vague, it nevertheless captures the common intuition that we want to 
make important decisions according to the right criteria (261). She suggests that we can 
understand the claim of moral arbitrariness as indicating that we have “wandered off the 
track” by making a decision that is grounded in impermissible considerations (Nine 262). Of 
course, it is not only decisions that can be morally arbitrary, but also results. To extrapolate from 
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Nine’s account, it seems that a result – like a particular distributive outcome, for example – is 
morally arbitrary when it is influenced by impermissible factors. Importantly, morally arbitrary 
decisions and morally arbitrary results seem to be conceptually distinct. A non-arbitrary 
decision can still give rise to arbitrary results. For example, it does not seem morally 
impermissible for states to allocate prestigious positions according to merit; merit does not, in 
itself, count as an improper or impermissible factor. Yet the result of such allocations may 
nevertheless end up morally arbitrary because a past history of racial injustice has led to black 
people being systematically barred from accessing the educational opportunities that would 
give them enough “merit” to qualify for those positions, and the state does not take steps to 
mitigate such injustice. In this case, the allocation of prestigious positions would certainly 
“wander off the track”, as the end-result (the curious absence of black people) is clearly 
influenced by race as a factor.  
 
As we can see, the claim of “anti-influence” moral arbitrariness leaves open the question of 
what the impermissible or permissible factors that influence a decision or determine an end-
result are, and these will need to be filled in by separate arguments that specify the content of 
the claim in its context.  So what qualifies as an objectionable or impermissible factor, 
according to Rawls? Consider his statement that, under just principles of distribution, “factors 
so arbitrary from a moral point of view” such as “social circumstances and such chance 
contingencies as accident and good fortune” ought not to improperly influence people’s 
distributive shares (Rawls 1999, 62-3). This can be restated as the claim that “social 
circumstances and chance contingencies” – those situations that are a matter of sheer luck or 
chance – are impermissible criteria for why one person ought to be worse off than another. It 
is not difficult to understand why Rawls believes this. As Zofia Stemplowska writes, “[L]uck’s 
victims are not chosen because they ought to be affected; luck strikes with no purpose” (390). 
In contrast, we normally also believe that equal respect does not require the elimination of 
chosen or avoidable disadvantages that are of people’s own making (ibid). Suppose that 
Angela and Ben start out with equal degrees of advantage. In his prime, Ben is suddenly 
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struck down by a debilitating genetic illness, and becomes penniless due to the escalating 
medical fees. But there is no sense in which Ben deserves to have less than Angela, as he had no 
control over the onset of his disease. As we can see, the force of luck is thoroughly insensitive to 
the unique situation of each person, and allowing inequality on the basis of luck would count 
as a failure to track the good of persons.   
 
Finally, according to “anti-influence” arbitrariness, the morally appropriate response to 
inequalities that are influenced by impermissible factors is to mitigate or neutralize them. The 
difference between “mitigation” and “neutralization” should also be spelt out. It is sometimes 
said that we should try to temper the influence of arbitrary features on distributions. For 
example, Rawls states that the “influence of social contingencies and natural fortune on 
distributive shares” must be mitigated (Rawls 1999, 63).  However, it is also suggested in other 
contexts that impermissible influences must be eliminated as far as possible, in order to track the 
good. For instance, Rawls notes that, while fleshing out the principles of justice, agreements 
must be made in a “state of affairs in which the parties are equally represented as moral 
persons and the outcome is not conditioned by arbitrary contingencies or the relative balance 
of social forces” (1999, 104). Thus, in order to yield just agreements, the principles of justice 
must be decided on behind the “veil of ignorance”, where the participants are thoroughly 
ignorant of contingent facts about themselves like their place in society, class position or social 
status, or even their “fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, 
strength, and the like” (Rawls 1999, 11), so that these factors cannot influence their 
deliberations. In Rawls’ words, “[T]he parties must be fairly situated and treated equally as 
moral persons. The arbitrariness of the world must be corrected for by adjusting the 
circumstances of the initial contractual situation” (Rawls 1999, 122).  
 
In contrast to “anti-influence” arbitrariness, a factor or consideration need not be impermissible, 
strictly speaking, under “no prior claim” arbitrariness. “No prior claim” arbitrariness simply 
states that “a characteristic of a person will be designated as morally arbitrary for certain named 
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purposes when it is the case that possession of that characteristic does not by itself generate a 
claim to a specified form of social advantage, or indeed a justification of a specified form of 
disadvantage” (Armstrong 325). Take, for example, Rawls’s views on talent. Rawls accepts 
that talent may legitimately contribute to one’s achieving a desired social position, but the 
final distribution of social positions is governed by the Difference Principle, which dictates that 
unequal rewards are only acceptable if their bestowal contributes to equality of advances the 
interests of the worst-off (ibid). In practice, those with great talent may or may not accrue 
greater material benefits; it depends on whether or not the position of the worst-off is 
advanced (ibid). Thus, to call talent arbitrary in this context is simply to say that talent, in 
itself, does not entitle you to a prior claim on better or worse treatment, not that it should 
never influence one’s social position (ibid); it certainly can if the influence of talent does help to 
advance overall equality and hence “track the good of persons”.  
 
This is what Rawls seems to think. As he writes, “the greater expectations allowed to 
entrepreneurs encourages them to do things which raise the prospects of the labouring class. 
Their better prospects act as incentives so that the economic process is more efficient, 
innovation proceeds at a faster pace, and so on” (Rawls 1999, 68). Or, to use another 
example, assume that the existing distributive scheme favours people of a particular race. The 
anti-influence view might dictate that one’s race ought not to influence their distributive 
shares. However, the “no prior claim” view, if applied to race, need not be committed to this 
principle. Hypothetically speaking, much like how talent might be to the advantage of the 
worst-off, if such racial favouring would be to the advantage of other races, and hence 
acceptable from their point of view, there need not be any objections to the influence of race 
on life-prospects.  
 
Overall, the “anti-influence” objection from arbitrariness suggests that it would be 
impermissible for a distribution to be influenced at all by a particular fact or feature, and that 
such influence should be mitigated or neutralized accordingly (ibid). In contrast, “no prior 
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claim” arbitrariness suggests that a fact or feature provides no claim to greater or lesser 
rewards from the perspective of a specified form of distribution, but may lead to them under 
the operation of other principles of justice (Armstrong 327). In the next section, we will see 
how exactly the objection of arbitrariness is used against the right to exclude. 
 
4. The Argument from Social Contingency 
 
By this point in the chapter, I have summarized three possible accounts of the state’s right to 
exclude non-citizens. I have also shown how the moral equality of persons creates the state’s 
duty not to treat people unequally for arbitrary reasons. In this section, I sketch out the claim 
that the right to exclude is wrongful because it does just that. I will assume, here, that non-
citizens who wish to enter the state’s territory are already subjected to its power to varying 
degrees. Although prospective immigrants are not yet enmeshed in the set of civil and 
criminal laws maintained by the state, they have “voluntarily come to a border, whether 
literally or through the legal act of application, and have agreed to have the legal machinery 
of the state determine their application for membership” (Blake 2008, 968). This 
determination is coercive because “borders have guards and the guards have guns” (Carens 
1987, 251), and would-be immigrants subject themselves to the power of those guards by 
accepting the state’s legitimate authority to determine the result of their claims (ibid).  
              
So, how exactly does their exclusion from entry subject non-citizens to arbitrary unequal 
treatment? According to one group of philosophers, which include Carens and Cole, we 
should look to the tremendous inequality in opportunities that obtain between citizens of 
wealthy and poor countries. As I have already hinted in the Introduction, it is no surprise that 
there are significant disparities of opportunity between citizens of different states; the “general 
well-being, quality of services, safety, and scope of freedoms and opportunities” available to 
those in affluent polities are far greater than the opportunities of those born in poor countries 
(Shachar 26). Under these conditions, it is maintained that opening borders to these non-
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citizens would help to promote the global spread of equal opportunity by enabling large 
numbers of people to travel from the poor world to the rich, to make use of the opportunities 
there (Seglow 327). In other words, poorer non-citizens could be able to equalize their 
opportunities by accessing those available within wealthy states. Excluding non-citizens, on the 
other hand, would consign them to significantly fewer opportunities in their homelands.  
                         
But why should global opportunities be equalized in this way? In line with anti-influence 
arbitrariness, these philosophers point to the fact that citizenship is a morally arbitrary feature 
that ought not to play a role in determining one’s life-prospects. Following Rawls, they 
presume that inequalities of life-prospects that arise from “social starting positions, natural 
advantages, and historical contingencies” must be justly regulated (Rawls 1993, 271). Note 
that it is possible to claim that citizenship is arbitrary in the “no prior claim” sense. On this 
view, there would be nothing inherently wrong with the influence of citizenship on 
distributions of opportunity; indeed, we might still embrace them if they enhance the position 
of the globally worst-off (Armstrong 330). However, to make their case against the right to 
exclude, Carens and Cole do not go down this path. Instead, they suggest that one’s place of 
citizenship should be viewed as “such a contingency” (Cole 2012, 123), and the inequalities in 
opportunity that arise from it ought to be mitigated; as Carens states, “Freedom of movement 
would contribute to a reduction of existing political, social, and economic inequalities” (2013, 
228). Call this the Argument from Social Contingency. Overall, the exclusion of poorer non-
citizens amounts to arbitrary unequal treatment on the part of wealthy states, because it 
excludes them from accessing opportunities equal to those of citizens, and allows their life-
prospects to remain profoundly affected by a morally arbitrary feature.   
                                                                                     
We need a separate explanation, then, for why we should see citizenship as a contingent 
feature. Again, there are two different ways of understanding “contingency”. We may say that 
something is contingent because it is unchosen and subject to chance – for example, we may say 
that my hair colour is contingent. Citizenship may be interpreted in this way. As Cole writes, 
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it is essentially unchosen, as we exert no control over where we are born or who our parents 
are (Cole 2000, 151). Similarly, Carens relies on an analogy between feudalism and 
citizenship. Under feudalism, opportunities were shaped by sheer luck; they largely depended 
on which class you happened to be born into. Yet, as Carens powerfully asserts, “Citizenship 
in the modern world is a lot like feudal status in the medieval world. It is assigned at birth; for 
the most part it is not subject to change by the individual’s will and efforts; and it has a major 
impact upon that person’s life chances” (1987, 26), as the range of available opportunities 
differs so greatly between states (2013, 228). If we agree that it is wrong for class to shape an 
individual’s opportunities because it is unchosen, citizenship ought not to shape an individual’s 
opportunities for the same reason.       
                         
On the other hand, there is also a closely related, but conceptually different sense of 
contingency; we may say that something is contingent when it is conditional on other factors. 
My job prospects, for example, are contingent on whether or not I successfully obtain my 
doctorate. This seems to be a purely descriptive claim. However, sometimes the claim of 
conditionality is meant to undermine the value or importance of a state of affairs. Specifically, it 
does so when it is conditional on illegitimate factors. Suppose that Carol says sadly to David, 
“Your love for me is only contingent – you wouldn’t love me if I didn’t have so much money”. 
Here, Carol is not necessarily saying that David’s love for her cannot be conditional on 
anything. She may accept that David only loves her because he believes she is the most 
beautiful person in the world, or because he adores her sparkling wit and intelligence. So 
Carol’s statement is not meant to point out the conditionality of David’s love; rather, the claim is 
that his love for her is dependent on the wrong reasons – her wealth, which ultimately cheapens 
his love. Likewise, the claim that citizenship is contingent may refer to the fact that the 
citizenship of persons is the result of illegitimate factors that serve to detract from its 
normative significance.                                                        
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As an example of such an argument, consider Cole’s comments on the placement of national 
boundaries. The location of borders is important for the present discussion because our 
relationship with the territorial space contained within the borders plays some role in 
determining membership (Cole 2014, 507). It is not just which side of the border I am born 
that matters, but where the border itself is. Cole claims that even if borders fall where they are 
through intention and planning, they could be different from the way they are, and there is no 
good or “natural” reason why they must be this way (ibid). They are a matter of historical 
contingency, rather than fixed by a practice that is “ethical or rational” (Cole 2014, 507). As 
an example of this, Cole cites how nation-state borders were fixed in Africa by the colonial 
powers: Lord Salisbury, the British Prime Minister, commented on how “we have been 
engaged in drawing lines upon maps where no white man’s foot ever trod; we have been 
giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, only hindered by the small 
impediment that we never knew exactly where the mountains  and rivers and lakes were” 
(2014, 518). While Cole is rather vague about what “ethical or rational” means, I take him to 
refer to how borders are often fixed by historical injustice like war or colonialism, and do not 
track the good of persons. The fact that borders have unjust or unsavoury origins undermines 
their normative significance, and gives us no reason to endorse the inequalities that rise from 
them. Of course, while this cannot be said of all borders, it is sufficient for Cole’s claim that a 
large number of them are. Thus, the claim that citizenship is contingent translates into the 
claim that it depends on factors that detract from its legitimacy in justifying unequal 
treatment.           
                              
In closing, I will summarize the above claims. It is asserted that citizenship is morally 
arbitrary, and an impermissible influence on one’s life-prospects because it is socially 
contingent.  This is because the citizenship that one is allocated can both be said to be 
unchosen, and the result of illegitimate factors. Therefore, in blocking poorer non-citizens from 
accessing the same opportunities as citizens of wealthy countries, the right to exclude subjects 
them to arbitrary unequal treatment. 
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5. Criticisms of the Argument from Social Contingency     
                          
To recap, I have presented three possible accounts of the right to exclude: it can either be 
grounded in states’ rights to preserve a particular public culture, citizens’ rights to the freedom 
of association, and their right to joint ownership of state institutions. While I do not claim to 
endorse any of these arguments, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide my own 
critique of them. My goal, rather, is to evaluate the success of one strategy – the Argument 
from Social Contingency – in responding to them. I will now show that the Argument from 
Social Contingency fails to overturn all three of these strategies, because the claim of 
“arbitrariness” is overly ambiguous.               
                     
Recall how the Argument from Social Contingency relies on the claim that citizenship is a 
morally arbitrary feature and ought not to influence citizens’ life-prospects. As I have noted, 
to say that citizenship is a morally arbitrary feature, in this context, is simply to say that it 
exerts an improper or impermissible influence on people’s life-prospects. However, the fact 
that a particular feature is the result of luck, or historically unjust factors, does not seem in 
itself to provide an argument against the three bases of the right to exclude that I have 
discussed. After all, the point of each argument is to show that citizenship is not an improper 
consideration, because it designates a special political relationship between citizens, even if 
they may disagree over what makes the relationship special.    
                                                    
It seems, then, that the claim of arbitrariness is used to “signal the conclusion of the argument 
as opposed to its premise (Miller 2005a, 68). As I have already suggested in the previous 
section, arbitrariness is not in itself an argument against the right to exclude; it will have to be 
shown why it is inappropriate for citizenship to shape one’s life-prospects. And whether or not 
citizenship is truly “arbitrary” will depend on how the consideration of social contingency 
squares up against the others I have mentioned – such as how citizenship reflects a relation 
between a group of people with a shared culture, or who have chosen to associate with one 
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another, or who jointly control the ownership of their shared institutions.. But this presents a 
very odd picture for two reasons, which I will now elaborate on.     
                                        
a. Social contingency and special relationships        
                     
Firstly, the charge of social contingency does not adequately respond to those who justify 
unequal treatment through the existence of special relationships, because it does not offer a 
strong argument against their normative significance, and the claims against non-citizens that 
emanate from this significance. For example, relationships between family members often give 
rise to various forms of unequal treatment. In the first sense of “contingency”, I do not choose 
who my family members are. In the second sense, we might be reminded that the existing 
nuclear family structure is socially contingent on changing economic structures. However, the 
moral force of the relationship is not called into doubt by the fact that I “just happen” to be 
someone’s daughter or sister. The nature of the special relationship means that it is insensitive to 
how the relationship came about. It doesn’t matter how we got there; what matters is how we 
are currently enmeshed in it. So what, it may be said, that the public culture shared by 
citizens is socially contingent? After all, it is our culture, and we are deeply attached to it. Even 
if it is a matter of chance that we have decided to associate with each other, and each other 
alone, isn’t it enough that we have made the decision? And couldn’t we still have collective 
property rights over our shared institutions even if it was through various contingencies that 
we were born into this particular state, and tasked to take care of them? Social contingency in 
itself simply does not seem to constitute an argument against the special relationships that are 
meant to ground the right to exclude.                    
                                               
One other possible move is to completely deny the validity of special relationships. 
Importantly, this argument no longer draws on social contingency. It simply states that special 
relationships, contingent or non-contingent, cannot justify unequal treatment. However, this 
perspective seems  implausible. To understand why, we should contrast ethical particularism with 
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ethical universalism. According to ethical universalism, as Bernard Williams succinctly writes, the 
moral point of view is “specially characterized by its impartiality and its indifference to 
particular relations to particular persons” (198). Furthermore, it requires that we abstract 
away from particular circumstances and characteristics of the parties involved, including the 
agent’s own, unless these count as universal features of any morally similar situation (ibid). For 
example, a universal principle like “Relieve the needy” might mean that in working out what 
I ought to do for Tom, the relevant facts are only that he is in need and that I have the 
capacity to allay his need; on the other hand, relational facts about Tom and the relationship 
we already stand in, like how he is my brother or my neighbour, cannot play a role in 
determining my duty to him (Miller 1995, 50). Importantly, the ethical universalist need not 
deny that relational facts can ever play a role; it may turn out that the fundamental moral 
principles can justify acting on the basis of relational facts. For example, we might say it is 
most efficient for people’s needs to be satisfied by those in close relationships with them. 
Nevertheless, even on this picture, ethical universalists will not accept “Tom’s my brother” or 
“she’s my wife” as basic reasons for action (ibid); they must be robustly supported by some 
reference to universal principles.  
 
I agree with ethical particularists, however, that the universalist perspective is deeply 
unappealing. Even if universal principles can justify the use of relational facts in particular 
instances, we may still believe that they require us to have “one thought too many” (Williams 
214). For example, in deciding to allay Tom’s need (as opposed to the hordes of other people 
to whom the same general facts apply), we might insist that my motivating thought should be 
“Tom is my brother”, not “in situations of this kind, it is permissible to prioritise Tom over 
others”. Therefore, in contrast to ethical univeralists, ethical particularists hold that relations 
between agents are “part of the basic subject-matter of ethics, so that fundamental principles 
may be attached directly to these relations” (Miller 1995, 50). Instead of abstracting away 
from particular circumstances and characteristics, we begin our ethical reasoning from the 
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commitments we have to particular agents, or to groups and collectivities (ibid). Our special 
commitments are not distractions from the moral point of view, but properly constitutive of it. 
While I cannot do justice to the nuances of the debate in this section, the difference between 
universalists and particularists can be summed up thus: while universalists will see special 
relationships (and the special obligations that flow from them) as agents allowing their moral 
decisions to be clouded by improper considerations, particularists view these special 
obligations as central to the fabric of moral life.  
 
Yet, in prioritizing our special relationships, don’t we fail to show equal respect for the moral 
status of those treated unequally? Not necessarily, even when the stakes are high.  
Particularism, as I have defined it, can be compatible with the equal moral worth of persons. 
The prioritisation of those we share special relationships with does not mean that I see the lives 
of others as less worthwhile than theirs. It is the relationship and the special demands it makes of 
us that motivates our decision, not the perception that some people’s lives are more valuable 
than others. If I can only save one person, I do not show disrespect for the lives I fail to save, 
or treat their lives as less valuable, when I reach out and grab my brother. As Richard Miller 
observes, grave self-sacrifice is not believed to be required of us, even if it brings about 
tremendous good (209). For example, I am not expected to break my bones in order to 
cushion the fall of a person who is plummeting headfirst out of a tenth-story window (ibid). 
Likewise, expecting me to disregard my special commitments, even in cases where I would 
benefit others greatly, would seem to impose an undue burden on me. It would be an 
admirable choice, were I to allow the death of my brother to save ten others, but I do not 
think it would be strictly required of me. In the same sense, it might be morally commendable if 
we gave up our interest in preserving our shared culture, maintaining our freedom of 
association, or our control over our shared institutions, if it meant that non-citizens could 
access valuable opportunities they would otherwise have been blocked from. They would 
finally be able to find jobs that are satisfyingly well-paid, or allow them to meet their full 
potential. Or they might finally be able to associate with people of similar political or religious 
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leanings, who do not exist in their home countries. Yet, according to one version of the 
particularist view, it is not morally required of us to do so. 
 
Three objections can be made to the view that citizenship is a non-arbitrary special 
relationship that justifies the unequal treatment of non-citizens. One is that citizenship should 
be treated as morally arbitrary because it no longer describes a significant form of relationship 
between persons. This is because “relationships across the globe” are now taking precedence 
over relationships within states, as people are increasingly embroiled in political or economic 
interactions that are global in scope (Miller 2005a, 69). Another is that the demands of special 
relationships, in some instances, are outweighed or overruled by the weightier claims of non-
citizens. The interests of non-citizens may ultimately outweigh the demands that our special 
relationships place on us. Suppose that I have a duty to attend my mother’s birthday party, 
and that I would be unable to do so if I pause to save you from drowning (assuming that I 
have the ability). In this case, the demands of my relationship with my mother seem trivial in 
comparison to my duty to save you, and it may be true that the preservation of a shared 
culture amongst citizens may turn out to have less moral weight than non-citizens’ interest in 
expanding their economic opportunities. The third is that, even if the relationship between 
citizens remains special, some, or all prospective migrants do already stand in relationships 
with the state that would also place limits on the state’s right to exclude them. All three 
arguments seem plausible to me. While I cannot consider all of them fully, it is the third, in 
particular, that I will expand on in the next chapter. It is enough to note, for the time being, 
that they are independent of the Argument from Social Contingency. As matters stand, it is 
insufficient to argue that states cannot exclude non-citizens on the basis of their citizenship 
because it is a social contingency. 
 
b. The incompleteness of social contingency 
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The second issue with the Argument from Social Contingency is that persons do not 
necessarily have to respond to exclusion with the objection that it condemns them to unequal 
opportunities on the basis of socially contingent features. Consider one controversial case of 
exclusion I have already mentioned: that of gay people from the Boy Scouts. Would the gay 
people who wish to join the Boy Scouts challenge their exclusion on the basis that it forces 
them to suffer fewer opportunities because of a socially contingent feature? The idea of 
equality of opportunity for all persons regardless of their sexual orientation was certainly 
broached in the American Civil Liberties Union brief for Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, when 
James Dale, a long-time member, was expelled from the Boy Scouts after revealing he was 
gay: “At a minimum, there can be no doubt that lesbians and gay men have historically been 
denied equal opportunity to participate in American life” (ACLU 1999). Yet, does their claim 
to equal opportunity depend on sexual orientation being a socially contingent feature? Even if a 
prospective Boy Scout has chosen to be gay, it does not seem to make his exclusion from the 
group any more permissible. Indeed, the brief goes on to say that “[the United States has] a 
long, sad history of judging people not by what they are capable of doing, but by such 
extraneous things as race, religion, national origin, sex, disability, and sexual 
orientation…Civil rights laws are enacted to bring our nation closer to a society that does not 
function on the basis of group stereotype” (ibid). The focus here is not on how sexual 
orientation is contingent, but on how the Boy Scouts excludes gay people on the basis of 
hateful stereotypes. Similarly, in objecting against the Boy Scouts’ ban on openly gay scout 
leaders, the American Civil Liberties Union stated that “the hesitation [to allow gay leaders] 
also perpetuated the historic and homophobic perception of gay adults as promiscuous 
individuals with nefarious intentions” (ACLU 2015). In other words, the exclusion of gay 
leaders is wrong because it perpetuates demeaning stereotypes about gay people.   
 
The claim that a mode of exclusion is demeaning in this way, I believe, can be formulated 
into a plausible alternative to the argument from social contingency. Consider a person who is 
excluded from a golf club on the basis of race. As a starting point, we could say that racism is 
	   47 
disrespectful due to its denial of equal citizenship on morally arbitrary grounds (Shelby 2004, 
1709).  Here, we may use Kwame Anthony Appiah’s framework, which defines racism as the 
belief that race is a morally relevant distinction and hence a “legitimate basis for treating 
people differently” (Shelby 2015, 338). We may distinguish between “extrinsic” and 
“intrinsic” racism. Extrinsic racists, on one hand, make moral distinctions between races 
because they believe that racial essences entail, imply, or causally determine morally relevant 
properties that lead to differences between members of particular races. In turn, those affect 
one’s moral duties to members of other races to license differential or negative treatment 
(Ikuenobe 164). Such properties may include, for example, character traits and tendencies like 
honesty, laziness, or intelligence (Shelby 2015, 339). On the other hand, intrinsic racists 
morally differentiate between members of different races simply because of the belief that 
“each race is intrinsically morally significant or that each race has a quality or a status that is 
morally significant to the race”, but this intrinsic moral quality is independent of any moral 
characteristics that may be implied or entailed by the racial essence of the specific race (ibid). 
Regardless of this difference, it seems that what racists essentially have in common, on 
Appiah’s view, is that they believe that race is a proper criterion for unequal treatment, when it is in 
fact an impermissible one.  
 
Significantly, Appiah’s view leaves out the explanation for why it is impermissible to use race 
as a criterion for unequal treatment. In line with the Argument from Social Contingency, we 
may say that it is impermissible because race is socially contingent. This has significant 
consequences for what a non-racist society would look like. As the opposite of racism will be 
the recognition that race should never justify unequal treatment, because it is socially 
contingent, it leads to the endorsement of colour-blindness, which holds that “race should never 
be a consideration in determining how government institutions treat persons regardless of the 
purpose or rationale behind such race-conscious measures” (Shelby 2015, 342). Yet it seems 
that there is a serious problem with the picture I have sketched so far. It is not always 
wrongful to use race as a consideration to justify unequal treatment. For example, differential 
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treatment based on race might sometimes be justified if the goal is to increase racial diversity 
or integration in public schools, against advocates of colour-blindness (Shelby 2015, 344). 
Race might also be highly relevant to some policies insofar as it is an accurate proxy of 
particular forms of historical disadvantage, given legacies of colonialism and slavery. The use 
of race does not seem impermissible in these cases even if it is no less socially contingent.1 If 
this is true, it cannot be the case that race is an improper criterion or consideration simply 
because it is socially contingent.  
 
A possible guideline, for whether race may permissibly be used as a criterion for unequal 
treatment, is to ask whether or not doing so will stigmatize people of that race. I will now 
examine the idea of stigmatisation in greater detail. According to Erving Goffman, “[S]ociety 
establishes the means of categorizing persons and the complement of attributes felt to be 
ordinary and natural for members of each of these categories” (11). When we encounter 
strangers, we assign a virtual social identity to them by anticipating the categories they belong to 
and the attributes they have. Put differently, virtual social identity involves making certain 
assumptions about “what the individual before us ought to be”. However, virtual identity and 
actual identity can diverge systematically in a given individual’s social experience (Loury 60). 
While virtual identity is constructed “from the outside”, through social imputations based on a 
person’s physical presentation, and actual identity is constructed “from the inside”, through 
the accumulation of facts that are specific to a person’s life-history that are more or less 
independent of conventional ascriptions (Loury 60). As Goffman continues, 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The description of race as a morally arbitrary feature makes sense, I think, in the realm of ideal theory. 
For example, Rawls believes that race should be excluded from the deliberative process of establishing 
a theory of justice, because it is an “aspect of the social world” that seems arbitrary from a moral point 
of view (1999, 14). However, as this is on the idealizing assumption that there has been no previous 
history of systemic racial disadvantage, and it is not clear how useful this view of race is when applied to 
non-ideal discussions of race and racism. As Charles Mills put it, “A model predicated on the (past or 
present) universal inclusion of colorless atomic individuals will therefore get things fundamentally 
wrong from the start. Races in relations from domination and subordination centrally constitute the 
social ontology” (1388). I am grateful to Chong Ming Lim for this point. 
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When a stranger is present before us, evidence can arise of his possessing an attribute that 
makes him different from others in the category of persons available for him to be, and of 
a less desirable kind – in the extreme, a person who is quite thoroughly bad, or 
dangerous, or weak. He is thus reduced in our minds from a whole and usual person to a 
tainted, discounted one. Such an attribute is a stigma, especially when its discrediting 
effect is very extensive; sometimes it is also called a failing, a shortcoming, a handicap. It 
constitutes a special discrepancy between virtual and actual social identity. (12)  
 
In short, to stigmatize someone is to impute to them a virtual social identity that is 
disreputable or “spoiled”, and we can understand the stigmatized as people who “[carry] 
bodily marks (stigmata) that incline others to judge them negatively, but also people with less 
visible markings who live at constant risk of being ‘exposed’” (Loury 60). Drawing from 
Goffman’s insights, Glenn Loury proposes that we can understand racism as a form of stigma. 
In his words, “When the meanings connoted by race-symbols undermine an observing agent’s 
ability to see their bearer as a person possessing a common humanity with the observer – as 
‘someone not unlike the rest of us’ – then I will say that this person is ‘racially stigmatized’, 
and that the group to which he belongs suffers a ‘spoiled collective identity’” (67). If we accept 
Loury’s characterisation, the golf club racially stigmatizes the black golfer by expressing the 
belief that black persons are inferior to white persons, and ought not to be able to share the 
same amenities as them. Thus, it seems that the black applicant is treated unequally on the 
basis of an improper consideration because she is devalued or demeaned by it in that context, and 
not because it is a socially contingent feature. 
 
However, I want to make a further point. Saying that treatment is morally arbitrary when it is 
demeaning or stigmatizing seems to conflate two conceptually distinct objections to inequality. 
As I have explained earlier in this chapter, labelling an inequality between two persons as 
“morally arbitrary” amounts to the suggestion that improper considerations, which fail to 
track the good or interests of individuals (for certain specified reasons in the relevant context), 
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have been used to justify it.  In line with this, it seems that morally arbitrary inequalities 
violate the requirements of moral equality because they fail to adequately justify the treatment 
of persons through reasons that adequately engage with their good. The golf club treats the 
black golfer arbitrarily, because their decision is grounded in improper considerations (i.e. 
those that stigmatize or humiliate them), and they disrespect the black golfer because they fail 
to justify the power they exercise over her. Thus, if the black golfer complains that the golf 
club has treated her unequally, she is interpreted as asserting that the colour of a person’s skin, 
compared to another, is not a difference that can permissibly justify unequal treatment in this 
context.  
 
In response, Patrick Shin opines that this characterization offers an incomplete account of the 
content of objections to unequal treatment. This is because it “focuses on the failure of 
justification for the treatment in question, rather than on the way in which the treatment 
offends against the presumed equality of the two individuals” (Shin 7). In actuality, the 
objection of unequal treatment not only implies that the treatment in question is insufficiently 
justified, but that the treatment in question relies on an objectionable judgment about “how 
the differently treated individuals are related to each other” (ibid). The black person is not just 
making a claim about the kinds of considerations that can justify unequal treatment, as this 
implies that race fits in the same category as other impermissible considerations (e.g. height 
and eye colour), but that the golf club’s actions imply a morally objectionable judgment about the 
difference between blacks and whites (ibid) – they judge the former group morally inferior to the latter 
group. Thus, rather than pointing out the “justificatory insufficiency” of using race as a 
consideration, she is protesting against the “relational judgment of moral inferiority that 
acting on such considerations involves’ (Shin 8).  Like Shin, I think that the complaints of 
those who were excluded from Boy Scouts, or golf clubs, are more than just the assertion that 
improper criteria has been used to justify unequal treatment. Rather, they are objecting to 
how they have been subjected to treatment that expresses a belief in their inferior moral status.  
As a result, it is not clear that we need to frame demeaning treatment in terms of arbitrariness 
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at all; the fact that a form of exclusion is demeaning or stigmatizing can in itself pose an 
objection to it.  
 
To conclude this section, I have made two objections to the Argument from Social 
Contingency. To begin with, I noted that the social contingency of citizenship does not, in 
itself, overturn arguments that ground the right to exclude non-citizens in special relationships 
that hold exclusively between citizens. Secondly, I suggested that those who protest their 
exclusion from various associations do not need to appeal to the social contingency of the 
attribute that motivated the exclusion. Rather, they may simply point to the fact that 
exclusion, for them, is humiliating or stigmatizing. I also argued that we do not need to phrase 
this objection in terms of arbitrariness, as the essence of the objection is not that the association 
has used an improper criterion for exclusion, but that it has expressed disrespect for their equal 
moral status.  
 
6. Conclusion  
 
I have sought to show why the Argument from Social Contingency, in itself, does not defeat 
states’ right to exclude non-citizens. This is because theorists like Miller, Wellman, and 
Pevnick may respond that citizenship is not a morally arbitrary feature, given the fact of special 
relationships between citizens. As a result, the right to exclude is not incompatible with the 
moral equality of non-citizens. However, this does not mean that the concept of moral 
equality cannot continue to pose an obstacle to the right to exclude; we will simply have to use 
a different strategy. In the above discussion, I have summarily considered one promising 
alternative: the possibility that states’ right to exclude non-citizens may in some instances 
express a belief in their moral inferiority, compared to citizens. Of course, this raises some 
important questions. Firstly, why is it in violation of moral equality to express disrespect for 
the equal moral status of persons? Secondly, why is it wrong for states to do so vis-à-vis non-
citizens, and not only their own citizens? These will be the focus of Chapter Two. 
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In the previous chapter, I explored Philip Cole’s and Joseph Carens’s argument that the right 
to exclude violates moral equality because it subjects prospective immigrants to morally 
arbitrary treatment. It does so by refusing them admission, and thus allowing their life-
prospects to continue being heavily influenced by their place of citizenship, which is a socially 
contingent feature. The grounds of the violation, here, is that states have failed to adequately 
justify the unequal treatment of non-citizens. Against this, however, I argued that Cole’s and 
Carens’s reliance on the concept of social contingency ultimately undermines their argument. On 
one hand, it does not seem to defeat the existence of special relationships that hold between 
citizens, which are widely believed to justify the right to exclude. On the other, I also noted 
that protests against wrongful exclusion that have been advanced are often very different in 
substance by those made by Cole and Carens. Rather than pointing out that they are treated 
unequally on the basis of a socially contingent feature, excluded groups often protest that they 
have been demeaned or disrespected. 
 
Drawing from the idea that exclusion can be demeaning or disrespectful, I want to build the 
foundations for a related, yet different critique of the right to exclude. It is similar to Cole and 
Carens’s argument because it is also grounded in our commitment to the equal worth of all 
persons, and the belief that this commitment places serious limitations on the actions of states. 
However, the limitation I have in mind is also very different, because it is not primarily 
concerned with issues of arbitrariness. Specifically, I will argue that states have a duty to 
uphold the social equality of all persons subject to its power, which includes both territorially 
present and prospective immigrants. They must do so by refraining from creating or 
maintaining policies that express disrespect for their equal moral status, or foreseeably 
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threaten to worsen the social inequalities between immigrants and citizens. This duty stems 
from what I will call the comparative requirement of moral equality, which prohibits forms of 
treatment that express unequal respect for the equal moral status of particular groups. If we 
agree that the right to exclude must meet this standard, it is likely that the right to exclude is 
currently practiced objectionably, and this possibility will be the subject of the next four 
chapters of my thesis. 
 
My argument proceeds in these steps: in Section 2, I explain what social equality is. In Section 
3, I explain why moral equality requires social equality between persons. I show how moral 
equality gives rise to a comparative demand of equal treatment that places constraints on how 
states treat persons relative to other persons. This leads to a prohibition on actions that treat 
persons as if they are as if they are inferior to others, through the expression of beliefs in their 
inferiority, or through avoidably creating, or allowing for circumstances that will lead to 
unequal relationships between persons. In Section 4, I build the case for why the state must 
uphold social equality between citizens and immigrants. Next, in Section 5, I consider an 
objection to my claim. I conclude by noting how this argument will shape the remainder of 
my thesis. 
 
2. What is social equality? 
 
The Argument from Social Contingency, which I considered in the previous chapter, was 
mainly concerned with distributive inequalities of opportunity between citizens of richer and 
poorer countries. I now turn my attention to a very different kind of inequality; the idea of 
social, or status-inequalities between persons. Although the ideal of social equality is often 
believed to only apply between citizens, within the context of a bounded society (Miller 2005a, 
76). I contend that the state must also uphold social equality between citizens and immigrants, 
including prospective immigrants, as the rationale for upholding social equality between 
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citizens also seems to apply to these non-citizens. I begin my argument by first sketching out 
the concept of social equality. 
 
A number of prominent contemporary philosophers have insisted that the idea of equality is 
foremost about relationships between people (Fourie et al 1). They believe that, in appealing 
to the value of equality, we primarily mean the value of egalitarian and non-hierarchical 
relationships, which can be more or less egalitarian, or more or less hierarchical (ibid). In 
Carina Fourie’s words, “an opposition to ranking people according to hierarchies of social 
status appears to be the central tenet of social equality” (2012, 111). In other words, social 
egalitarians seek to minimise the existence of such hierarchies between persons in the same 
society, who must stand in relationships to each other that are “in certain crucial respects at 
least, unstructured by differences of rank, power, or status” (Scheffler 2012, 225). But what, 
exactly, is a status hierarchy? On this view, 
 
[a] status hierarchy occurs when a behaviour, social practice or policy expresses a 
particular kind of unequal relationship between a person or group of people, and others. 
More specifically, it is a relationship between inferiors and superiors. In this relationship, 
one person is deemed to be an inferior in relation to another person, who is either 
directly deemed to be a superior or who, by their virtue of their relationship to an inferior 
person, automatically becomes the superior. (Fourie 2012, 111) 
 
To make the definition of social inequality clearer, I will introduce some examples. Consider, 
for example, a man who insists that his wife defer to his judgment in major decisions and obey 
his commands, and threatens her with violence each time she remotely expresses 
disagreement with him. His behaviour undoubtedly expresses his belief that she is his inferior; 
he demands that she behave in a submissive and subservient manner towards him. Compare 
them to another hypothetical couple who makes major decisions by holding reasonable 
discussions with one another, and who deeply value each other’s opinions and seek to 
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compromise. Here, there appears to be no difference in status between the couple; neither of 
them participates in forms of behaviour that treats the other as their inferior. Alternatively, 
think about the Jim Crow era in the United States, which upheld status hierarchies through 
both social practices and policies. Black people were forced to abide by particular rules of 
etiquette. For example, black men were not supposed to shake hands with white men because 
it implied being of equal rank, and black people had to use courtesy titles when addressing 
whites, instead of calling them by their first names, while white people did not use courtesy 
titles when referring to them. These rules of etiquette went hand-in-hand with official Jim 
Crow laws, which excluded black people from public transport and facilities; they were not 
allowed to use the train carriages and bathrooms as white people. Again, these social practices 
and policies were intended to convey the inferior status of blacks to whites.  
 
Several clarifications about social equality should be made. Importantly, the fact that one 
person is treated as a superior, and the other as their inferior, does not necessarily mean that 
the former is treated very well, or that the inferior person is necessarily severely 
disadvantaged. As Fourie notes, “The point, when we refer to hierarchies of social status, is 
the nature of the relationship between social positions, not the absolute level of treatment (2012, 111, 
my emphasis). The main problem with social inequality is not that one party is treated badly, 
or that the other is privileged, but that they are not treated as equals (2012, 112). That said, a 
person’s absolute level of treatment could influence how they relate to others. It might be 
difficult for the financially destitute, for example, to afford the essential provisions they need 
(like clean clothes and basic toiletries) to not be snubbed or treated contemptuously by others 
in society. 
 
Furthermore, at least four main distinctions can be made between examples of social 
inequality. The two examples I have just discussed are very different, even if they are both 
examples of social inequality. One happens at the interpersonal level, and denotes a relationship 
between two individuals, while the other occurs at the greater societal level, and denotes a 
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relationship between two social groups. The two levels often exert a strong influence on each 
other. For example, a socially unequal interpersonal relationship may be significantly 
influenced by socially unequal relationships between men and women at large, rather than 
wholly the result of the man’s intentional behaviour. He may believe that he sees his female 
partner as his equal, but the relationship remains unequal because he accepts wider social 
norms that render women socially inferior (e.g. that he alone should reserve control over their 
finances). At the same time, social inequality at the societal level is often maintained by the 
individual behaviour of people at the interpersonal level; every white person who insisted that 
black people behave deferentially towards them, or allowed them to do so, contributed to 
keeping Jim Crow etiquette alive and well.  
 
As the above examples also show, while status hierarchies can be built into a society’s formal 
legal and political framework, they need not be legally coded or legally enforced (Fourie 2012, 
116). They are often also part of informal social structures, where particular norms and 
interactions are reproduced (ibid). In this way, socially unequal relationships can be “formal, 
codified and institutionalized”, or informally characterized by daily interactions; “they are 
often part of the social structure without necessarily being part of a society’s legal structure” 
(ibid). For more examples of legally coded or enforced status hierarchies, think of the system 
of racial classification in apartheid South Africa, or the caste system in India, or the inability 
of women to own property under Victorian-era laws in England. Informal status hierarchies, 
however, may include social practices like these: women in the present age being expected to 
retreat into the kitchen and clean up, while men hobnob with one another, or being expected 
to obtain permission from their husbands before making certain purchases. 
 
Thirdly, Fourie distinguishes between direct and indirect social inequalities. The former is an 
inequality of status that explicitly and unambiguously confers a higher status to some in 
comparison to others, and an example would be where certain individuals are expected to 
look down when they are spoken to, or speak only when they are spoken to (Fourie 2012, 
	   57 
114). In comparison, indirect social inequalities are differences or inequalities of non-social 
kinds that indicate or lead to social inequality, such as a social policy that “serves to humiliate 
or marginalise a particular group of people, and thus by implication to treat them as inferiors, 
without any necessary conscious intention on the part of those who developed and 
implemented the policy to confer inferior status on the group” (ibid). Attention to indirect 
social inequality may be regarded as especially important in the current context. While 
philosophers previously defined social equality by contrast with ranked societies where each 
person could be placed in a particular station, and where deference and condescension were 
considered primary virtues, people’s experience of social inequality has changed over time 
(Miller viii). Even in the absence of an explicit and formal hierarchy, people may continue 
failing to interact with each other on equal terms in more subtle ways.  
 
However, we should take care to further distinguish between indirect and direct social 
inequalities, and intentional and unintentional social inequalities – as Fourie’s comments suggest, 
a social policy or practice can be any combination of these. For example, indirect social 
inequalities can be intentional or unintentional. One example of an intentional and indirect social 
inequality is the case of racially segregated schools. These schools did not “explicitly and 
unambiguously” confer a higher status to white children, but the segregation was nevertheless 
intended to signal that black children were inferior to white children, and ought not to 
associate with them. In this instance, it seems that social inequalities would not have resulted 
from racial segregation if it were driven by a different motivation: for example, if black and 
white children had radically different physiological responses to the same highly contagious flu 
virus, such that white children would die from it but black children escaped with a mere cold, 
and school administrators acted to prevent more deaths (Anderson 1999b). Significantly, 
however, social inequalities can be created even if the intentions and motivations of an agent 
are innocent, or driven by seemingly legitimate considerations. An example of unintentional and 
indirect social inequality arises from voter registration laws in the US, where citizens must 
present only certain kinds of identification before they are allowed to vote. Presumably, the 
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laws were introduced to prevent vocal fraud. Yet, regardless of the intention behind them, 
they suppress the turnout of black voters, and sends the demeaning message that they are not 
equal citizens, because their votes are unimportant and unwelcome.   
 
To summarise my claims so far, instances of social inequality can differ in these ways: (a) they 
can be interpersonal, or societal; (b) they can be formally, or informally enforced; (c) they can 
be direct, or indirect; and (d) they can be intentional or unintentional. 
 
3. Why does moral equality require social equality? 
 
Many believe that the moral equality of persons requires that they be treated as socially equal. 
Consider Stefan Gosepath’s statement that there is a “minimal overlapping consensus among 
all leading schools of modern Western political and moral culture”, where “in spite of 
descriptive differences in certain relevant respects, all persons should be regarded and treated 
as moral equals, so that they are essentially entitled to the same basic moral rights and duties” 
(170). Gosepath continues that, following the assertion of their fundamental moral equality, all 
persons should be equal in their social status, as “this is the morally and politically fundamental 
principle of basic moral equality” (ibid). In other words, moral equality means that it is an 
intrinsic evil for people to be “treated as inferior, or made to feel inferior”. In this section, I 
show that recognition-respect for the equal moral status of persons imposes comparative and 
non-comparative duties on us, and that our comparative duties lead to the demand of social 
equality.   
 
a. The comparative and non-comparative requirements of equality 
 
I concluded the previous chapter by noting that objections to unequal treatment seem to have 
two dimensions. While one has to do with justification, the other has to do with an 
objectionable judgment about the moral status of persons. These dimensions mirror the fact 
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that moral equality makes two conceptually distinct demands of us. On a conventional 
reading of moral respect, when we say that everyone should be treated as equals, we are only 
saying that we must treat each person in accordance with reasons that are consistent with 
recognition-respect for their unique standpoint, and the interests that flow from it. This is the 
account of moral respect that I first explored in the previous chapter. Yet, it seems that the 
idea of “equality” ends up doing very little work in this formulation. While it correctly 
suggests that everyone has an equal entitlement to moral respect, it simply says that the 
content of the entitlement is identical for everyone (Shin 11). Suppose that we each have a 
right to ten strawberries. It is true that we have equal entitlements to strawberries in the sense 
that we are each entitled to ten. But the right we have is to ten strawberries each, not to equal 
numbers of strawberries. Likewise, we could simply say that recognition-respect merely requires 
that we treat each person with respect, where the relevant demands or constraints are 
identical for every person. As a result, talking about equal respect adds no further meaning. 
 
Patrick Shin, however, argues that this interpretation of equal respect is inadequate. 
Instructively, he proposes that we distinguish between non-comparative and comparative 
requirements concerning our treatment of others (11). A non-comparative requirement is a 
“constraint on how an individual may be treated that is not predicated on how any other 
individual is treated”, like the right to receive a statutory minimum wage, as the minimum 
wage I am entitled to has nothing to do with what other people are being paid (ibid). On the 
other hand, a comparative requirement “represents a constraint on how an individual may be 
treated whose content is predicated upon how individuals in some comparison class are 
treated” (Shin 12). For example, a comparative requirement might be a right to equal pay for 
equal work. Whether this right is satisfied in Smith’s regard is contingent on how other 
employees performing equal work are being paid (ibid). On this view, one aspect of treating 
people with equal respect is, indeed, to treat them in accordance with the non-comparative 
requirement that their unique good be adequately taken into account. However, at the same 
time, equal respect also amounts to a comparative requirement to recognise that the basis of 
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respect is a status shared by everyone (Shin 13); it “consists in an unconditional demand that our 
attitudes reflect the moral equality of persons”, and this requirement is violated when “an 
action expresses an inequality of respect for the moral status of some class of individuals 
compared to another” (Shin 27). In this sense, these two requirements are representative of 
two different aspects of recognizing an individual’s moral status (Shin 14). Quoting Shin, “If 
we can think of the non-comparative requirement of respect as a constraint that speaks to the 
adequacy of particular considerations as justifications for action, then we can think of the 
requirement of equal treatment as a constraint that speaks to whether the reasons for an 
action are consistent with the fact of the moral equality of persons” (ibid).  
 
To bring out the distinction between these two requirements, consider this example: you 
break a promise to a non-Caucasian person because you only keep your promises to 
Caucasians (Shin 14). It is a violation of moral respect as it “involves a failure to take seriously 
the promisee’s entitlement to have her expectations met except on the basis of adequate 
reasons” (ibid). Yet there is a further dimension of disrespect; you also violate the comparative 
requirement of equal treatment insofar as your actions express a rejection of the presumed 
moral equality between Caucasians and non-Caucasians (Shin 14-15).  Shin believes that it 
would be reasonable to attribute to you an attitude endorsing the idea that non-Caucasian 
individuals are less entitled than others to moral respect (Shin 25), as your actions suggest that 
they simply do not merit the effort of promise-keeping, unlike Caucasians. To re-iterate, there 
are two different forms of disrespect here: one is disrespect qua the promisee’s individual moral 
status, and the other is disrespect qua her status in relation to other persons’. Compare this to 
another example, where you wantonly break your promises to everyone, regardless of their race. 
Here, like in the previous case, you surely violate moral respect by failing to honour your 
promises, but you do not violate equal respect because you equally violate your non-comparative 
duties to everyone; you do not suggest that members of particular groups are less deserving of 
moral respect than others. While your behaviour violates the non-comparative requirement of 
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respect, it is ultimately not inconsistent with the comparative requirement, as you are treating 
everyone as if your obligation to keep promises to them can, in all cases, be equally disregarded. 
 
I will now shift my focus to the comparative requirement of equality, as I believe it is instrumental 
to understanding the duty to treat persons as social equals. According to Shin, it is violated 
when the treatment of an individual, “in view of its rationale, expresses unequal respect for 
the moral status of that individual under some differentiating description, compared to the 
respect reserved to some class of individuals who are not picked out by that description” (19). 
Interestingly, Shin makes some curious comments that seem to speak against his own 
definition. He writes that “an action, in view of its rationale, might express unequal respect for 
the status of some class of individuals even if the agent responsible for the action has no 
conscious belief as to the moral inferiority of such individuals” (24). This leaves open the 
possibility that the agent in question is not aware that she has acted on a disrespectful rationale, 
and may believe she has acted on a permissible or legitimate one. Suppose that a government 
prosecutor seeks the death penalty in every case where the defendant is a racial minority, but 
not in cases where the defendant is white. Despite her obvious bias, she insists that she has 
acted neutrally towards all defendants (ibid). Shin contends that her unequal treatment of 
minority defendants expresses unequal respect for them because her rationale (neutral 
treatment) fails to explain her conduct adequately (ibid).  
 
I agree with Shin that we can act on rationales that we are not consciously aware of. Anna 
may care for her grandfather with the conscious rationale of discharging a loving 
granddaughter’s filial duties, but the actual rationale she acts on, which becomes apparent to 
her only years later, is that she wants to inherit the bulk of his fortune. I also agree that there 
are cases where a person’s actions are so transparent that it is obvious which rationale they are 
acting on; for example, if Anna claims to love her grandfather but only behaves kindly to him 
when he mentions the prospect of amending his will. However, the fact that a person’s 
rationale fails to adequately explain their conduct does not necessarily indicate that they are 
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acting on a disrespectful rationale. It merely means that they are acting on a different rationale 
from the one they claim to, which may or may not be disrespectful. Furthermore, there can be 
cases where persons act on a permissible or legitimate rationale, but whose actions still express 
unequal respect for a particular group, even if there is no suspicion that they are acting on 
ulterior motives. For example, the sports channel ESPN published an article describing 
Jeremy Lin, a Chinese-American basketball player, as a “chink in the armour” of his team. It 
was very unlikely that the sports writer had intended to use an ethnic slur on Lin, as the term 
had been used in sports articles on multiple occasions. Nevertheless, given the social context it 
was used in (to describe a Chinese-American person), there was widespread agreement that 
the phrase was racist. We can make this claim without insinuating that the sports writer did act 
on a racist rationale. In short, the use of a permissible or legitimate rationale may be necessary 
for an action not to express disrespect for a person’s equal worth, but it is not a sufficient 
condition for this. 
 
For these reasons, I believe that an amendment can be made to Shin’s definition. Instead of 
referring to the rationale of unequal treatment, we may simply state that the treatment of an 
individual itself violates the non-comparative requirement when it expresses unequal respect 
for the moral status of that individual under some differentiating description, compared to the 
respect reserved to some class of individuals who are not picked out by that description (e.g. 
my refusal to keep my promises to you because you are Asian, while I steadfastly keep my 
promises to people who are non-Asian). The rationale behind such treatment may or may not 
be disrespectful. To be sure, this does not mean that the rationale is morally insignificant. An 
obviously disrespectful rationale can render otherwise innocent forms of treatment 
expressively disrespectful. In other cases, it will simply confirm that a form of treatment is 
expressively disrespectful.  
 
Shin himself seems to accept this, given his recognition that the claim that the treatment of an 
individual expresses unequal respect is not necessarily a claim about the psychology or 
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intentions of the agent who is responsible (Shin 25). We may be justified in regarding an 
action as expressive of an attitude of unequal moral respect regardless of the attitudes that the 
agent in question acts on (Shin 25-26). As Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes observe, 
“Not everything that expresses a state of mind is caused by that state of mind” (1508). For 
example, musicians can play music that expresses sadness without themselves experiencing 
sadness; “the sadness is in the music itself” (ibid). Likewise, lawmakers could pass a law that 
expresses contempt for black people even though none of the lawmakers personally feel racist 
contempt, and are merely pandering to the hostile demands of their white constituents (ibid). 
Instead, whether or not policies succeed in expressing the appropriate attitudes is determined 
by our shared social conventions. Expressive meanings result from “the ways in which actions 
fit with (or fail to fit with) other meaningful norms and practices in the community” (Anderson 
and Pildes 1525). This idea is echoed by Deborah Hellman, who suggests that “[i]t is our 
common history and culture and its conventions and social understandings that that 
determine which actions express a rejection of the equal humanity of others” (7-8). Put 
differently, we do not simply express (or fail to express) attitudes by intending to express them, 
or by believing that our actions do express those attitudes. Rather, the standard of adequacy is 
public and set by objective criteria for determining what actions mean (Anderson and Pildes 
1512).  
 
b. Why must we treat people as moral equals? 
 
More fundamentally, however, why must we treat persons with equal respect in the 
comparative sense? This seems rather demanding. Wouldn’t it be enough to meet the non-
comparative requirement? We can envision a hypothetical society where one group is widely 
believed to be the moral inferiors of another, and treated as if they are so (e.g. they might be 
expected to behave deferentially to the other group), but each person’s non-comparative 
rights remained duly fulfilled. A social arrangement like this might be unpleasant or 
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undesirable, but it wouldn’t necessarily be impermissible. What, exactly, is so important about 
refraining from treating some with less moral respect than others?  
 
One preliminary answer is that it is a straightforward failure of recognition-respect not to 
show equal respect for each person. This is because each person is in possession of a particular 
attribute – a Factor X – that automatically endows him or her with equal moral status. To fail 
to recognise their Factor X, and respond to it appropriately, is to commit a serious error. Yet, 
could a Factor X truly exist? Consider Elizabeth Anderson’s account of moral equality, which 
closely resembles the Rawlsian account I have described. As she explains, asserting the equal 
moral worth of persons comprises two claims: negatively, it “repudiates distinctions of moral 
worth based on birth or social identity – on family membership, inherited social status, race, 
ethnicity, gender or genes. There are no natural slaves, plebeians, or aristocrats” (1999a, 312). 
Secondly, it claims positively that “everyone equally has the power to develop and exercise 
moral responsibility, to cooperate with others according to principles of justice, to shape and 
fulfil a conception of their good” (ibid).  
 
Unfortunately, there is a tension between these two claims. The negative claim seems to be 
saying that moral worth does not vary regardless of the other attributes that a person might 
have; no distinctions or divisions should prevent us from being recognized as full equals 
(Philips 1). On the other hand, Anderson’s positive claim assumes, without further 
explanation, that all persons possess equal power to develop moral capacities. The implication 
seems to be that we have equal worth in virtue of this power, as it is this capacity that does not 
vary between persons, even if we differ by height, weight, race, gender, etc. But this leaves 
open the possibility that we may not be moral equals if we do end up differing in terms of our 
power to develop moral capacities, which inadvertently contradicts the previous claim that we 
possess equal humanity in spite of any other differences that we appear to have. We may 
attempt to resolve the problem by treating the second claim as a brute fact; it simply is true 
that people do not vary in this regard.  
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However, this answer seems unconvincing. It does not seem impossible that some people 
could have more power to develop moral capacities than others. For example, some individuals 
might simply be more teachable, and more receptive to grasping new moral concepts than 
others. From here, it is tempting to conclude that either moral capacities are the relevant 
respect in which people are equals, and it is plainly false that all persons have equal moral 
worth – or we must find some other morally relevant respect (Carter 541). Locating an 
alternative point of similarity between all persons seems to be very tricky indeed. One possible 
solution to this problem is that we should treat the basis of equality as a range property. As Ian 
Carter explains, “A range property is a binary property: it is either possessed or not possessed. To 
possess a range property is to possess some other, scalar property, within a specified range” 
(548). For example, Rawls proposes that the basic of equality is the binary property of being a 
moral person who has a capacity for a conception of the good, and for a sense of justice 
(Carter 549). In his words, “…while individuals presumably have varying capacities for a 
sense of justice, this fact is not a reason for depriving those with a lesser capacity of the full 
protection of justice. Once a certain minimum is met, a person is entitled to equal liberty on 
par with everyone else” (Rawls 1999, 443). In other words, it does not matter if people are not 
equal in their moral capacities. It is enough to say that all persons qualify as moral persons, because 
they possess at least a certain minimum set of capacities, and this entitles them to equal 
respect. However, this response is unsatisfying when applied to the present case. Notably, in 
saying that persons are “entitled to equal liberty on par with everyone else”, Rawls is talking 
about their non-comparative requirement of respect; people are entitled to equal liberties as long 
as they meet the requisite minimum. The range property could be relevant for the purposes of 
the non-comparative requirement, while the scalar property is relevant for the purposes of the 
comparative requirement. It is not necessarily inconsistent, for example, to hold that everyone 
who possesses the range property of “moral person” should have an identical bundle of non-
comparative rights, but that those with less power to develop moral capacities could be treated 
as the moral inferiors of those with more power. In short, treating the basis of equality as a 
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range property does not explain why the comparative requirement of respect must hold in spite 
of these variations. 
 
Ian Carter’s account of “opacity respect” hints at a solution to the problem. While Carter 
intends to offer a response to the question of why our varying moral capacities should not 
justify differences in non-comparative rights, it is highly instructive for why we should also 
uphold the comparative requirement of respect. Very roughly, Carter believes that there is a 
strong moral requirement to treat persons with the attitude of “opacity respect” in “certain 
significant spheres of life” (556), as long as they possess the minimum capacities that Rawls 
describes. After perceiving individuals as moral agents, because we judge them to have at least 
a certain minimum of agential capacities, we are morally required to treat them as opaque, by 
holding back from evaluating any of the variable capacities (including the power to develop 
moral capacities) on which moral personality supervenes, as part of our deliberations about 
how to treat them (Carter 551-2). One such sphere is political institutions’ treatment of 
citizens (Carter 557). As Carter points out, political liberals commonly endorse the view that 
political institutions must simply view citizens as agents, and that “it is not business of the state, 
in its role of guarantor of basic rights, to evaluate the degrees to which individuals are able to 
make rational and reasonable decisions, to form reasonable value commitments, to develop 
worthwhile life plans, and so on, for in so doing the state would show disrespect towards those 
individuals” (Carter 557). This requirement does not stem from a prior commitment to equal 
capacities, but rather, the fact that the state’s evaluations of its citizens’ moral capacities would 
be a degrading or humiliating form of “inappropriate exposure” to them, where “the 
exposure in question is to evaluations of certain of her features by certain people in certain 
situations – features that would not normally be, or ought not normally to be, evaluated by 
those people in those situations” (Carter 555). Thus, states cannot treat allocate fewer rights or 
liberties to persons, on the basis of variation in their moral capacities, for the independent reason 
that it would harm them in this way. 
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Drawing from these ideas, I want to suggest that the comparative requirement of equality can 
also be independently justified, in virtue of the serious harms that people experience when they 
are treated as moral inferiors, even when the non-comparative requirement is satisfied with 
regard to them. I will suggest that being perceived or treated as an inferior is wrongful 
because it threatens to harm or destroy our sense of self, as long as we are in possession of the 
minimum degree of agential capacities to have a sense of self. By “sense of self”, I mean their 
ability to have a stable identity, which gives rise to a sense of ourselves as autonomous or self-
governing, with choices, actions, values, and commitments that properly belong to us 
(Sangiovanni 60). When our sense of self is fractured, it hurts us in a fundamental way that 
gravely affects how we view our own lives, and our ability to “enjoy and participate in the 
most important goods in a life, those things we have most reason to value” (Sangiovanni 65-6). 
Avoidance of such harms is sufficiently important that we must retain a robust commitment to 
comparative equality. In order to see why, we must first understand the composition of the 
self. 
 
Andrea Sangiovanni provides an insightful account of what constitutes our sense of self, and 
why it is so valuable to us. To begin with, he defines the self as “one’s self-conception, one’s 
conception of the values, commitments, concerns that are central to one’s life, the 
relationships and roles that makes one that “kind of person” one is, including the qualities and 
defects of one’s personality and character” (58). Our sense of self, on the other hand, emerges 
from the interplay between two points of view: “There is the point of view of oneself as a 
creator and enactor (the “self-conceiver”) and the point of view of oneself as what has been 
created and enacted (the “self-conception”) (59). For example, there is the point of view of 
myself who has become a scientist, and there is the point of view of myself who regrets this, 
and aspires towards a career change, like becoming a famous ballerina. As Sangiovanni 
continues, in our conscious life, we constantly move between one and the other: “by acting, 
deciding, and pursuing, we shape the kinds of people we are and can become, and by 
reflecting on who we are and can become, we give rise to our actions, decisions, and pursuits” 
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(ibid). Here, the self-conceiver chases pursuits and ambitions that give rise to a particular self-
conception, which in turn shapes the self-conceiver’s future pursuits and ambitions, and so on, 
and it is these cycles of interaction that lend us a sense of authorship over our own lives. This 
sense of authorship, Sangiovanni argues, is a “constituent ingredient and structural element of 
a flourishing life” (62), because the value of the things we regard as the most important in life 
are only fully realized when we pursue them through our own endeavour, choice, and 
commitment. In other words, the good of such things can only be realized “when they are 
pursued together, and in harmony with the rest of our ends and the place they hold in our 
life” (ibid).  
 
Importantly, our sense of self emerges only emerges if the interplay between the two selves is 
minimally integrated, and has some baseline degree of coherence, continuity, and consistency 
among the roles over time (Sangiovanni 5), and there is no radical disjuncture between the 
self-conceiver and self-conception. Sometimes these disjunctures are of one’s own making. To 
use Gabriele Taylor’s example, consider the character Mr Casaubon, in George Eliot’s 
Middlemarch (146). While Mr Casaubon chooses to orient his life around scholarship, and views 
himself as a devoted scholar, he actually acts contrary to these aims; in fighting to keep this 
self-image going, he ends up taking steps against his own scholarly pursuits, such as working in 
isolation, away from other scholars in the field. In this sense, while the self-conceiving aspect 
of Mr Casaubon’s self yearns towards scholarship, the self-conceived aspect is decidedly 
unscholarly, as the direct result of his clinging to a wishful picture of himself (Taylor 148). In 
other instances, however, how others perceive and treat us can also cause great harm to the 
integrated self. This is because, as sociable beings, we do not develop our self-conception in 
total isolation, but in “communication and interaction with others similarly engaged” 
(Sangiovanni 63). One condition for the emergence of our sense of self is the ability to control 
(to some degree) the terms in which others recognise us: “We do not only want to be 
recognized as this or that, but we want to be recognized as self-presenting beings – as beings 
who have a say in how we are to be seen by others” (Sangiovanni 64). In other words, there 
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has to be some unity between how we choose to present ourselves, and how others see. In the 
1944 film Gaslight, for example, the character Gregory seeks to convince his wife, Paula, that 
she is going insane by repeatedly relocating and misplacing items on purpose, and attributing 
those actions to Paula, although she naturally has no memory of doing so. In great distress, 
she cries out that she “doesn’t know what she does anymore”. Her sense of self is shattered 
precisely because the composed self-conception she valiantly attempts to present to Gregory 
finds no echo in how she seems to appear to him: as a disturbed and unwell woman.   
 
The essential role that others play, in our ability to maintain a sense of self, is the key to why it 
is wrongful to treat others as moral inferiors. To be sure, it may wound or offend us, on a 
superficial level, when others may fail or refuse to see us in the same way we see ourselves. 
Imagine my sadness when my mother publicly described my working on a PhD in philosophy 
as me going down the path to “Permanent Head Damage”. However, these are secondary 
aspects of how we present ourselves. It is entirely possible for others to doubt certain components 
of our self-presentation – that we are budding intellectuals, or prize-winning athletes, or gifted 
writers – yet overall recognise us as self-presenting beings with the power to exert control over 
how others see us. Unlike in the previous examples, however, it is plainly not possible to 
recognise someone as a talented writer, or a caring friend, while simultaneously failing to 
recognise them as of an equal moral status. Failing to recognise and treat me as your equal 
means the foreclosure of an enormous range of possibilities for who I can be to you in our 
inter-personal relations; no matter who I am or who I try to become, my status appears fixed 
in your mind as your inferior. To use Glen Loury’s wording, in your mind, my identity is 
already “spoiled” in advance (67). In illustration of this point, the Olympic runner Tommie 
Smith, who staged a silent protest against racial discrimination at the Mexico Olympics in 
1968, was once quoted as saying, “It is very discouraging to be on a team with white athletes. 
On the track you are Tommie Smith, the fastest man in the world, but once you are in the 
dressing rooms you are nothing more than a dirty negro” (BBC). Regardless of Smith’s athletic 
achievements, he remained a “dirty negro” to his white teammates. In yet another example, a 
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misogynist does not see women as people with unique values, commitments, and projects; to 
him, they are simply sexual objects to be used and discarded.  Thus, the denial of equality 
attacks our sense of self at a fundamental level because it creates a chasm between how we see 
ourselves, and how others see us. Worse still, as a gap between how we see ourselves and the 
way others see us will cause dissonance, and often compel us to adjust or adapt in response 
(Sangiovanni 63), we may even begin to view ourselves in others’ demeaning terms, or find 
ourselves unable to do otherwise from the start. To summarise: failing to be treated as a moral 
equal breaks our sense of ourselves as self-presenting beings. It does so by impeding our 
capacity to attain some semblance of unity between how we see ourselves, and others see us. 
As W. E. B. Du Bois put it, “[i]t is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of 
always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a 
world that looks on in amused contempt and pity” (8, my emphasis). 
 
There is a further point to be made. Being treated, or viewed as unequal may also mean that 
we are denied the relevant standing to influence how others perceive us. This is potentially a 
form of testimonial injustice, where a hearer’s prejudice leads them to give a deflated level of 
credibility to a speaker’s word (Fricker 1), but of a very specific kind. Suppose that I am 
unsure about some fact about you; let’s say it is unclear to me whether you are truly an 
Olympic gold medallist. You smile reassuringly and tell me that you definitely are one, 
regardless of the tales that other gossip-mongers have been spreading. Of course, your 
assurance might not leave me completely convinced; I might have some lingering doubts. But 
under typical circumstances, your reporting this fact about yourself should count in some 
special way. It ought to alter the balance between belief and disbelief. This is because you 
telling me that you are really an Olympic gold medallist is not the same as any other person 
chiming in with their opinion. It matters more to me because I am hearing it directly from you. 
Your self-conception ought to be to be privileged by me (unless, of course, you have acquired 
a reputation as a pathological liar, or practical joker), as I recognise that you have a particular 
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standing to make statements about yourself that ought to exert significant force over how I see 
you.  
 
How does treating someone as a moral inferior reject this standing? Tellingly, when we view 
others as our inferiors, we deny them the standing to determine how we see them, and in this 
way deny them control over their public self-presentation. This is because, borrowing 
somewhat from a point by Samuel Scheffler, it is only in relationships of equality that I have a 
standing disposition to treat your own self-conception as playing a significant role in 
constraining and influencing how I see you, and you have a reciprocal disposition, and both of 
us normally act on these dispositions (2015, 25). Yet, when relating to people we deem our 
moral inferiors, we have no such standing disposition. Instead, we are inclined to silence them 
and talk over them. Again, the misogynist does not care about how women want him to 
perceive them; he view himself as having the authority to tell them who they are, and sort 
them into the demeaning categories he creates for them. On other occasions, we study them 
and scrutinise them as if they were specimens in a petri dish; like the 19th-century scientific 
racists of the past, who declared their belief in the innate inferiority of “non-Caucasian races”, 
we adopt what P. F. Strawson called the “objective attitude”. Overall, while the perceived 
inferiority of other persons disqualifies them from having the appropriate standing to influence 
how we see them, and make meaningful claims about themselves that express their unique 
self-conceptions.  
 
To sum up this rather lengthy subsection: I have sought to answer the question of why we 
must show others comparative respect. Regardless of whether they are granted the same non-
comparative rights, treating others as our moral inferiors harms them in a special way; it 
damages their sense of self by denying them control over the terms in which we see them. 
This is because our judgment of their inferiority is usually accompanied by our inability to 
view them as anything other than our inferiors, as well as the failure to grant them the proper 
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standing to influence how we view them. In damaging their sense of self, we prevent them 
from enjoying a fully flourishing human life (Sangiovanni 62).  
 
c. Moral equality and social equality 
 
We are now in a good place to see why moral equality is thought to require social equality 
between persons. I will argue that it does so because comparative equality is only fulfilled under 
conditions of social equality. As I have already sought to emphasise, non-comparative equality can 
be met in a community where everyone is given an equal bundle of rights, even if some 
groups stand in socially inegalitarian relationships to each other. It is not logically inconsistent 
to believe that a person could have a moral status that demands the same set of rights as ours, 
while also believing that they are not of an equal moral status to us. However, comparative 
equality, and thus the full demands of equal respect, can only be met if socially egalitarian 
relationships hold between members of the community, because socially egalitarian 
relationships are exactly those where people stand in relations of moral equality to each other, 
instead of being stigmatized or demeaned. 
 
The centrality of moral equality to the concept of social equality can be seen in how social 
egalitarians differentiate between hierarchical relationships that are socially egalitarian, and 
those that are not. Importantly, while social egalitarians oppose many relationships that 
exhibit a hierarchical character, like the ones I described in Section 2, they do not object to all 
of them. In Scheffler’s words,  
 
…differences of rank, power, and status are endemic to human social life. Almost all 
human organisations and institutions recognise hierarchies of authority, for example, and 
most social roles confer distinctions of status which in turn structure human relationships, 
such as the relationships of doctors to patients, teachers to students, parents to children, 
attorneys to clients, employers to employees, and so on. (2012, 225)  
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As a result, for social equality to be of reasonably broad scope, it is not necessary, for a 
relationship to qualify as a socially egalitarian one, for it to be “altogether unmarked by 
distinctions of rank or status” (Scheffler 2012, 226). I agree with Scheffler, and I believe that 
the separation between egalitarian hierarchical relationships, and the inegalitarian ones that 
social egalitarians are concerned with, can be made by reference to the comparative 
requirement of moral equality.  
 
The main difference between hierarchical relationships between men and women, or people 
of different races, and those between doctors and patients, or teachers and students, is that the 
former track distinctions in moral, or “recognition” respect, while the latter do not. 
Hierarchies between people of different races, for example, are based on the assumption that 
people of one race are simply unequal to people from the other. The latter, however, track 
what Stephen Darwall calls “appraisal respect”, which “consists in an attitude of positive 
appraisal of [a] person either as a person or as engaged in some particular pursuit…the 
appropriate ground for such respect is that the person has manifested characteristics which 
make him deserving of such positive appraisal” (38). Put differently, distinctions in rank or 
status are prima facie compatible with social equality when they simply track particular 
attributes that a person has, like experience, skill, and intelligence. These do not necessitate 
differences in recognition-respect, as we can hold that someone is more experienced or skilful 
than another, and thus worthy of a higher status in a particular given context, without treating 
the others as if they are of a lower moral status. Unlike gendered or racial hierarchies, the 
hierarchical social roles that Scheffler describes do not express attitudes of denigration or 
contempt towards those at the bottom. 
 
However, the lines between appraisal respect and moral respect can be blurry, as there may 
be practices of positive and negative appraisal that “actually disrespect and misrecognise 
others, for instance by suggesting that all people with a certain trait are ‘inferior’” (Schuppert 
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2015a, 137). Fabian Schuppert contends that appraisal-based hierarchies become 
objectionable when disesteem turns into disrespect, misrecognition and stigma, but also when 
positive esteem turns into privilege (2015a, 137). This can happen in two ways. The first is 
when people are awarded appraisal respect for personal attributes that are morally loaded in the 
current social context. By morally loaded, I mean that the esteem of certain attributes cannot 
be conceptually disentangled from the stigmatisation of others, according to our shared 
history and social conventions. For example, the hierarchy between doctor and patients is 
unproblematic in this regard, because the deference the patients show doctors is rooted in 
appraisal-respect for their medical knowledge and expertise. Such esteem carries no 
corresponding demeaning message about the persons who lack medical expertise, as no such 
stigma exists. In contrast, think of colourism, where people with darker skin have historically 
been treated as inferior to lighter-skinned people, through derogatory representations in 
society’s cultural symbols, and their subjection to discriminatory practices. In this context, it is 
runs counter to moral and social equality to esteem someone for having exquisitely fair skin 
(or as Carina Fourie colourfully puts it, to form a “white skin appreciation society”[98, 2015]), 
because such esteem translates into social privileges that they enjoy at the expense of 
disrespect for darker-skinned people. Likewise, while distinctions in military rank generally 
bear no connection to moral respect in present-day societies, the widespread glorification of 
people who serve in the military may also be inextricable from contempt for groups who are 
deemed too weak and pathetic to serve, like women, or the non-able-bodied. Thus, social 
inequality refers only to differences in rank, power, or status that are grounded in disrespect 
and stigma for those at the losing end. 
 
At the same time, some differences in appraisal, even if they do not relate to contextually loaded 
personal attributes, may also be regarded such that they “serve to construct a social hierarchy 
in which A can be unequivocally be ranked as B’s superior” (Miller 1997, 232). That is, 
unequal ratings along particular dimensions (ibid) may translate into unequal moral standing. 
In many instances, hierarchies of esteem do not affect our ability to show equal recognition-
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respect for persons. The deference we may show those we esteem is confined to the sphere in 
which the appraisal is relevant. To use David Miller’s example, “John may be a better doctor 
than Peter, in which case it is right for me to prefer seeing him when I am sick, but in every 
other respect I regard them as equals and treat them accordingly. I don’t show John any 
deference that I withhold from Peter except in the particular area in which he has superior 
knowledge” (1997, 234). Similarly, as a doctoral student, I defer to my supervisor within the 
sphere of academia, because I show appraisal respect for her philosophical expertise, but in 
every other respect we stand in relation to each other as equals. Yet, the differences in rank, 
power, and status within one sphere may creep into the moral one, where people who lack 
certain forms of appraisal respect are treated in demeaning ways by those more successful 
than them.  For example, consider the difference between “high” and “low status” 
occupations. As I have pointed out, there is nothing inherently wrong with showing appraisal 
respect for people in high-status occupations; we may admire their skill, knowledge, expertise, 
and experience, and our admiration for these attributes is not contextually loaded (unlike the 
admiration of fair skin).  Yet, it is clear that the sense of “status” here does not only refer to 
high and low status within some particular sphere. The “low status” of other occupations, like 
toilet cleaning and road sweeping, also refers to the stigma and contempt reserved for toilet 
cleaners and road sweepers in society at large.  
 
To conclude this section, I have sought to explain why respect for moral equality demands 
social equality. Specifically, I showed that moral equality has a comparative dimension that 
requires us to treat persons as though they are of an equal moral status, on top of fulfilling 
their non-comparative rights.  This comparative dimension must play an important role in 
structuring our behaviour towards others, because treating people as our moral inferiors 
threatens to seriously harm their ability to have a sense of self, and it is met by ensuring 
conditions of social equality between persons. 
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4. Social equality, the state, and immigrants 
 
I now turn to what states owe to immigrants with regard to social equality. By “immigrants”, I 
refer both those who are territorially present, and those who are merely prospective. I will 
argue that, while states have a duty to uphold social equality between their citizens in the 
policies they create or maintain, they also have a duty to uphold social equality between 
immigrants and citizens. By this, I mean that states must refrain from creating or maintaining 
policies that either express disrespect for immigrants, or may foreseeably bring about 
conditions where it is likely that immigrants will face disrespect, or both. As I have mentioned 
earlier, social equality is believed to only hold between citizens. However, if we examine the 
reasoning behind the attention that philosophers have given to social relations between 
citizens, we will see that the same reasoning demands that states treat immigrants as social 
equals.  
 
a. Social equality, the state, and citizens 
 
Rekha Nath has persuasively argued that the state has a duty to uphold social equality 
between its citizens. This is because the state’s terms centrally define the character of 
interaction between fellow citizens (2015, 195), which inevitably results in “dense 
interconnections” between them. As she puts it, “Within the context of the state, individuals 
are subject to the rules of background institutions that define the character of their political, 
social, and economic interaction”, and their subjection to these institutional terms is 
predominantly unavoidable and non-voluntary (2015, 191). Consequently, state institutions 
have the power to shape and define the relative social standing of citizens, whose participation 
in them is largely non-voluntary. As they are capable of creating status-hierarchies, or 
worsening existing ones, by enforcing practices or policies that express the inferiority of 
particular groups, states exert a significant degree of control over whether or not social 
equality holds between citizens. Think, for example, of how white racism towards black South 
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Africans was deeply ingrained by the formal introduction of apartheid. By the same token, 
states also have the power to mitigate, if not ameliorate completely, social inequalities between 
citizens. A policy of this sort might take the form of affirmative action, which favours 
members of socially disadvantaged groups in the realm of education or employment, with the 
aim of reducing gender or race-based status-hierarchies.  
 
In my view, this power endows states with the responsibility to refrain from creating, or 
maintaining institutional rules and norms that express disrespect, or may foreseeably 
engender social inequality. It is worth noting the distinction between a policy that expresses 
disrespect, or may foreseeably bring about social inequality. An extreme example of the 
former is a policy which dictates that people of a certain race must carry identification cards 
with them at all times, so police can identify them more easily, while not legislating that 
people from other groups need to do the same thing. This clearly expresses disrespect for that 
group because it stereotypes them as dangerous criminals who must be managed by law 
enforcement. On the other hand, consider the recently introduced HB2 law in North 
Carolina, which makes it illegal for people to use toilets not in line with their biological sex. 
While the law explicitly expresses disrespect towards transgender people, by outright denying 
the possibility that a person’s gender identity may be different from their biological sex and 
penalizing their strong interest in using bathrooms that match their gender identity, it also 
foreseeably worsens the social inequality that gay people face, even if it does not express 
disrespect for them. This is because the enforcement of HB2 would, in general, harm people 
whose appearance does not conform to gender stereotypes, increasing the likelihood of 
humiliating treatment towards many gay people who are not gender-conforming in this way. 
Overall, as the demands of social equality mean that individuals ought not to be “inescapably 
subject to terms that avoidably produce inegalitarian relations”, individuals should enjoy 
equal standing in relation to one another under the institutional rules and norms that they are 
unavoidably subject to (Nath 2015, 195). 
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While I largely agree with Nath, it is not clear to me why we should only enjoy equal standing 
under rules and norms that we are unavoidably or inescapably subject to. The fact that we may 
opt out of certain institutional rules and arrangements does not take away from how they may 
wrongfully create or worsen existing social inequalities. Suppose that a university has deeply 
demeaning institutional policies towards female students: that they must observe a certain 
“modest” dress code, for example, or that they are not permitted to take classes that are 
designated to be male-only. Suppose, also, that this university is anomalous, and that there are 
many other universities in the vicinity with institutional practices and policies that fully respect 
gender equality between its students, and as a matter of luck, are also equally willing to accept 
new students. As a result, the students who attend the sexist university are not “unavoidably” 
subject to it; they could have opted out and gone to a different university. But this does not 
change how it is still wrong for the sexist university to introduce policies that express contempt 
for the equal moral status of female students, because this will shape the social standing of 
female students regardless of whether or not they could have avoided them. Or suppose that the 
state introduces some “opt-in” policies that citizens can choose whether or not they want to be 
subject to. Under an optional savings scheme, for example, citizens can decide if they want to 
give a portion of their income to the state, which will be returned to them, with interest, by a 
certain age. Unfortunately, under the same scheme, imagine that the state insists that the 
interest accrued by any woman’s savings be given to her husband, if she has one, because her 
property is properly his. Again, it is not at all obvious that this policy is permissible just because 
citizens may “avoid” it. Whether or not they opt in, it still expresses disrespect for women, and 
introduces a new form of status-inequality between men and women. Thus, to amend Nath’s 
argument, individuals should enjoy social standing in relation to one another under the 
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b. The case of non-citizens 
 
As I will now argue, the principle I described has important consequences for states’ treatment 
of immigrants and prospective immigrants. In particular, I follow Nath’s footsteps by asserting 
that the rationale behind states’ duty to create, or maintain policies that uphold social equality 
between citizens are not restricted in their application to the context of the state (2015, 195). 
To begin with, the case of immigrants who are already territorially present is fairly 
straightforward. This group comprises permanent residents, people on work visas, foreign 
students, and also guest workers. Like citizens, these non-citizens are subject to the rules are 
background institutions that shape the character of their political, social, and economic 
interaction, and by extension, their social standing vis-à-vis other persons in the state. Again, 
states have the power to create or maintain policies concerning non-citizens that produce 
socially inegalitarian relations between them and citizens.  
 
This, I think, helps to clarify a dimension of Michael Walzer’s discussion of guest workers. He 
appears to make a democratic case for the political rights of guest workers, who are commonly 
denied civil liberties of speech, assembly, and association by state authorities (Walzer 1983, 
57). In Walzer’s words, “They do socially necessary work, and they are deeply enmeshed in 
the legal system of the country to which they have come. Participants in economy and law, 
they ought to be able to regard themselves as potential or future participants in politics as 
well” (1983, 60). The argument seems fairly straightforward: people subject to the power of 
the state ought to have a say in how the state rules them. Walzer anticipates the objection that 
guest workers have consented to live in the receiving state on such unfavourable terms. 
Interestingly, in response, he denies that the consent they have given at the outset legitimises 
their lack of political power, because political power “can’t be exercised democratically 
without the ongoing consent of its subjects…every man and woman who lives within the 
territory over which those decisions are enforced” (Walzer 1983, 58). By “ongoing consent”, 
Walzer seems to mean the introduction of democratic processes that assess their continued 
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willingness to be subject to such terms.  But ongoing consent is a somewhat tricky concept. It 
does not seem obviously wrong, in many mundane cases, for persons to consent to 
unfavourable terms at t and be subject to those terms till the contract has expired at t1, 
regardless of how they feel in between. It is certainly not pleasant for me to sign a work 
contract that commits me to hours of dreary work for six months, only to realise after a day’s 
work that I loathe it. Nonetheless, it does not seem obviously wrong for my workplace to 
commit me to work for the six-month period, instead of asking me to reaffirm my consent at 
the one-month mark. 
 
However, Walzer also alludes to a different route to showing why guest workers ought to be 
granted the full set of political rights. Describing their situation, he states that “[g]uest 
workers, then, are excluded from the company of men and women that includes other people 
exactly like themselves. They are locked into an inferior position that is also an anomalous 
position; they are outcast in a society that has no caste norms, metics in a society where metics 
have no comprehensible, protected, and dignified place” (Walzer 1983, 59, my emphasis). 
Here, he clearly describes a social inequality between citizens and guest workers that is created 
by their lack of political rights: “As a group, they constitute a disenfranchised class. They are 
typically an exploited or oppressed class as well, and they are exploited or oppressed at least in 
part because they are disenfranchised, incapable of organizing effectively for self-defence” 
(ibid). Implicit in his argument is the idea that the denial of political rights is wrongful because 
it creates social inequalities between citizens and guest workers. The state does so by placing 
guest workers in a vulnerable position where citizens are able to exploit and oppress them, 
and get away with it. We might even go further and say that the denial of political rights, in 
itself, expresses unequal respect for the moral status of guest workers. In the current social 
context, disenfranchisement is strongly associated with the refusal to recognise particular 
groups as moral equals, as it was in the case of women and black people. Thus, we need not 
argue that the contracts between guest workers and the state do not legitimise their lack of 
political power, because ongoing consent is not given. Instead, we may simply say that that 
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the denial of political rights is wrong, both because it expresses disrespect for guest workers 
and foreseeably worsens the likelihood of unequal social relations between citizens and 
themselves. 
 
But what about prospective immigrants who are not yet admitted into the state? To be sure, 
some prospective immigrants are already present on the territory, just that they may be 
waiting for an immigration decision to be processed. If so, the rationale I have used for non-
citizen residents easily applies. However, there are also prospective migrants who have not yet 
travelled to the receiving state. They may, for example, have applied for work or student visas. 
Does the state also have a duty to avoid subjecting them to policies that express disrespect for 
them, or foreseeably risk the creation of social inequalities? The answer is yes. As I have noted 
in the previous chapter, states do subject prospective immigrants to their power even when 
they are not territorially present; they accept the state’s legal machinery to determine the 
results of their claim to admission. Or, put it differently, by applying for admission, they 
become subjected to the state’s immigration-related institutional rules and norms.  Yet it may 
be argued that there remains no sense in which the state can influence their social standing if they 
are not yet located within its bounds. Therefore, states have no duties relating to the social 
equality of these non-citizens.   
 
I think this is false. There is no obvious reason why people cannot stand in inegalitarian 
relations with each other on a global or regional scale. Take, for example, the current 
condition of Muslim prospective immigrants in the West. It makes sense to say, I believe, that 
Muslim prospective immigrants stand in unequal relations with the citizens of many European 
countries; they are commonly held in fear, suspicion, and contempt. The fact that they are not 
territorially present does not insulate them from the effects of these social inequalities. The 
knowledge that you will likely be perceived in terms of ugly stereotypes by the border officials 
evaluating your visa application, because of your name or the country you are making the 
application from, or the experience of being interrogated hostilely during the visa interview, 
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can also be extremely humiliating and damaging to one’s sense of self. If social inequalities 
can already hold between prospective immigrants and the citizens of receiving states prior to 
their entry, it seems that states do have the capacity to create or worsen these social 
inequalities. They can do so by introducing policies that directly discriminate against would-
be immigrants from particular states, for example, that legitimise hateful and xenophobic 
mindsets on the part of citizens, and lead those would-be immigrants to experience shame and 
denigration at their hands. Furthermore, if at least some of these prospective immigrants are 
eventually admitted, the state’s policies sow the seeds for status-hierarchies between citizens 
and these groups of immigrants that may manifest more vividly upon their arrival. 
 
To summarize my argument, I have tried to show that states have a duty to uphold social 
equality between citizens. More than this, in the context of immigration, states must also 
uphold social equality between citizens and immigrants, and this imposes on them the duty to 
refrain from creating or maintaining policies that express disrespect for immigrants, or may 
foreseeably engender unequal social relations between citizens and immigrants. The 
reasoning behind this is that immigrants are subject to the state’s institutional rules and 
practices, which gives states the power to shape their social standing, and the duty to ensure 
that the comparative requirement of equal respect is duly fulfilled. 
 
5. The objection from special relationships 
 
Before I proceed to the next part of my thesis, I will respond to an important objection that I 
considered in the previous chapter. If special relationships between citizens exist, do they pose 
a threat to the arguments I have made? There are two different ways that this argument can 
be made. The first is that demands of social equality only hold between persons who have 
special relationships with one another (i.e. citizens), and not between citizens and non-citizens. 
The second is that the state’s duty to uphold the social equality of immigrants may conflict with 
the special relationships of citizens, and the claims to self-determination that they produce. 
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The first claim is not very promising, and I think it can be quickly set aside. I have already 
argued that the state’s duty to uphold social equality is rooted in the comparative requirement of 
moral equality, which applies to all persons subject to its power, and not only those who have 
special relationships with one another. Besides, the idea that the comparative requirement of 
moral equality does not apply to all persons is extremely unappealing. It would mean that we 
could permissibly demean or denigrate people as long as they were not our fellow citizens. This 
seems very strange. It seems to be equally wrong to insult someone on the basis of their race, 
for example, regardless of their citizenship status. In response, it might be said that my 
account of moral equality does not sufficiently consider the fact that our social relationships 
with fellow citizens might be far more significant in shaping our sense of self than our 
relationships with other persons. But neither does this possibility conflict with my arguments. 
The acknowledgment that social inequalities between fellow citizens and ourselves may be 
significantly more detrimental to our well-being than social inequalities between ourselves and 
foreigners does not lead us to the conclusion that the latter type of social inequality can be 
morally condoned, or that there is no duty to prevent or avoid it. 
 
What, then, about the potential conflict between citizens’ special relationships and the state’s 
duty to uphold the social equality of immigrants and prospective immigrants? Even though I 
do not claim that the social equality of immigrants must always trump the special relationships 
between citizens, it is worth noting that some limitations placed on self-determination by 
social equality are already recognized. Walzer’s argument about the political rights of guest 
workers, and how they must be allowed access to citizenship, is one such argument. Similarly, 
as Chapter Four will show, it has also been acknowledged by those who defend the right to 
exclude that certain discriminatory immigration policies, like those that select immigrants on 
the basis of sex or race, are wrongful even if citizens want to exclude persons from those 
groups. For example, Miller has claimed that “[w]hat cannot be defended in any 
circumstances is discrimination on grounds of race, sex, or, in most instances, religion – 
religion could be a relevant criterion only where it continues to form an essential part of the 
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public culture, as in the case of the state of Israel” (2013, 204). Here, the wrongfulness of 
insulting prospective immigrants – a social egalitarian consideration – outweighs citizens’ self-
determining choice not to admit immigrants from those groups in typical circumstances. In 
line with the above examples, that social equality seems to be of sufficient weight to constrain 
self-determination in at least some cases, and this presents the possibility that it can in others.  
That said, it would be unreasonably demanding to expect exact guidelines for when the 
demands social equality can defeat self-determination, and when they cannot. We are 
constantly faced with similar conflicts between important moral and political values, and often 
there is no clear-cut rubric to tell us how we should act. The tension between social equality 
and self-determination is no different in this regard. While my account does not purport to 
show that social equality always outweighs self-determination, it makes the case that social 
equality, and the duties it imposes on states, are fundamental considerations that cannot be 
ignored or minimized in our decision-making, because they arise from our shared 




What consequences, then, does the above argument have for the right to exclude?  In this 
chapter, I have offered a different way in which the right to exclude may violate the 
requirements of moral equality. Let me explain how. I have introduced the idea that states 
must act in accordance with what I have termed the comparative requirement of moral 
respect. On this view, we do not only have to adequately justify the treatment of those who 
are subjected to our power, but we must also refrain from forms of treatment that express 
unequal respect for people of a particular group, compared to another. I have also argued 
that it is the commitment to the comparative requirement of respect that animates social 
egalitarians’ concerns. The relationships that social egalitarians oppose are exactly those 
where the comparative requirement of moral respect is violated. Given the power that states 
have to shape the social standing of those subject to their power, they have a duty to refrain 
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from introducing or maintaining policies that express disrespect for immigrants and 
prospective immigrants alike, or those that will foreseeably worsen.  
 
It does not follow from this, however, that states do not have the right to exclude. After all, the 
argument is not against the right to exclude, but against the state’s right to treat non-citizens in 
a demeaning way, or bring about conditions where they are demeaned. Nevertheless, at the 
same time, it is also highly plausible that the right to exclude may be enforced in a way that 
violates the state’s duty to uphold the social equality of immigrants, and that many aspects of 
current immigration policy may be objectionable in this way. The remainder of my thesis – 
Chapters Three, Four, Five, and Six – will be dedicated to providing an analysis of the moral 
disrespect inherent in these policies: detention and deportation, direct and indirect 
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Detention and deportation are two heavy-handed tactics that have been commonly adopted 
by states to exclude those who have who have entered the territory without permission, or 
whose visa status has changed. Many have criticized the use of detention and deportation. For 
example, Alice Bloch and Liza Schuster write they are “employed in spite of the vast expense 
involved and of their inefficacy in controlling entry” (509). At the same time, it has been 
asserted that these policies embody a “liberal democratic paradox”: while the capacity to 
exercise border control is believed to be fundamental to liberal democracy and self-
determination, for the reasons I have explained in Chapter One, they also sit uneasily with 
liberal principles, as they bring the full powers of the state to bear against individuals, and 
subject them to immense hardships against their will (Gibney and Hansen 1).  
 
In this chapter, I will be concerned with criticism of the second type: that regardless of the 
effectiveness of detention and deportation in controlling migratory flows, they are morally 
impermissible. I argue that detention and deportation conflicts with the demands of equal 
respect. As I noted in Chapter Two, it follows from the comparative requirement of moral 
equality that states have the duty to refrain from introducing policies or practices that worsen 
social inequalities between citizens and immigrants. Detention and deportation violate this 
duty because they enclose immigrants and prospective immigrants in dominating 
relationships, where they are vulnerable to arbitrary interference from the state. However, 
despite the importance of recognizing the domination that immigrants are subjected to, I 
argue that domination alone cannot fully account for the status-harms produced by these 
practices, and we must supplement it by turning our gaze towards a broader notion of social 
equality. 
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 In Section 2, I will explain what detention and deportation are. Next, in Section 3, I outline 
the concept of domination, showing that republicans are fundamentally concerned with 
upholding moral equality between persons. In Section 4, I argue that, according to the 
republican framework I have sketched out, detention and deportation are incompatible with 
the state’s duty to uphold social equality, because they dominate non-citizens. Lastly, in 
Section 4, I argue that detention and deportation may lead to the unequal social standing of 
some groups, including citizens and ex-detainees, even if they are not, strictly speaking, 
dominated by those practices.  
 
2. Detention and deportation 
 
a. Shifting the focus to border enforcement 
 
Consider the case of an Indian student who had planned to pursue her PhD in the UK, after 
having studied there for a few years. Her application faced a serious obstacle when the college 
to which she applied was removed from the register of Border Agency-approved colleges 
(Yeo). Unable to find a new college in the 60-day grace period she was given, she applied for 
further leave, but her application was refused. Instead of sending her a notice of refusal, she 
and her husband were paid an “enforcement visit” at the break of dawn, and they were 
placed in immigration detention (ibid). Only then were they informed that their application 
had been rejected (ibid). This incident bore striking similarities to the case of an American 
who was arrested and placed in detention after his application for leave to remain, upon 
completing his PhD, was rejected (Dunt). Like in the previous case, he had not received notice 
of the refusal before the police showed up at his door (ibid).  Also consider the case of Ishtiyaq 
Shukri, a South African citizen who had possessed indefinite leave to remain in the UK since 
1997. Those with indefinite leave to remain are not permitted to retain their status if they are 
away from the UK for over 2 years. Having exceeded the limit, upon his return to the UK in 
2015, Shukri was detained for more than nine hours and promptly deported after being 
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refused leave to enter, despite being married to a British citizen, and owning a home in 
London (Shukri). 
 
While we may disagree over whether these non-citizens did possess the right to stay, I think 
most will find that there is something very discomfiting about these stories. We may also ask if 
it was truly necessary to apprehend the students and place them in detention, or whether 
deportation is an acceptable tool to use on long-term residents. Although cases like these have 
received some degree of attention in the news and mainstream debates on immigration, this 
is, for the most part, not reflected in the philosophical literature. Philosophers have largely 
focused on questions of admission and exclusion, concerning who may be let in and who may 
be kept out. However, this is coupled with a penchant to ignore questions surrounding the 
enforcement of border controls, which have to do with “how and to what extent people may be 
kept out” (Mendoza 82). In other words, we lack a discussion about which modes of border 
enforcement are states permitted to employ, or the moral limits that states should be guided 
by in designing such policies. Stephanie Silverman has similarly noted that the existing 
debates on immigration admissions fall prey to a significant oversight: they “pay no attention 
to the practice of detaining migrants as they attempt to cross borders and gain admission”, 
even though it plays an essential role in border control, having “become interdependent with 
immigration enforcement policy and practice in all liberal states” (Silverman 602). The 
numbers speak for themselves; the cases I described above are by no means exceptional. For 
example, between March 2014 and 2015, a total of 30,902 non-citizens were placed in 
immigration detention in the UK (The Detention Forum), and as of 30 December 2015, there 
were 1792 people held in Australian immigration detention facilities (Immigration Detention and 
Community Statistics Summary). The same might be argued of deportation; while overall figures 
seem to be declining, it is still used very frequently. In 2014, 38,767 people were removed 
from the UK (Blinder 2), and the US Department of Homeland Security conducted a total of 
414,481 removals in 2014 (Department of Homeland Security).   
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This lacuna in the philosophical literature is highly problematic.  So far, I have sought to 
emphasise that even if states have the right to exclude, we may still recognise important 
limitations on how they exercise it. For example, my right to exclude you from my property 
does not necessarily mean that I can enforce my right by shooting you, even if I may enforce 
it in other ways; there can be wrongful ways of enforcing an otherwise legitimate right. One 
challenge, therefore, is how we can separate enforcement practices that are morally 
permissible from the ones that are not. A second challenge would be to examine whether the 
use of enforcement methods, which are in principle impermissible, could ever be justified 
under particular circumstances, such as when the safety of citizens is genuinely at stake. 
Thirdly, we must investigate how our views on enforcement interact with existing questions of 
admission and exclusion. As I have noted, there is no inherent contradiction between holding 
that states have the right to exclude, yet that some enforcement methods are impermissible. 
Nevertheless, our views on enforcement may have an impact on how we answer such 
questions. For example, we may have to admit that, even if there is a robust case for the right 
to exclude particular groups of non-citizens, they cannot actually be excluded in practice 
because the primary methods of effectively enforcing their exclusion have been ruled out. A 
just theory of migration would certainly need to take these issues concerning workability into 
account.  
 
While this chapter cannot meet all these challenges, it will proceed with the first in mind. In 
Chapter Two, I suggested a criterion for distinguishing between morally impermissible and 
permissible immigration practices. I argued that states’ exercise of the right to exclude must 
be reined in by respect for the moral equality for immigrants, and that they must uphold the 
social equality of immigrants by refraining from creating or maintaining policies that express 
disrespect for immigrants, or worsen social inequalities between citizens and immigrants. To 
be sure, immigration detention and deportation are not the only troubling practices that 
border control agencies readily and regularly employ. However, I think it will be useful to 
hone in on, and provide a close normative analysis of these two enforcement practices in 
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particular, and how they fit into existing criticisms of border coercion. In this section, I will 
focus on briefly illustrating what exactly these practices entail. While we should keep in mind 
that detention and deportation are normatively distinct, each bringing up different ethical 
questions, they also share a great deal in common, and I think it will be helpful to note their 
similarities for the purposes of this chapter. 
 
b. What are detention and deportation? 
 
Stephanie Silverman and Evelyne Massa define immigration detention as the “holding of 
foreign nationals, or non-citizens, for the purposes of realizing an immigration-related goal” 
(679). I suggest that we can understand detention as involving primary and secondary 
deprivations of liberty. The primary deprivation, where migrants’ freedom of movement is 
restrained (Silverman 602), is common to all cases of immigration detention. They are held in 
designated facilities in the custody of immigration officials (Silverman and Massa 679) and 
barred from leaving. On top of specially designed detention centres, these facilities may 
include “a number of reporting centres, transit centres, short-term holding facilities near 
airports and seaports, and prison cells”, as well as “informal holding areas such as hotel 
rooms, airplane hangars, and buses or other transport vehicles” (Silverman 602). The 
secondary deprivations of liberty, on the other hand, arise from the coercive measures 
deployed by detention facilities to observe control and order amongst detainees. They bear a 
close resemblance to prisons, including penal-like characteristics like “an internal punishment 
codes, including the use of solitary confinement; transport vans with bars, escorts and 
handcuffing of detainees travelling to other centres, to court or to receive medical attention; 
the heavy use of guards”, etc (Silverman and Nethery 3).  
 
In contrast, deportation refers generally to the “state-enforced or enforceable departure of a 
non-citizen from the country” (Blinder 2). Similarly, William Walters has suggested that 
deportation is best defined as the “removal of aliens by state power from the territory of that 
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state, either ‘voluntarily’, under threat of force, or forcibly” (268). Nevertheless, like detention, 
it can also be analysed as a serious deprivation of liberty, involving both primary and 
secondary deprivations. The primary constraint on freedom, common to all cases of 
deportation, is the individual’s removal from the territory, and therefore their freedom to 
pursue the assorted interests and projects that are bound up with their presence. Secondary 
constraints, on the other hand, comprise the additional coercive measures states may 
undertake to force out unwanted non-citizens. For example, as Matthew Gibney observes, 
 
[a]t the extreme, deportation is a form of international movement that is all push and no 
pull. The push is provided by the agents of the State who use detention centres, 
handcuffs, physical force, and sometimes even drugs, to effect departure. Deportation is a 
form of forced migration in which individuals who do not leave the State under their own 
steam will be shackled, bound, and literally carried out the State. (2013, 117) 
 
Next, who are the subjects of detention and deportation? Generally speaking, two categories of 
people face detention: non-citizens who have entered state territory without authorisation, or 
are under suspicion of intending to cross a border without authorisation, or non-citizens 
whose permit to legally reside within the state has expired (Silverman and Nethery 4). So non-
citizens are either detained at the border, before a decision has been made about whether or 
not to admit them, or face pre-expulsion detention, if their stay in the territory is or has 
become unauthorized (Leerkes and Broeders 830).  
 
Similar categories of people are vulnerable to deportation. However, the waters are somewhat 
muddier, as there has been significant disagreement over which removals constitute proper 
instances of deportation. For example, Patti Lenard does not consider individuals who are not 
allowed to enter at the border, or forcibly removed soon after they have entered the border, to 
be deportees in the proper sense (467). Nevertheless, she recommends that deportation should 
include the “administrative removal” of “those who have resided in a state for a significant 
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period of time, including both those whose status has transitioned from legal to irregular, and 
those whose status has remained consistently legal but who are denied the right to apply for 
permanent status for unjust reasons” (ibid). While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to 
comment on the precise conceptual limits of deportation, I am sympathetic to a broader, 
more capacious definition of deportation that reflects the ordinary use of the term, capturing a 
range of practices that “go under a range of different nomenclatures in different states” 
(Gibney 2013, 119). For this reason, I will assume that deportation, like detention, falls upon 
the shoulders of non-citizens who have attempted to enter without authorisation, and non-
citizens who have entered legally, but who have transitioned to a “more precarious legal 
status” (Lenard 466). The latter group tends to include refugee claimants whose request for 
asylum has been denied, those who have entered on temporary visas that have now expired 
(ibid), and individuals whose removal has been recommended alongside the conviction of a 
criminal offence, or deemed necessary for security reasons (Blinder 3).  
 
A final, and crucial commonality that detention and deportation share is that they are both 
largely represented as administrative measures essential to the state’s right to exclude, rather 
than as a form of punishment – with the exception of people who are detained and deported 
on the basis of criminal suspicion or charges, rather than violations of immigration law. From 
this perspective, detention simply controls the movement of people as they are processed 
through the visa system (Silverman and Nethery 5). It is supposedly a non-punitive, 
bureaucratic measure that is designed to enable the enactment of border control, ensuring 
that “unwanted” migrants can be found and identified, and are unable to abscond while the 
expulsion is planned (Leerkes and Broeders 831), or before their admission has been 
confirmed. Likewise, deportation purports to help preserve the integrity of the system (Gibney 
2008, 146) by narrowing the gap between the group of people who are permitted to be 
physically present on the territory, and the group who actually are. Traditionally, the right to 
deport has been “understood simply as an extension of the right to control borders in the first 
place…as one among many tools states have to control borders” (Lenard 468). One 
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consequence of this view, which I will contest in the next section, is that states have been able 
to claim that these practices do not stand in any special need of legal or moral justification. 
Under this logic, detainees are either “simply waiting for the government to resolve a 
perceived irregularity in their immigration proceedings” (Silverman and Massa 677), and 
deportees are simply being sent back to a country where they rightfully belong, and out of a 
country where they do not (Gibney 2013, 122).  
 
3. Social equality and non-domination 
 
Against the belief that detention and deportation do not stand in special need of any moral 
justification, I will argue that it is, in fact, morally impermissible to employ such measures in 
support of the right to exclude. Chiefly, detention and deportation lead to the domination of 
non-citizens, which violates the state’s duty to uphold their social equality. Before I make the 
case for why detention and deportation subject non-citizens to domination, I will first 
introduce the concept of domination, and why it creates social inequalities between persons. 
 
a. What is domination? 
 
To start with, what do we mean when we say that someone is subject to domination? 
Essentially, to be dominated is to, in virtue of your status, be systematically vulnerable to the 
exercise of arbitrary power over you (Honohan 34). According to Philip Pettit’s influential 
account, there are three basic aspects to any dominating relationship (1997, 52). Someone has 
dominating power over another to the degree that they have the capacity to interfere, on an 
arbitrary basis, in particular choices that the other is able to exercise (1997, 52-4). Interference 
may encompass a wide range of possible behaviours, including:  
 
…coercion of the body, as in restraint or obstruction; coercion of the will, as in 
punishment or the threat of punishment; and, to add a category that was not salient in 
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earlier centuries, manipulation: this is usually covert and may take the form of agenda-
fixing, the deceptive or non-rational shaping of people’s beliefs or desires, or the rigging 
of the consequences of people’s actions. (Pettit 1997, 52) 
 
In Pettit’s view, all these interfering behaviours are performed with the intention of worsening 
the agent’s situation by altering the range of options, the predicted payoffs assigned to those 
options, or by establishing control over which outcomes will result from which options (1997, 
53). To be sure, it is not necessary that the dominating agent actually interferes with the 
dominated party; in fact, “it does not require even that the person who enjoys that power is 
inclined in the slightest measure towards such interference” (Pettit 1997, 63). What they must 
have, however, is the effective capacity to interfere (Lovett 98), which leads the power-victim to 
live at the mercy of the power-bearer (ibid). 
 
As we have seen, the capacity to interfere must also be the capacity to interfere arbitrarily. 
More precisely, interference is arbitrary when it is only subject “to the arbitrium, the decision 
or judgment, of the agent; the agent was in a position to choose it or not choose it, at their 
pleasure”, and it is not procedurally forced to track the interests or opinions of those who are 
interfered with (Pettit 1997, 55). In contrast, an act of interference will only be non-arbitrary if 
it is forced to track at least the relevant interests and ideas of the persons subjected to 
interference (ibid). This leaves room for the possibility that an arbitrary act of interference 
may not actually run counter to the interests of the persons who are affected; it is sufficient that 
interference remains unchecked and unconstrained (ibid), or as Meghan Benton puts it, 
unaccountable (2010, 408). Accountability gaps may be said to exist when there are 
insufficient checking mechanisms which necessitate that power is justified to its subjects 
(justification), that subjects of the power are able to protest if their interests fail to be met 
(contestation), and that power-holders are appropriately punished if they do not track power-
subjects’ interests (retribution) (Benton 2010, 408). Furthermore, checking mechanisms must 
be external to the power-wielding groups or persons (Lovett 97); they must not depend on the 
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psychology of the power-holder himself or herself, because they will be unreliable unless they 
are externally backed by a third party, such as constraints on the police that are backed by 
appeal to the courts (ibid).  
 
Even assuming that the above conditions are met – that an agent has the actual capacity to 
arbitrarily interfere with another, in a way that worsens their prospects – Frank Lovett 
suggests that dependency may be a fourth important consideration that determines a 
dominating relationship’s level of intensity. The “greater the dependency of subject persons or 
groups, the more severe their domination will be, other things being equal” (50). Suppose that 
leaving a dominating social relationship would worsen someone’s prospects, and that 
undertaking the move itself would impose further costs and risks (ibid). As these exit costs of 
leaving (which Lovett terms “dependency”) increase for the dominated party, “so too does the 
leeway of the agents of the agents of her domination – they can treat her with greater severity 
in rough proportion to their confidence that she will not leave” (ibid). Importantly, the 
measure of these exit costs is determined subjectively, in line with how the individual in question 
experiences domination; it does not matter if external observers believe that her options 
outside of the dominating relationship are good, or that her exit costs are low (ibid).  
 
b. A necessary condition of social equality 
 
But what, exactly, is the connection between non-domination and moral equality? I will now 
show that non-domination is one of the necessary conditions for social equality. That is, two 
persons cannot relate to each other as social equals if one of them is dominated by the other. 
Significantly, in his conception of non-domination, Pettit begins from the assumption of 
comparative equality I have discussed: that the state ought to be expressively egalitarian in the 
sense that it must manifest an equal degree of respect for each citizen, and that the very 
paradigm of injustice would be a scenario where “those of certain caste or colour, religion, 
gender or ethnicity suffer discrimination under the institutions established by the state” (2012, 
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78). On this analysis, non-domination enters the picture as the currency of egalitarian 
treatment; that is, freedom as non-domination should be the good with respect to which the 
state is required in justice to treat people as equals (Pettit 2012, 81). So, in line with my 
argument in Chapter Two, the state ought to regulate social relations so as to achieve social 
equality between its citizens, such that all groups or individuals are equally free from 
domination. Thus, instead of calling for material equality for equality’s sake, republicans aim 
for a distribution of rights, goods, and resources that secure each individual’s status as safe 
from domination and provides a sufficient degree of free undominated choice (Schuppert 
2015b, 5). But how do we know when social equality has been achieved? Pettit argues that 
people ought to securely enjoy resources and protections up to the point where they satisfy 
what he terms the “eyeball test”, where “they can look others in the eye without reason for the 
fear of deference that a power of interference might inspire; they can walk tall and assume the 
public status, objective and subjective, of being equal in this regard with the best” (2012, 84).    
 
It may be asked, however, why we should turn to domination as the currency of social equality. 
Republicans believe that domination is the main source of social inequality, as it forces peoples 
into the positions of inferiors, rather than social equals, through their deleterious effects on 
self-respect and autonomy. It subjects them to demeaning and debasing treatment that 
expresses contempt for their equal worth.  For example, Lovett observes that the symbolic 
structure of domination comprises rituals of deference and debasement on the subjects’ part, 
combined with disrespect and contempt on the powerful agent’s (132-133). To elaborate on 
this claim, I will outline two reasons for thinking that domination creates social inequality.  
 
Firstly, domination leads to social inequality because the choices and options available to the 
dominated party can be controlled by another. Even if they are not presently interfered with, 
interference may occur at any given moment. It becomes challenging, for the dominated 
party, to cultivate and pursue their own autonomous goals and projects, as the choices that 
are available to them, or the outcomes of their choices, are highly unstable; they may, at any 
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moment, shift, distort, and disappear in accordance with the arbitrary decisions of the 
dominator, who cannot be held accountable for their behaviour. While it is bad enough to 
have one’s choices intentionally curtailed, unpredictability leads to an “extra malaise” (Pettit 
1997, 85); it forces the dominated party to endure high levels of uncertainty, as they are 
unable to foresee when interference would occur, given its arbitrary basis. Consequently, 
planning one’s autonomous pursuits becomes very difficult, and is likely to produce a high 
level of anxiety (ibid). A closely related point is that those who are dominated may also be 
forced to overcompensate and take evasive measures against the danger of interference, 
hoarding goods or lowering life expectations accordingly (Lovett 132).  Overall, the subjects of 
domination will be heavily restricted in their ability to freely formulate their own life plans, to 
the extent that they may even give up the idea of formulating personal goals or aims at all 
(ibid). They are forced to settle for a subordinate mode of existence, structured by the 
omnipresent power of another.  
 
Secondly, domination would also create a need for strategic deference or anticipation to those 
who hold power over us (Pettit 1997, 86); it compels us to behave as inferiors, relating to 
others in a fawning and servile manner. This is because domination would force us to “keep a 
weather eye on the powerful, anticipating what they will expect of you and trying to please 
them, or anticipating where they will be and trying to stay out of their way” (ibid), so as to 
reduce the likelihood of their exercising the power to interfere with us. For example, imagine 
a world in which women become adept at placating men, or at not crossing their paths, 
because it represents the best prospect for minimizing arbitrary interference from them (Pettit 
1997, 87). They would be forced to flatter men, speak in a pleasing tone of voice, and bend to 
their will at the first sign of conflict, for fear of the dire consequences that might otherwise 
ensue. While this phenomenon leads to a “serious cost”, as it requires the agent to curtail their 
own choices in order to achieve non-interference (Pettit 1997, 87), what is at stake is not just 
the agent’s freedom but also their ability to relate to others as equals. They must recognise that they 
are “vulnerable to the whim of another, and have an inferior social status to that other”. In 
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stark contrast to his description of dominating relations between persons, consider Pettit’s 
powerful depiction of social relations in the ideal republican society, when equal degrees of 
non-domination for all persons has been achieved: 
 
In the received republican image, free persons can walk tall, and look others in the eye. 
They do not depend on anyone’s grace or favour for being able to choose their mode of 
life. And they relate to one another in a shared, mutually reinforcing consciousness of 
enjoying this independence. Thus, in the established terms of republican denigration, 
they do not have to bow or scrape, toady or kowtow, fawn or flatter; they do not have to 
placate any others with beguiling smiles or mincing steps. In short, they do not have to 
live on their wits, whether out of fear or deference. They are their own men and women, 
and however deeply they bind themselves to one another, as in love or friendship or trust, 
they do so freely, reaching out to one another from positions of relatively equal strength.
 
(Pettit 2012, 82) 
In this picture, the absence of domination leads to ideal conditions of social equality, where 
people stand in equal relation to each other, rather than in hierarchical social relations where 
inferiors face regular “denigration” at the hands of their superiors, and the conditions of 
unfreedom that arise from it. 
 
Importantly, while I have sought to argue that non-domination is indispensable to social 
equality, I do not claim that it is sufficient for social equality and, by extension, the comparative 
requirement of moral respect. Restricting one’s analysis to the negative impacts of domination 
may mean to the failure to “deal adequately with other instances of social and structural 
inequality, and people’s associated vulnerabilities” (Schuppert 2015b, 8). Even if domination 
is applicable to a large range of cases, the basic focus of domination remains on one agent’s 
power to arbitrarily interfere with another, and the only inequalities of status that we must 
condemn are those which stem from dominating power imbalances between two agents, with 
one having a degree of control over the other (ibid). However, within contemporary societies, 
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dominating relationships are not the only issue that can impact people’s equal social status, or 
range and quality of available choices (ibid).  I will return to this point, and its implications for 
detention and deportation in Section 4. 
 
4. The republican critique of detention and deportation 
 
a. Why are detention and deportation dominating practices? 
 
Now that I have established the relation between domination and moral equality, this section 
will focus on fleshing out the claim that detention and deportation subject immigrants to 
domination, and thus violates the state’s duty to uphold the social equality of immigrants. For 
this reason, they should be eliminated, or are the very least, subject to serious deform.  
 
It is useful to note that republicans have started extending the theory of non-domination 
beyond the boundaries of nation-states, and to the distinct issue of how non-citizens ought to be 
treated by potential receiving countries (Costa 1). For example, Iseult Honohan has pointed 
out that “[m]igration is an area in which the theory of domination may seem to have 
particular relevance”, because states participate in the widespread exercise of broad 
discretionary procedures over determining entry and exclusion (32). Furthermore, non-
citizens are particularly vulnerable to domination by the state “insofar as they lack the power 
to contest its decisions politically, and insofar as its powers over them are more discretionary 
than over citizens” (ibid). Sarah Fine also notes that republicanism “appears well equipped to 
diagnose at least some of the distinctive ills that can accompany the precarious status of 
certain classes of migrant in certain contexts” (2014, 14). These include the situation of the 
stateless who are dominated by multiple parties, including, but not limited to the expelling or 
denationalizing state, border officials, and private citizens like employers, landlords and 
traffickers (Fine 2014, 15), or the status of resident non-citizens, like undocumented migrants, 
and unskilled migrants from poor and weak states (Fine 2014, 16). I will now proceed in the 
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same spirit, showing how republicanism can also shed important light on what can be 
wrongful about enforcement practices like detention and deportation. 
 
Assuming the concept of domination I sketched out in the previous section, how are detention 
and deportation dominating towards immigrants? Firstly, border enforcement authorities 
clearly have the effective capacity to interfere with immigrants. While they have manpower 
and resources that may be used to coerce immigrants at their disposal, they also, to a large 
extent, have the capacity to determine and adjust the terms of detention and deportation; that 
is, the grounds on which a non-citizen can be detained or deported, and the conditions under 
which detention or deportation is conducted.  
 
Secondly, they also have the capacity to interfere arbitrarily. Migration decisions are 
traditionally associated with a wide breadth of discretion, and a large scope for unchecked 
executive action (Dauvergne 6). Honohan observes that arbitrariness arises from the greater 
prevalence of discretionary powers in the realm of migration, compared to other areas of 
domestic policy; “agencies and officials are given wide powers, often laid down without 
legislative provision or oversight; their decisions are often not subject to review, judicial or 
otherwise; the framework within which they make decisions is often neither clearly laid out 
nor well known to citizens as well as non-citizens” (40). Similarly, Benton draws attention to 
the accountability gap that exists when “governments do not have to give reasons for their 
decisions to the non-citizen populace in the same way as the citizen electorate and they are 
not forced to be responsive to their interests through the democratic process” (2010, 408). 
Accountability is needed to ensure that immigrants have a voice (Benton 2014, 62) with which 
they can contest, or have some sway over how border coercion is practised, alongside the 
existence of an alternative agency that can impose penalties on the host government if they 
fail to track the interests of immigrants (ibid).  
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To be sure, accountability mechanisms do exist for some non-immigrants, but these vary with 
their country of origin. European Union citizens, in particular, enjoy strong accountability 
mechanisms, such as the protection of European Union institutions, local political rights and 
European courts; similarly, citizens of countries with considerable international clout tend to 
have their interests safeguarded (Benton 2014, 58). However, in contrast, immigrants from 
countries that have little diplomatic influence are more vulnerable (ibid). The point is that 
there are no accountability mechanisms within states that are specially designed to protect the 
interests of all who are subjected to detention or deportation. Furthermore, the lack of 
external checking mechanisms has been proven to have an adverse impact on non-citizens’ 
interests. For example, in interviews with ex-detainees, Coffey et al found that every 
participant reported multiple instances of injustices experienced in detention. These injustices 
fell into the following three broad categories: being subject to criminalizing, punitive and 
humiliating practices and behaviours; instances of apparent disregard for due process relating 
to visa applications; and experiences relating to the perceived arbitrariness, inhumanity and 
senselessness of rule-making in detention (2074). Domination seems to be perfectly on the 
mark in capturing what is distinctively wrong about these practices. 
 
Thirdly, such arbitrary interference worsens immigrants’ situation by altering their range of 
options and forcing them to change their behaviour in response. Detention and deportation 
does this in an obvious sense, insofar as non-citizens are forcefully detained or forced to leave 
the country. But there are also subtle ways where some immigrants who are threatened by 
coercion have their choices interfered with. In light of their precarious status, they must also 
be constantly wary of interference by non-state actors like employers and landlords (Honohan 
39), as well as checks, raids, or arrests by the police, as in the cases I mentioned in Section 2.. 
This forces them to “bow and scrape” to the people perceived as having the power to turn 
them over to border authorities. While these issues particularly affect irregular migrants, they 
also have an impact on the lives of non-citizens who fall into the “pure” category that I 
delineated in the Introduction. For example, in the UK, it is compulsory for international 
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students from an extensive list of countries, including Brazil, China, Russia, and Turkey, to 
register with the police and obtain a “Police Registration Certificate”, even though their 
information is already held by the UK Border Agency (Ratcliffe). The point of the 
registration, it seems, is to send the message that the police can crack down on them at any 
moment, should they be suspected of posing a security threat. 
 
Lastly, Lovett’s notion of dependency seems particularly applicable to the relationship between 
immigrants and the receiving state. It is surely true that some groups of immigrants are more 
seriously dominated than others, and the extent of their domination seems to be strongly 
correlated with the high exit costs attached to their leaving the state in question. As Benton 
explains, 
 
On one side of the spectrum, refugees are clearly completely unable to leave the country 
as they cannot return to their home country for fear of persecution, nor do they have the 
right to claim asylum in a new country. Migrants who face destitution or other dire 
circumstances if they must return home have similarly high exit costs. On the other side 
of the spectrum, members of the cosmopolitan elite, employees of multinational firms, 
and certain groups of students are actively recruited by many governments to the extent 
that they hold considerable power in the form of the threat to ‘take their business 
elsewhere’ (409, 2010).  
 
However, this does not mean that more independent migrants are free from domination. 
Benton goes on to clarify that for some relatively independent immigrants, dependence 
increases with the passage of time if they take up residence or “denizenship” in the state, as 
they begin to experience significantly high exit costs after a certain time-period (ibid), given 
that their lives tend to become increasingly enmeshed with the state they live in. I think 
Benton’s account is generally correct, but I am not sure that relatively independent 
immigrants can only be dominated after experiencing high exit costs (and thus becoming 
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dependent). They may be dominated even if they remain relatively independent throughout. 
One example of this is the experience of Sabine Parrish, an American PhD applicant. Parrish 
was previously a Master’s student in the UK (Parrish). After her visa expired, she re-entered 
the country to attend an interview for a PhD position at a university (ibid). At the airport, she 
was stopped “on account of not possessing formal letters of invitation for interview by the 
universities”, and the Border Force discovered she did not have sufficient funds in her bank 
account to pay for a full year of study – even if Parrish had not even been accepted to a course 
(ibid). As a result, she spent eight hours in airport detention before being released (ibid). At 
this point, Parrish did not stand in a relationship of dependency with the UK. The only exit costs 
at this point were her inability to attend an interview in person. But this does not change the 
fact that she was vulnerable to arbitrary interference by the state. The same could be said of 
the examples I have offered in Section 2. It would be strange to conclude that the Indian and 
American students were not dominated by their apprehension by border authorities and 
subsequent placement in detention simply because there were no high exit costs attached to 
their leaving the UK. Again, while dependency has a clear bearing on the degree to which the 
exercise of power is problematic (Benton 2010, 409), independence does not guarantee the 
absence of domination. 
 
As a whole, the practices of detention and deportation seem to meet all the conditions for 
domination that I established in Section 3. It is fitting, I think, to conclude this section with 
Shukri’s vivid description of his deportation:  
 
The embarrassment one feels at being dispossessed of one’s travel documents, of being 
escorted through the duty-free shopping area, of being walked past the other passengers 
queuing to board the flight, of having one’s passport and boarding pass handed to the captain 
upon embarkation for the duration of the flight, and of being handed them back only when 
one has disembarked after landing, is acute, the gut-wrenching feeling upon take-off that one 
is being torn away from one’s family and home, more than I can describe…That flight of 
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deportation was a moment of great weakness and dispossession, a reminder that I am a 
muhajir, an immigrant at the mercy of the journey, and vulnerable to the powerful who would enact 
their power over me [my emphasis].  
 
b. The objection from necessity 
 
One possible objection to the claims I have made above may come from an unlikely source: 
Pettit himself. Interestingly, he comments that the right to exclude itself cannot be viewed as 
an instance of domination (2012, 161). This is largely because he believes that “[n]o state can 
open its borders to non-residents in general, on pain of internal malfunction or collapse; as a 
matter of political necessity, every state has to place limits on who can enter and in what 
numbers”, and this entails that states will have to institute selective admission policies (ibid). 
Consequently, when states adopt policies that are non-discriminatory or dominating from the 
point of view of anyone, and you are refused admission under that policy, your exclusion will 
be a “by-product of an independently necessitated, otherwise unobjectionable policy” (Pettit 
2012, 162). Ultimately, while the existing statist world order might be reorganized to contain 
less domination overall, it is due to “historical and political necessity”, not domination, that 
the movement of persons are constrained and they are forced to remain in particular political 
societies, instead of moving to the location of their choice (ibid). The challenge at hand, then, 
is this: detention and deportation may be a necessary component of the right to exclude, and 
therefore not dominating.  
 
We may respond in two different ways. Firstly, we may accept the possibility that the right to 
exclude is not intrinsically dominating, but that detention and deportation may nevertheless 
count as such, because they flout Pettit’s guidelines. Secondly, we may reject Pettit’s claim 
entirely, so that it poses no threat to my own arguments. I will now reject the first conclusion, 
and argue for the second. The first is very appealing, because it seems highly plausible that, 
even if the right to exclude itself is not dominating, there may be modes of enforcing it that 
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are. This mirrors my claim that the right to exclude can be enforced in ways that violate 
moral equality, even if the two are in principle compatible. However, Pettit’s criterion for 
non-dominating immigration practices does not obviously exclude the use of detention and 
deportation. To repeat, he seems to suggest that immigration policies will not be dominating 
unless they exclude or dominate any groups in particular. This would prohibit immigration 
policies where people of a particular race are denied entry, or singled out for arbitrary 
treatment, while others are not. Yet detention and deportation arguably does not violate this 
criterion, because any immigrant can be subjected to these if they flout the rules. The state 
cannot be faulted as long as they do not single out any particular group.  
 
At the same time, the criterion itself is somewhat puzzling. If the exclusion of immigrants is 
non-dominating because it is necessary for reasons of public order, the targeted exclusion of 
particular groups (e.g. the poor and unskilled, or members of religious or ethnic groups that 
have a history of strife with other religious or ethnic groups that already reside in the receiving 
state) may be similarly justified. So it is not at all clear why exclusion becomes dominating 
when it is discriminatory from someone’s point of view. Alternatively, we may say that the 
exclusion of particular groups is dominating regardless of whether it is justified by necessity. 
However, if we admit that practices can be dominating even when they are in some sense 
“necessary”, it becomes an open question why border controls in general are not dominating.  
 
For these reasons, I think the second reply is preferable. We should reject the claim that 
border controls are not dominating, as long as they are necessary. Even if some forms of 
domination are strictly “necessary” to prevent further domination, it seems more accurate to 
call them “justified interference” instead of “non-domination” (Costa 7). The fact that open 
borders might lead to an increase in domination inside society beyond an acceptable 
threshold is perfectly consistent with the recognition that those potentially excluded by 
borders are dominated, because they are subject to interference that is not forced to track 
their interests (Costa 8). Here, my opponent could point out that I have only moved my 
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argument one step backwards: detention and deportation may count as instances of justified 
interference. But the fact that a potentially dominating policy or institution can be justified on 
some independent grounds does not mean that we need not embark on establishing the 
proper checks on its exercise of power. For example, the fact that the coercive rule of law is 
“independently necessitated” (Pettit 2012, 163) even in the absence of checks does not mean 
that there is no need for procedural checks and balances to prevent it from arbitrarily 
interfering with the persons subjected to it. Likewise, the possibility that detention and 
deportation may be “independently necessitated” does not preclude the imperative to 
introduce effective accountability mechanisms, or create cosmopolitan democratic institutions 
in which border controls are actually justified to both citizens and non-citizens (Abizadeh 48). 
Even so, it may well be the case that detention and deportation carry too much inherent risk 
for the arbitrary exercise of power over non-citizens. However, it is beyond the scope of my 
chapter to speculate about whether detention and deportation could theoretically ever be non-
dominating. Rather, as stated in the introduction, I am concerned with how they are currently 
practised. 
 
5. Social inequality without domination 
 
To briefly summarise my claims thus far: after explaining why domination is an essential 
component of social equality, I have shown that detention and deportation violate the state’s 
duty to uphold the social equality of immigrants, because these practices subject them to 
domination. In the final section, I will now return to an earlier point: that while non-
domination is necessary for social equality, it is not a sufficient condition of it. Social equality 
cannot be fulfilled and safeguarded through the ideal of non-domination alone (Schemmel 7). 
As a result, by restricting our analysis of detention and deportation to the republican 
framework, we risk missing out on other aspects of these practices that run counter to social 
equality. Drawing from Marie Garrau and Cecile Laborde’s work, I will argue that they result 
in harms to social equality that cannot be fully captured in terms of domination. In fact, 
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detention and deportation are good examples of state practices that may worsen the social 
inequality of some groups even if they do not dominate them. To show this, I elaborate on both 
the post-detention experiences of ex-detainees, and of the social effects that these practices 
have on minority citizens. 
 
Garrau and Laborde propose that there are social processes that lead to social inequality, but 
cannot be adequately captured by the framework of domination alone (18). Recall that on 
Pettit’s account, the agent who dominates must have the actual capacity to interfere, not just 
hypothetical. In other words, they must have the ability to change the choice set available to 
the dominated party; for example, by attaching high costs to some options or eliminating 
others (Garrau and Laborde 19). However, Garrau and Laborde contend that there may still 
be unequal or hierarchical relationships based on a structural imbalance of power that affects 
individuals’ “conception of themselves and their ability to think of themselves as agents 
capable of choice”, rather than their set of options itself. In other words, an agent may stand 
in unequal relation to another by virtue of their own self-conception, even if they are not 
dominated. Often “[t]hose who were once subjected to domination or who grew up in a social 
environment that still bears the mark of past relationships of domination, may no longer be 
dominated in Pettit’s sense, but they still suffer the effects of domination” (Garrau and 
Laborde 20).  
 
To illustrate this point, Garrau and Laborde draw attention to how women continue to suffer 
various forms of social inequality, despite the social and legal opportunities that are now 
available to them. This is largely due, they suggest, to how women have often internalized 
particular social norms (for example, that they are better suited to domestic forms of work) 
that mire them in a position of subordination. To quote Garrau and Laborde, “Such norms 
and representations categorise social agents, attribute differential meanings and values to their 
social positions and identities, and equip them with unequal social power” (21). Thus, past 
experiences or pervasive social conditioning serve to entrench social norms in dominated 
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agents themselves, such that they are unable to function as fully autonomous beings even in the 
absence of domination. 
 
However, I think it is worth making a more precise distinction between people who have 
suffered domination before, and who are unable to shake off the damage to their self-respect 
due to the norms they have internalized consequent on the dominating relationship, and 
people who have not, or will never be dominated in the relevant sense, but whose self-conception 
nevertheless closely resembles that of dominated agents’. The women that Garrau and 
Laborde discuss seem to fall into the second category. They behave as though they were 
dominated, even if actual domination was only real for women of the past. The former 
category would apply, however, to an individual who has spent a considerable period of time 
as a slave, and unsurprisingly, upon their release, finds themselves unable to recover their 
autonomy, or their ability to see themselves as free agents. It is also worth noting that both 
categories may be applicable to a single individual. For example, a woman who has left an 
abusive relationship may finds herself internalizing misogynistic norms imposed by her 
abusive partner, on top of the patriarchal social beliefs more widely shared by society. I will 
now consider these two categories in relation to the effects on persons produced by border 
coercion. 
 
The fact that social inequality may persist long after domination has ended is highly 
applicable to those who have once been subjected to detention. Firstly, consider the well-
documented after-effects of detention. Coffey et al state that “immigration detention for 
protracted periods may have many psychological effects, associated with, for example, the 
deprivation of liberty itself, the lengthy period of uncertainty with regard to visa applications, 
the social isolation detention imposes, and the nature of the detention environment” (2071). 
Significantly, the Australian ex-detainees they interviewed all experienced severe difficulties 
after release from detention, which continued to manifest even after they gained permanent 
residency. These included “ongoing experiences of insecurity and injustice, difficulties with 
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relationships, profound changes to view of self and mental health symptoms (Coffey et al 
2075).  
 
While all these problems are relevant to my analysis, I will focus particularly on the third, as it 
seems to mirror most closely what Garrau and Laborde have in mind. Notably, “a prominent 
recurring theme for almost all participants was their perception that they had changed 
irrevocably as a person. These changes were articulated primarily in relation to a sense of 
having failed in their role as protectors and providers for their families, and as a more general 
loss of agency” (Coffey et al 2076). Furthermore, nearly all participants expressed self-
perception that reflected a loss of agency and sociability; “[a] sense of diminished agency was 
prominent in almost all participants’ accounts of their present lives”, combined with a sense of 
failure (ibid). Overall, we can see how the effects of past domination can continue to linger in 
the psyche, irrevocably altering agents’ sense of self. This self-perceived loss of agency, I 
believe, is detrimental to our capacity to relate to others on terms of equality. If we are mired 
in constant feelings of shame and helplessness, we cannot hold up our heads and lock others in 
the eye, even if they do not wield arbitrary power over us.  
 
At the same time, detention and deportation may also give rise to the second kind of case that 
Garrau and Laborde describe: where agents who are not dominated, in reality, may 
effectively continue to feel or act as if they are. Consider what José Jorge Mendoza terms 
“xenophobic profiling”, where the state’s enforcement agencies, like the border patrol, feel 
justified in citing “Mexican appearance” as sufficient cause to warrant stopping or 
interrogating people they come into contact with (74). For example, in United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, Felix Humberto Brignoni-Ponce and his two passengers had their car stopped by roving 
border patrol agents, on the basis that they all had a “Mexican appearance” (ibid). The court 
ruled that, while border patrol agents could not stop people for having a “Mexican 
appearance” alone, due to worries about undocumented Mexican immigrants, “Mexican 
appearance” could lawfully be used as a relevant factor for a stop (ibid). Given that roughly 80 
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percent of irregular migrants are of Latin American descent, “[t]his means that aggressive 
internal enforcement strategies, such as attrition through enforcement, will disproportionally 
target citizens who are (or appear to be) of Latin American descent, even though the vast 
majority of Latino/as in the US are legally present (Mendoza 75, my emphasis). The same 
worry about ethnic profiling might perhaps apply to deportation, given that nearly 6 out of 
every 10 people deported or voluntarily removed from the UK in 2014 were citizens of Asian 
countries, with nationals of India, Pakistan, and China making up 40% of the total (Blinder 2). 
An incident where the UK Border Agency accidentally sent text messages that read “Our 
records show you may not have leave to remain in the UK. Please contact us to discuss your 
case” to Suresh Grover, a civil rights activist, and Bobby Chan, an immigration lawyer, who 
were both British citizens, may be an example of this (Metro). 
 
As a result, even if citizens may not actually face domination, as they cannot be detained or 
deported, border enforcement agents may still treat them with immense suspicion and 
disrespect. This is at least partially attributable to the social norms instituted in coercive 
border practices, which serve to generate xenophobic attitudes and beliefs against particular 
communities in particular (Mendoza 76). These include, for example, the stereotype that 
Latinos are inherently suspicious and alien. The fact that Latino citizens do enjoy a degree of 
indemnity against border coercion does not negate the harmful consequences of profiling, 
which include the higher likelihood of being asked to produce documents to prove their 
immigration status, lower likelihood of using government services or travelling abroad, or 
even having more difficulty finding work or housing (Pew Hispanic Center Survey). While 
increased scrutiny clearly reduces autonomy through decreasing their opportunities, it also 
has an effect on their self-perception, as they are equally made to feel as if they are unwelcome 
outsiders who must remain vigilant about the constant threat of state interference, and forgo 
opportunities that they are entitled to (such as access to government services) in order to avoid 
apparent risks. It is also not difficult to see how beliefs about one’s vulnerability to domination 
might flourish in this climate, regardless of how true they are. As Deepa Fernandez recounts, 
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[A student] said that he was scared that he and his parents might be reported, even 
though they had done nothing wrong. My instinct was to ask him if he was 
undocumented, but I caught myself, realizing the intrusiveness of my question. So instead 
I asked him why he feared deportation, and he told me that he was not “illegal”, that he 
was a citizen, but that his parents were only green-card holders. Yet he said he was 
frightened because his boss at the deli where he works regularly threatens the staff by 
saying that he will call immigration. My student honestly believed that citizens could be 
deported. (241) 
 
This unsettling incident underscores the point that detention and deportation may affect the 
social equality of citizens even if they do not dominate them, strictly speaking. In this sense, the 
domination framework is insufficient to account for the broader social harm of detention and 
deportation. 
 
To conclude this section, I have shown that the state’s practices of detention and deportation 
can harm the social equality of persons, immigrants and citizens alike, even if they do not 
dominate them.  This can be said of ex-detainees who suffered a diminished lack of agency, 
even after their release, as well as citizens from minority groups who are aggressively profiled 
by enforcement authorities. In light of my analysis, contrary to what Pettit has suggested, it is 




In this chapter, by bridging the gap between social equality and republicanism, I have sought 
to provide a normative analysis of immigration detention and deportation, and a new 
argument for why these practices are impermissible. In particular, as detention and 
deportation serve to dominate immigrants, they are fundamentally incompatible with the 
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state’s duty to uphold social equality between immigrants and citizens, which prescribes that 
the state must refrain from introducing or maintaining policies that harm the social equality of 
immigrants. At the same time, although the work of republicans has been essential to my 
critique, I have also argued that detention and deportation can harm the social equality of 
certain groups even if it does not dominate them. This gives us reason to doubt that non-
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It has been suggested that states have no right to directly discriminate against would-be 
immigrants on grounds of race or sex. This anti-discrimination principle must hold even 
assuming what Joseph Carens calls “the conventional view”, that states have a right to exclude 
non- citizens (2008, 165). However, while the discourse on cases of wrongful discrimination 
has largely focused on discrimination on grounds of gender, race, and sexual orientation, 
states frequently engage in discrimination of a different kind when it comes to admissions and 
naturalisation policies. As Ayelet Shachar and Ran Hirschl note, governments pick winners 
“through fast-tracked, strategic grants of citizenship for those with exceptional skills and 
extraordinary talent, while at the same time holding other categories of immigration 
applicants to ever stricter admission and permission-to-stay requirements” (71). It is assumed 
that the anti-discrimination principle does not include such cases of talent-
based discrimination, and that these fall well within the rights of states. I wish to suggest, to 
the contrary, that selecting immigrants on the basis of talent is a form of wrongful 
discrimination. While I do not argue that it is never permissible, in principle, to select 
immigrants on the basis of particular skills, my account draws attention to the demeaning relation 
between states’ current preference for the highly-skilled, and their exclusion of the low-skilled.  
Recalling the argument I have made in Chapter Two, and consistent with my critique of 
detention and domination in Chapter Three, skill-based selection violates the state’s duty to 
uphold the social equality of non-citizens by expressing disrespect for their equal moral status. 
 
In Section 2, with reference to Deborah Hellman’s expressive theory of discrimination, I 
explain what is wrongful about particular forms of state discrimination between would-be 
migrants. Next, in Section 3, I tackle the issue of immigrant selection on grounds of talent, 
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which I refer to as “talent-based selection”. Unlike gender or race-based selection, it is 
generally not regarded as wrongful discrimination, for the reason that it does not express 
disrespect in the same way that sexist or racist selection criteria does. I argue that this 
assumption is mistaken, as talent-based discrimination does involve the expression of 
disrespect. In the existing social context, and in its current form, it has the expressive effect of 
reproducing demeaning stereotypes about low-skilled foreigners. Finally, in Section 4, I 
anticipate four objections to my conclusion. 
 
2. What is wrongful discrimination? 
 
Before I commence my discussion of wrongful discrimination, two conceptual clarifications 
will be made. Firstly, while the word “discrimination” is often pejoratively used, it is possible 
to subscribe to a non-moralized sense of discrimination, where saying that someone 
discriminates is simply to say that the person distinguishes or differentiates, and it remains an 
open question whether this is bad or not (Singer 202). My theory of discrimination prefers the 
non-moralized use of “discrimination” for two reasons. Firstly, there exist morally neutral 
cases of discrimination; for example, if I discriminate between singers with alto and soprano 
voices when picking someone for the leading role in an opera. There also exist morally 
appropriate or fitting forms of discrimination; for example, if I discriminate between people 
who need help and those who do not, in deciding how to allocate aid. To account for these 
cases, I will use “discrimination” in the non-moralized sense, indicating wrongfulness by 
referring to it as “wrongful discrimination”. 
 
Secondly, as discrimination simply refers to differential treatment, and not only negative 
differential treatment, there exist positive forms of discrimination, where individuals are given 
particular benefits on the basis of their possessing some attribute. These stand in contrast to 
negative forms of discrimination, where individuals are denied particular benefits or suffer harm 
on the basis of their possessing some attribute. I acknowledge that there can be wrongful 
	   115 
positive forms of discrimination. That is, it can be wrong to benefit someone merely because 
they possess some trait, such as a case where female students are given free extra-curricular 
tuition, based on the assumption that they will be slower to understand scientific concepts 
than male students. However, in this paper, I will focus exclusively on negative forms of 
discrimination in the realm of immigration, leaving out cases of positive discrimination from 
my analysis. 
 
a. Wrongful discrimination and immigration 
 
Many agree that immigration policies that directly discriminate between candidates for 
admission on the basis of gender or race are wrongful. For example, David Miller regards 
“discrimination on grounds of race, sex, or, in most instances, religion” to be indefensible 
under any circumstance, because it is insulting for would-be immigrants to be told that they 
belong to the wrong race or sex, or have the wrong colour, given how “these features do not 
connect to anything of real significance to the society they want to join” (2013, 204). 
However, Miller’s explanation of why such discrimination is wrong is unsatisfying in three 
serious ways. 
  
First, he cannot mean that discrimination is wrong insofar as would-be migrants feel insulted. I 
might feel extremely offended, were I told that the people of the United Kingdom do not need 
my highly specific and well-honed furniture-testing skill. Yet this is not, in itself, a compelling 
reason to think that I have been wrongfully discriminated against. Or imagine that the 
potential migrants who are rejected for wrongfully discriminatory reasons take the news in 
good stride; it is no skin off their noses. But the fact they are not offended does not seem to 
neutralise the wrongfulness of the immigration policy in question. Overall, it seems that the 
insult in the immigration policy must operate independently of the discriminatees’ subjective 
responses. 
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Second, it is unclear what Miller means by race, sex, or religion not connecting to anything 
of real significance for the society in question. Could a racist state not insist that maintaining a 
homogenous racial identity is extremely important for members of its society? An Australian 
minister of immigration, for example, claimed that nobody could reasonably object to 
Australians, as a whole, seeking to create a racially homogenous nation (Carens 1988, 165). 
But another way of interpreting “real significance” is to say that gender and race are 
objectively irrelevant grounds for immigrant selection, regardless of how existing members of 
the state feel. Even if I strongly desire to award an essay prize to the most attractive 
philosopher, and it is of enormous importance for me that I do that, good looks are an entirely 
irrelevant reason for awarding someone an essay prize. However, why is race an objectively 
irrelevant criteria for selecting immigrants? Certainly, good looks have nothing to do with 
how well-written one’s philosophy is, but it begs the question against a “White Australia” 
advocate to say that race is irrelevant to the goal of securing Australia’s national identity and 
culture.  
 
Finally, pointing out their irrelevance does not seem to fully explain why we think some forms 
of discrimination are so wrong. For example, the Chinese Exclusion Acts, which barred entry 
to Chinese immigrants, was founded on the belief that Chinese people were fundamentally 
strange and inassimilable and ultimately incapable of comprehending republican values 
(Volpp 470). Locating wrongfulness in its use of “irrelevant” or “unimportant” criteria makes 
it sound as though those behind US border policy merely used arbitrary or irrational criteria 
about who to take in, like if I were to select my marriage partner based on how round their 
head is, or how many pairs of purple socks they have. But this is hardly the full story. It seems 
a big part of why the Chinese Exclusion Acts were morally egregious is that they were 
primarily driven by beliefs in the innate inferiority of Chinese people, and an attitude of 
profound contempt towards them. In this sense, they were not, strictly speaking, arbitrary or 
irrational; instead, they were based on a set of widely shared racist views that seemed perfectly 
rational to hold at the time. Similarly, racially segregated public toilets for black and white 
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people are not wrong because one’s race is irrelevant to which toilet he or she uses, and 
because it is irrational to separate toilets on such grounds. Rather, they are wrong because 
they are based on the view that black people are lower in status than white people, and thus 
ought not to share the same facilities as them. Simply shrugging these cases off as applications 
of objectively irrelevant criteria means stopping short of morally evaluating why such criteria 
were used in the first place, and confronting the racist attitudes that underpinned them.  
 
b. The status-harm theory of discrimination 
 
Following Owen Fiss, one possibility is that discrimination is wrong when it results in ‘status-
harm’ to members of a specially disadvantaged group who suffer from socioeconomic and 
political disadvantage (155). According to this view, discrimination is wrong because it worsens 
the position of an already marginalized group. For example, as Peter Higgins writes, virtually 
all past or ongoing exclusions on the basis of perceived race, religion, and sexual preference 
are plainly unjust because denial of their admission avoidably harms unjustly disadvantaged 
groups, including members of the same or similar groups who are already present in the 
receiving country (ibid). This is because “such policies intimate an official belief in the 
inferiority of members of excluded groups, and thereby make domestic members of excluded 
groups (more) vulnerable to discrimination and oppression” (ibid). The “status-harm” account 
could do well in answering the concerns I outlined above. First, it gives those who are 
excluded on the basis of their gender or race an objective reason for feeling insulted, if their 
already disadvantaged position in society would be worsened as a result. On top of this, it 
would give us a prima facie reason to criticise the “White Australia” policy, even if race was of 
special significance to Australians. It would not matter that race does connect to something of 
“real significance”; what matters is whether or not it will worsen the status of an already 
disadvantaged group. Finally, it would also help to complete our account of why the Chinese 
Exclusion Acts were wrong; they did not merely involve the employment of arbitrary or 
irrational criteria, but criteria that worsened the position of a disadvantaged group. 
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However, this suggestion suffers from two major limitations. To understand why, it is 
necessary to take a closer look at what counts as “status-harm”. According to Fiss, in the 
realm of discriminatory employment criteria, a full theory of status-harm could have to 
include an assessment of the status or prestige of the job itself, the public visibility of the 
position, how diffuse the exclusionary impact is, and how strongly the criterion can be justified 
(158-9). To extrapolate from this, the wrongfulness of a discriminatory immigration policy 
could be assessed according to factors like the global status of the state in question (e.g. 
exclusion from a rich superpower could be much worse for a group’s status than exclusion 
from a relatively small and poor one), or the visibility of the exclusion (e.g. it would be worse if 
the group was excluded on a large and visible scale, compared to instances where only one or 
two members who wish to enter are denied the opportunity). But this seems odd. For 
example, it does not seem less wrongful for Burkina Faso to racially discriminate against a 
particular group than for a wealthy superpower like the United States, even if exclusion from 
the latter would affect the group’s status on a larger scale. At the same time, it seems that a 
racist exclusion policy remains seriously wrong even if hardly anyone is aware of it, because it 
is practised by a relatively obscure country (e.g. Micronesia) and no one from the excluded 
group actually attempts to enter it. The wrongfulness of a racist immigration policy does not 
seem to vary in accordance with the scale of its disadvantageous impact. 
 
Furthermore, suppose that the exclusion of a racial group would have the unexpected effect of 
further improving the status of group members who are present in the receiving state, because 
members of the dominant race are satisfied that they are unlikely to be present in large 
enough numbers to take over the country, and thus no longer constitute a threat, or perhaps 
even because group members tend to favour certain occupations, and there will be less 
competition for prestigious positions within those occupations than if more members of the 
group were to enter the receiving state. But as the status-harm view locates the wrongfulness 
of discrimination in how it worsens disadvantage, discrimination that confers unexpected 
advantage cannot be wrongful on its account. From here, we have two options. One is to 
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maintain that discrimination could still be wrong even if it has the surprising consequence of 
improving the group’s status, except for reasons extrinsic to status-harm. This would not 
necessarily impugn the widespread applicability or appeal of the status-harm view. Another is 
to concede that discrimination is not wrong when it has the effect of improving group status. 
Yet both these options seem unattractive. Firstly, if the status-harm view cannot, on its own, 
explain the wrongfulness of discrimination that improves group status, why not prefer other 
accounts that can readily offer an explanation? On the other hand, conceding that exclusion 
would not be wrongful if it improves the status of the group in question seems to misrepresent 
how we generally view discrimination. Peculiar or unforeseen circumstances could plausibly 
lead to many situations where discriminatory policies we normally consider to be wrongful 
end up improving the position of a disadvantaged group. But it would be deeply unappealing 
for the wrongfulness of a discriminatory policy to depend in part on the circumstances that 
materialize after its implementation.  
 
c. The expressive theory of disrespect 
 
A better account of why racist immigration policies are wrong is that they express disrespect for 
particular groups. Specifically, they violate the comparative requirement of respect by treating 
people in ways that rejects their moral equality. Notably, disrespect need not apply only to 
presently disadvantaged groups, or be accompanied by bad consequences. This falls in line 
with Hellman’s expressive theory of discrimination, to which I now turn. At the heart of 
Hellman’s account is the “bedrock moral principle” I have been committed to: the equal 
moral worth, or equal humanity of all persons (6). The belief that some types of people are of 
greater moral worth than others is intrinsically wrong, as it is reflective of an incorrect moral 
judgment (Alexander 161). It is this concern for upholding moral respect that animates 
Hellman’s account of wrongful discrimination.  
 
For Hellman, an instance of discrimination is wrongful when it “distinguish[es] among people 
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on the basis of an attribute when doing so demeans any of the people affected”; that is, it 
disrespects discriminatees in a way that denies their equal moral worth (7-8). As she observes, 
 
…the point of prohibiting discrimination is not to forbid distinguishing between people – 
differentiation is important and even necessary in some instances. Neither is it to insure 
that we always act efficiently and sensibly. Stupid or careless judgment, without more, is 
not of particular concern from the perspective of equality. Rather the point of equality is 
to treat one another as equals, and thus the wrong of discrimination is to fail to treat 
people as equals. We do that when we differentiate among people in a manner that ranks 
some as less morally worthy than others. This is the concern that fuels our worries about 
classification and differentiation. (Hellman 204) 
 
Furthermore, as I have emphasized in Chapter Two, demeaning also need not be intentional 
or explicit. After all, only a select number of wrongful discrimination cases occur because 
discriminators intentionally wish to mark discriminatees out as unequals. Those accused of 
wrongfully discriminatory practices are often very quick to assure their detractors that 
they do afford the affected parties equal respect. For example, a racist state may deny that they 
see potential immigrants of certain races as morally unequal; they may simply claim that they 
prefer mixing with their own race, just as how Jim Crow laws claimed to leave black people 
“separate but equal”. For this reason, it is sufficient that the act is expressive of disrespect. 
Whether or not it constitutes a rejection of others’ equal humanity, again, is dependent on our 
shared history and cultural conventions (Hellman 35). Consequently, there are no objective 
criteria for what constitutes a demeaning act; the question of whether or not something is 
demeaning will have to be decided with reference to the relevant cultural context. In some 
cases, this will prove no easy task, but I do not regard potential difficulties as a theoretical 
flaw. Disrespect is often frustratingly complex. As the writer Toni Morrison aptly observed, 
expressions of hateful prejudice have “mysterious definitions but clear meanings”. The slurs 
themselves may lack offensive dictionary definitions, but it is obvious to their targets that they 
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are meant to demean. The same can be said of discrimination. It may not be immediately 
apparent why an act of discrimination demeans, and it will take time to tease out a cultural 
analysis – tell a story, as it were – about why the selection or differential treatment in question 
is loaded with disrespect. Take, for example, how black prisoners in apartheid South Africa 
were made to wear shorts, while white prisoners wore pants (Hellman 5). This form of 
discrimination was not self-evidently demeaning to the black prisoners. They may even have 
felt more comfortable in the sweltering heat. But to understand what made this act of 
discrimination wrong, we need to look to the sartorial culture of the postcolonial regime, and 
how it viewed shorts as infantilizing (ibid). It is only then that we can understand how this 
different uniform symbolically reflected the black prisoners’ disrespected status.  
 
In summary, to decide on whether or not an act of discrimination is wrongful, we must refer 
to our existing social conventions and understandings to see if the differential treatment is 
charged with particular disrespectful meanings. I will now go on to explain what talent-based 
selection is, and how it passes both these tests.  
 
3. Talent and wrongful discrimination 
 
a. Talent-based selection 
   
Ayelet Shachar observes that “a growing number of well-off countries [are vying] to attract 
and retain skilled migrants with abundant talent” (2088). This occurs amidst increasing 
pressure on competing nations to transform citizenship into a tradable good that will help 
them recruit the world’s “best and brightest” (Shachar and Hirschl 2013, 73). The practice of 
making immigration and naturalisation accessible to ‘talented’ people has been termed 
“Olympic citizenship” by Shachar and Hirschl, in reference to governments attempting to 
attract accomplished athletes to represent them in the Olympic games by fast-tracking their 
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citizenship, although it now applies to the business of attracting many different types of 
“Olympians”, not just the athletically-skilled. As Shachar and Hirschl write, 
  
Just as they introduce restrictions on most other categories of entrants, governments are 
proactively ‘picking winners’ who are fast-tracked to citizenship based on their skills, 
innovation, and potential contribution to the country’s stature, economic growth, and 
international reputation. From the wealthy and highly educated, to top scientists, elite 
athletes, world-class artists, and successful entrepreneurs and innovators, a citizenship-
for-talent exchange – what we might call Olympic citizenship – is on the rise. (2013, 73)  
 
It is tempting to see talent-based selection as applying only to exceptionally talented 
individuals, in a number of extraordinary cases that do not bear much on the selection 
patterns. For example, Anna Netrebko, a Russian-born opera star soprano singer, was 
granted fast-tracked Austrian citizenship due to her status as one of the world’s most 
distinguished singers – in the process evading the nationality test that most applicants would 
have to take (Shachar and Hirschl 2014, 238). However, in other cases, the basic machinery 
of states’ immigration bureaucracy routinely scrutinises the talent levels of ordinary applicants 
and ranks them accordingly. Presently, Canada has separate immigration programs for 
highly-skilled and low-skilled workers. For example, under the Express Entry system, skilled 
workers are admitted under a point-system selection matrix called the Comprehensive 
Ranking System, which “assesses applicants by assigning them a score based on combined 
factors such as level of education, professional experience in high-demand occupations, age, 
linguistic ability, and adaptability (with bonus points increasingly awarded for job offers as 
well)” (The Law Library of Congress). Those who receive at least the minimum number of points 
will be ranked against other applicants, after which the highest-ranking candidates will be 
invited to apply for permanent residence (Government of Canada). On the other hand, low-skilled 
workers are not assessed through a point system, but primarily enter through specific guest 
worker programs (The Low Skilled Worker Pilot, the Live-In Caregiver Program, and the 
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Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program), which normally deny them the right to apply for 
citizenship (Lenard and Straehle 213). Similarly, while Australia utilizes a points-based skilled 
migration system whose purpose is to “help select skilled migrants who offer the best in terms 
of economic benefit to Australia”, low-skilled migrants may only enter and work through 
temporary guest worker programs (the Seasonal Worker Program and Working Holiday 
Programs), which also prevent them from applying for further visas while on the territory (The 
Law Library of Congress). Finally, the United Kingdom’s own point-based visa system divides 
applicants into five “tiers”. Despite the recent governmental decision to reduce the country’s 
net migration and adopt a more restrictive immigration policy for non-European Union 
citizens, there remains a Tier 1 “exceptional talent” category aimed at attracting 
“exceptionally talented individuals in the fields of science, humanities, engineering and the 
arts, who wish to work in the UK” (Shachar and Hirschl 2014, 238). In contrast, the Tier 3 
category, which was originally envisaged as the tier for unskilled migrants, and intended to 
serve as a replacement for existing low-skilled immigration programmes, was never 
operational – by 2008, the UK government decided that there was no need for low-skilled 
workers outside of the EU.  
 
While Shachar and Hirschl have not framed Olympic citizenship in these terms, it clearly 
constitutes a case of discrimination. While these point-based systems do discriminate between 
highly-skilled foreigners (e.g. there may be highly-skilled foreigners who do not meet the 
minimum points threshold because they lack the relevant language skills), I will focus only on 
how they discriminate against low-skilled migrants while demonstrating an overall preference 
for highly-skilled migrants. Countries are sharply indicating that they desire to bring in those 
with specialized skills and talents, and extending attractive admission offers to high-skilled 
migrants while creating higher and higher legal walls to prevent the entry of those deemed 
“unwanted’ or ‘too different” (Shachar and Hirschl 2014, 236). On top of low-skilled 
foreigners finding themselves subjected to unfavourable terms of entry, or facing the closure of 
low-skilled categories as avenues to entry, those seeking admission on the basis of family ties or 
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humanitarian causes are also becoming the targets of increased scrutiny and control (ibid). A 
question that arises, then, is whether or not talent-based selection 
involves wrongful discrimination, in a way that makes it comparable to a sexist or racist 
immigration policy. I suggest, according to the criteria I have sketched out, that it can be 
shown to be an example of wrongful discrimination.  
 
b. Is talent-based discrimination disrespectful? 
  
 As we have seen in Section 2, in order for talent-based discrimination to qualify as a 
demeaning form of discrimination, it must be demeaning. As a starting point, we must first 
identify the relevant group who is being wrongfully discriminated against. I believe that the 
group of people, in this case, are low-skilled foreigners.  Defining who counts as “low-skilled” 
or “highly-skilled” can be contentious, as definitions vary over time to reflect changes in the 
economic and labour market structures of national and global economies (Batalova and 
Lowell 86). However, for the purposes of this paper, I will utilize the definitions and groupings 
adopted by the Migration Advisory Committee. According to them, low-skilled work involves 
“competence associated with a general education, usually acquired by the time compulsory 
education is complete”, and do not require long periods of on-the-job training (Migration 
Advisory Committee). These include people typically employed as waiters, construction workers, 
and cleaners. In contrast, we may understand highly skilled workers as those who work in 
“management, business/finance operations, information technology, math science and 
engineering, architecture and engineering, life and physical sciences”, etc (ibid). 
 
Here, two important concerns may be raised. Firstly, why should we focus on low-skilled 
foreigners as a group, instead of talking about foreigners in general? The answer is 
straightforward: talent-based selection benefits highly-skilled foreigners at the expense of 
wrongfully discriminating against low-skilled foreigners, rather than wrongfully discriminating 
against all foreigners. At the same time, we have good reason to think of low-skilled foreigners 
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as a distinct category. The particular experience of being perceived as a low-skilled foreigner, 
and how this perception determines how one is treated in multiple contexts, is not reducible to 
one that foreigners at large endure. It is well-established that hierarchical social distinctions are 
frequently drawn between different categories of migrants. For example, while a Migration 
Observatory survey found, amongst UK respondents, that there was majority support for 
reducing immigration of low-skilled workers (64%), there was minority support for reducing 
immigration of highly-skilled workers (32%) (Migration Observatory). The survey results also 
indicated that low-skilled workers were also among the most popular targets for reductions to 
immigration (ibid). In another survey, Jens Hainmueller and Daniel Hopkins also found, in 
the US context, that “the preferred immigrant – one who is well educated and in a high-status 
occupation, with plans to work, good English skills, and no prior unauthorized entries – 
hardly varies based on respondent characteristics including age, income, labour market 
position, partisanship, ethnocentrism, and self-monitoring” (17). This is not to say that that 
highly-skilled foreigners do not ever face xenophobia; indeed, the above data does not 
indicate this. The point is simply that we should avoid a broad-brush approach while 
performing an analysis of xenophobia, as some categories of foreigners suffer their own strain 
of xenophobic stigma that others do not.  
 
Now that we have identified the group of people who are demeaned, I turn to the question of 
why talent-based discrimination is demeaning. At first glance, it looks starkly different from the 
other kinds of discrimination I discussed in Section 2. In fact, it might even be said to be the 
antithesis of gender or race-discriminatory immigration policies, because it is technically blind 
to those traits. It is theoretically open to everyone, regardless of race, gender, religion, etc, so 
long as they display the necessary talent, and belong to the “best and the brightest”. As Iris 
Marion Young puts it, with meritocracy, “the unjust hierarchy of caste is to be replaced by a 
“natural” hierarchy of intellect and skill” (200). 
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On what grounds, then, can talent-based selection be accused of disrespecting low-skilled 
workers? It will help, as a starting point, to understand why highly-skilled foreigners are 
preferred. While there may be several reasons why low-skilled migrants are undesirable in 
comparison, from a receiving state’s point of view, I will briefly outline two familiar 
arguments. It has been argued that low-skilled and poorly educated migrants are bad for the 
economy, and that they might also place a heavy strain on welfare systems. These claims have 
been raised in both the economic literature and, even more frequently, in the mainstream 
media. For example, George Borjas and Lawrence Katz’s study of the effects of low-skilled 
Mexican immigrants on the American economy purported to show that the large influx, in 
recent decades, “widened the U.S. wage structure by adversely affecting the earnings of less-
educated native workers”, as well as “[lowered] the prices of non-traded goods and services 
that are low-skill labour intensive” (53). Steven Camarota also concludes that immigrants are 
“creating a significant burden on public coffers”, and that by using welfare programs, they 
may “strain public resources, harming taxpayers, and making it more difficult to assist the 
low-income population already in the country”.  
 
Notably, both these claims are highly contestable. David Card has argued, for example, that 
the wages of native dropouts, relative to native high school graduates (23), have remained 
almost constant since 1980, despite pressures from immigration inflows, while Leighton Ku 
and Brian Bruen found that low-income non-citizen children and adults utilize American 
welfare benefits at generally lower rates than comparable low-income, native-born citizen 
children and adults, and that “the average value of public benefits received per person is 
generally lower for non-citizens than for natives”. The belief that low-skilled foreigners 
disproportionately consume welfare benefits in the UK continues, despite the fact that a large 
proportion of immigrants are not permitted access to “public funds”, and others have 
restricted access to them.  To be sure, my goal is not to claim that we have decisive evidence 
that these popular rationales for excluding low-skilled foreigners are false. New studies may 
prove these wrong, and these issues may remain controversial for a long time to come. 
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Rather, what I find interesting is the pervasive currency of these ideas in mainstream 
immigration discourse, even if they rest on relatively shaky ground. For instance, the majority 
of people in a British Social Attitudes survey believed that immigration was bad for the 
economy (British Social Attitudes 2013). Furthermore, as one UK newspaper report claims, 
“[t]ens of thousands are expected to flock to the UK – in part due to our generous welfare 
system. Under current rules, they would only have to live here for three months before 
claiming benefits” (Balch and Balabanova 9). 
 
These beliefs are often firmly held, I think, not because empirical data has clearly 
demonstrated that low-skilled foreigners have particular effects on the economy, but because 
citizens believe these immigrants to be particular kinds of people. That is, the preponderance of 
these beliefs is less attributable to well-grounded fears about the economic effects of low-skilled 
foreigners entering the country, than to their holding prejudiced stereotypes about low-skilled 
foreigners, which Jens Rydgren defines as “an attitude or set of attitudes held toward a group 
or members of a group, encompassing over-simplified beliefs and a set of negative or positive 
feelings and evaluations” (129). As Higgins aptly notes, “The pervasiveness and persistence of 
the belief that immigration is economically harmful in the face of compelling evidence to the 
contrary is a testament to the power of xenophobia and racism” (202). 
 
Here, it is worth briefly sketching out the general pattern through which a group comes to be 
associated with certain negative stereotypes, and how those stereotypes serve to justify their 
exclusion, or their subjection to serious forms of disadvantage. Very roughly, I begin from the 
idea of difference: the widespread perception of a particular group as strange, foreign, and 
unfamiliar. Dominant groups have a tendency to assume that their own experience is universal, 
and thus representative of humanity as a whole, but find this challenged by encounters with 
unfamiliar groups that have unfamiliar beliefs, practices, or experiences, who appear to 
threaten the order of ongoing customs and culture (Sheth 69). In response, dominant groups 
act to reinforce their position by measuring and fixing the worth of these other groups in 
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accordance with their dominant norms. Through the lens of the dominant group, they will 
only have equal worth insofar as they are similar, while difference is promptly reconstructed as 
deviance and inferiority (Young 59). More than this, in order to rationalise their antipathy, 
the dominant group will try to find a way to blame the other group for its difference, which 
they transform into a “sense of wrongdoing on the part of the ‘strange’ group itself” (Sheth 
68). It must appear as if the other group is responsible for its despised status, and that they are 
getting precisely what they deserve. This is where negative stereotypes come in. It becomes 
popularly accepted that the group in question is not despised merely because their difference 
causes discomfort, but because all their members possess some undesirable or immoral set of 
traits. At the same time, it will seem justifiable to subject the group to various forms of exclusion 
or ill-treatment in pursuit of regulating or eradicating these attributes. 
 
It is not difficult to see how negative beliefs about low-skilled foreigners fit into this pattern of 
oppression. Foreigners epitomise the unfamiliar and frightening. In Bonnie Honig’s words, 
“[f]oreignness is a symbolic marker that the nation attaches to the people we want to disavow, 
deport, or detain because we experience them as a threat”. They bring their strange cultures 
and ways of life, and risk throwing the existing order of things into disarray. We do not know 
who these people are, where their loyalties lie, what they are capable of, or what they will do 
to us. And just as this strangeness is frequently immediately linked to a potential danger it 
poses to another group (Sheth 69), it becomes widely agreed that their presence will be 
deleterious to native-born citizens. I suspect that “strangeness” is a problem that afflicts low-
skilled workers more than highly-skilled ones, because they often do not have the economic, 
social, or cultural capital to conform to the receiving society’s dominant social mores. 
Furthermore, highly-skilled foreigners may be tolerated despite their strangeness because of 
their ability to contribute to society. But low-skilled foreigners are perceived as carrying no 
such promises; they only have bad things to contribute. They want to steal our jobs and lower 
our wages, grab benefits from the poor, and take hard-earned money from citizens if they can, 
primarily because they are greedy, unscrupulous, and exploitative by nature. The only 
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appropriate response is for the state to neutralise these dangers by employing “housecleaning” 
strategies to eliminate or manage their difference (ibid). In the present case, this will mean 
reshaping immigration policy to keep out low-skilled foreigners.2 
 
Two questions arise at this point. Firstly, it might be protested that these beliefs about low-
skilled foreigners are rude or unpleasant, but not demeaning, as they say nothing about their 
moral status. After all, you can call someone untrustworthy or money-grubbing without also 
claiming that they have a lower moral status. But this response ignores the expressive dimension 
of disrespect. Insults that are not objectively demeaning on some universal standard may 
nevertheless be demeaning relative to the cultural context. For example, sexist comments 
about women might take the form of comments that women are “deceitful” or “foolish”. 
These are ascriptions of negative personal traits that need not have anything to do with the 
denial of equal moral status. But they are demeaning, in this case, because they have been 
employed to reduce women to two-dimensional stereotypes that are patently inhuman, by 
virtue of their ugliness and over-simplicity, as well as deny them basic rights or entitlements. 
The same can be said of low-skilled foreigners, whose equal status is denied precisely because 
they are only allowed to exist as unflattering caricatures, hungry for jobs and benefits. Instead 
of possessing unique histories, personalities, and life-goals, with their own specific reasons for 
migration, they are assumed to be uniformly morally dubious, with the singular agenda of 
worsening the lives of citizens and stealing public resources to which they are not entitled. In a 
particularly repugnant example that portrays low-skilled foreigners as society’s “vermin”, one 
columnist has written, “Some of our towns are festering sores, plagued by swarms of migrants 
and asylum seekers, shelling out benefits like Monopoly money”, while also likening them to 
‘cockroaches’ (Usbourne). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 I believe this pattern also applies to current public attitudes towards Syrian refugees. Ostensibly, 
people do not think that Syrian refugees should be excluded on the basis of race, but of concerns about 
public safety, as it is claimed that admitting Syrian refugees would doubtless increase the risk of terrorist 
attacks. However, this seems far more like a poorly-grounded belief rooted in demeaning stereotypes 
about Muslims and their penchant towards terrorist activity, and this connection gives us good reason 
to reject the exclusion of Syrian refugees on such grounds.  
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Secondly, what does the stigmatisation of low-skilled foreigners have to do with talent-based 
selection? An objection might look like this: if states were to introduce policies directly aimed 
at stemming the flow of low-skilled workers, much like how the UK placed a ban in 2007 on 
unskilled workers from outside European Union territories, we might be able to make the case 
that those policies demean. Admittedly, they send the message that low-skilled workers are 
unwanted. But could states not simply prefer talented foreigners? Certainly, in theory, a state 
might have a predominantly talent-focused admission policy that is not at all connected to 
such disrespectful beliefs; its appreciation for the benefits of taking in highly-skilled foreigners 
need not imply animosity towards low-skilled foreigners, in the manner I have described. In this 
vein, Douglas MacKay has suggested that the public endorsement of skill as a favourable 
factor is “no more objectionable than state policies promoting adult enrolment in post-
secondary education, or state employers’ favouring of skilled citizens when hiring” (135).  
 
However, I believe that it is no coincidence that talent-based selection is practised alongside the 
greater policing of non-citizens seeking family reunification, or asylum. The preference for 
highly-skilled foreigners, in the non-ideal circumstances at hand, cannot be conceptually 
disentangled from popularly-expressed demeaning views on low-skilled foreigners. Think, for 
example, of the myth of the “model minority”, which refers to minority groups that have 
“ostensibly achieved a high level of success” (Boderhausen 73), such as Asian-Americans in 
US society, and how it serves to fuel stigma against other ethnic groups. On the face of it, 
there is nothing wrong with holding up a particular minority group who are especially 
prosperous and well-educated, with low crime rates. We may say, following MacKay’s 
argument, that the public endorsement of model minorities’ success on these grounds is no 
more objectionable than state policies that encourage educational achievement and 
discourage criminal behaviour.  However, to understand why it is problematic, we must look 
to the existing social context. One serious problem with the myth is that it tends to reproduce 
binary representations of ethnic minorities. On one hand, there are the “good minorities” 
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who play by society’s rules, work hard, and do whatever is demanded of them without protest. 
While they are still read as fundamentally different, they show that difference can be 
unthreatening to the majority’s dominance. On the other, there are the “bad minorities”, who 
are undisciplined, disorderly, and dangerous. The model minority is meaningfully compared 
against these groups to send a particular message. In Claire Jean Kim’s words, “the model 
minority myth has always worked in tandem with explicit constructions of Blacks as culturally 
deficient” (121). This is because model minorities are held up as exemplars of how the 
material consequences of racism can be overcome by hard work and good behaviour, and 
that the persistently disadvantaged position of “bad minorities” is solely attributable to 
personal failure, which society bears no responsibility for. In line with the pattern of 
oppression I have sketched out, examples of “bad minority” traits include character flaws like 
laziness, lack of discipline, and criminal inclinations (Kim 121), which together form a 
negative stereotype about group members. Overall, the model minority myth ought not to be 
read as benevolent approval, but as a convenient tool to reinforce demeaning beliefs about 
other groups.   
 
Something very similar is going on, I think, in the case of talent-based selection. Why do states 
proudly declare their desire to admit the “best and the brightest”, while practising increased 
surveillance and regulation of other types of foreigners? Just as how praise for “model 
minorities” serves to express disrespectful stereotypes about other ethnic groups, the 
privileging of highly-skilled immigrants, in the current social context, also expresses contempt 
for other categories of foreigners: the ones who are known to heedlessly threaten the receiving 
society by worsening their economic prospects and stealing their welfare benefits. To quote 
Bridget Anderson, “[t]he kinds of people wanted and not wanted are described in graphic and 
value-laden terms: ‘bogus’ asylum seekers, ‘sham’ marriages, ‘low-skilled’ workers versus 
‘genuine refugees’, ‘genuine and subsisting marriages’, ‘the brightest and the best’ (2013, 69). 
This tendency is nicely exemplified in a quote by the British Home Secretary, about new 
restrictions on immigration: “The new rules will see us exercising control, ensuring that only 
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the best and the brightest remain in Britain permanently” (Waldron and Sanwar). This is 
tantamount to saying that we only want the good foreigners, and we will use whatever measure 
we can to keep out the bad.  
 
Here, an important clarification should be made. I do not claim that it is never appropriate, in 
principle, for states to admit people on the basis of particular skills – as skill-based admittance 
is not intrinsically disrespectful, it can be permissible on the expressive theory of 
discrimination. Suppose that a state has suffered a serious drought that seriously threatens 
crop production, and workers with the relevant know-how are specifically required to improve 
matters. The preference for workers with this skill set seems benign, simply because there are 
no demeaning stereotypes about non-citizens who do not have technical knowledge about 
drought management. However, in the current social context, the preference for highly-skilled 
workers is inextricable from the (relative) cultural elevation of highly-skilled foreigners, and 
the contemptuous devaluation of low-skilled foreigners.  Thus, the problem is not with skill 
serving as a basis for admission per se, but the demeaning relation between the preference for 
the highly-skilled and the exclusion of the low-skilled.  The welcoming of highly-skilled 
foreigners cannot be detached from the reviled status of low-skilled foreigners, much like how 
the admiration of “model minorities” is inextricably connected to the expression of disrespect 
towards so-called “bad minorities”. 
 
To sum up, I have sought to illustrate how talent-based selection, much like the model 
minority myth, should not be interpreted as the mere approval of, or preference towards a 
group with particular positive traits. Rather, it is intimately bound up with binary 
representations of “good” and “bad” foreigners that demean low-skilled foreigners by 
reducing them to ugly caricatures, out to damage the lives of citizens. As I have shown, 
highly-skilled foreigners are presented as the polar opposite of low-skilled foreigners. They are 
hard-working assets to society and will help to improve it, in contrast to how low-skilled 
foreigners will threaten and undermine society. The immigration practices that privilege the 
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a. The state’s freedom of association 
 
Why should we assume that states’ immigration policies must never violate the anti- 
discrimination norm I have described? Contrary to this, it might be argued that states reserve 
the right to wrongfully discriminate; they may have the right to design immigration policies of 
their choice, even if we judge aspects of those policies to be morally wrong. According to 
Christopher Heath Wellman, autonomous individuals and legitimate states both have rights 
to autonomy, occupying morally privileged positions of control over their own affairs, and the 
freedom of association is just one component of the exercise of autonomy (110). This is why 
Wellman believes in states’ pro tanto right to exercise discretion over whom it allows entry to, 
even if they employ criteria he acknowledges as wrongfully discriminatory. Citizens’ right to 
associate, or not associate with whomever they choose (even if we morally disapprove of the 
criteria in question) fully entitles them to discriminate against certain groups of potential 
migrants, whether by race or by perceived levels of “talent”. 
 
Importantly, Wellman does not disagree that the anti-discrimination principle ought to hold 
in some cases, like in the state’s dealings with its citizens. However, he simply denies that 
duties of non-discrimination – that is, duties to treat people as if they are moral equals - are 
things that we owe to non-citizens. Racial discrimination in immigration policy is only wrong 
when states institute an immigration policy that excludes entry to members of a given group, 
and in the process disrespects citizens who fall into the dispreferred category (Wellman 139). 
This is because we have a “special duty to respect our fellow citizens as equal partners in 
the political cooperative’, a responsibility that we do not equally owe to foreigners” (ibid). By 
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extension, it seems that the Chinese Exclusion Acts, for example, would only be off the table 
for states if there were already immigrants of Chinese descent who had become citizens prior, 
who would be impermissibly disrespected by it. 
  
I think this argument is ultimately implausible. Firstly, anti-discrimination norms 
are not secondarily derived from our duties to respect fellow citizens as equal partners. Rather, 
as I have already noted in Chapter Two, they are derived from the worth or inherent dignity 
of persons. After all, it seems impermissible for a golf club or a school to refuse to admit black 
students not because discrimination violates equal partnership between citizens, but because it 
violates the universal moral equality that holds between all humans, regardless of citizenship. 
It seems equally wrong for a school to not admit a foreign exchange student, for racist 
reasons. 
 
Even more significantly, the state cannot be assumed to have the same type of freedom of 
association as private individuals. Wellman’s argument appeals to the claim that, if “racist 
individuals cannot permissibly be forced to marry someone (or adopt a child) outside of their 
race”, because their freedom of association entitles them to racially discriminate during the 
process of choosing a suitable marriage partner, the freedom of association should also entitle 
racist citizens to exclude immigrants based on racial criteria (138), at least insofar as it does 
not disrespect existing citizens. It might be said that the state should commit itself to 
upholding moral equality wherever possible, but this obligation is trumped by the important 
right to freedom of association. Likewise, even if it might be protested that talent-based 
selection is wrongfully discriminatory, this complaint is overruled by the state’s freedom to 
associate with the talented. 
  
However, this is a misleading picture. According to Michael Blake, the problem with 
Wellman’s account of the freedom of association is that it is falsely characterized as a  
simple, deontic trump right” (2012, 750). That is, “[i]f we have a right to freedom of 
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association, then anyone who forces an unwanted association upon us wrongs us – a 
conclusion which does not fail simply because the one who is being forced upon us is in 
circumstances of dire need”(ibid). In contrast, on Blake’s account, freedom of association 
should be understood as part of a complex set of political rights, each of which is derived from 
the basic moral norm that governments should treat all those impacted by their policies with 
equal concern and respect (2012, 751). While none of these political rights can be sacrificed 
for a greater quantity of well-being, there can be serious tensions between them, and it 
becomes a matter of judgment and argument as to which right ought to take precedence in 
particular cases (ibid).  In other words, the right to freedom of association is certainly an 
important one that, in line with Wellman’s view, cannot be trumped by consequentialist 
considerations (e.g. states cannot force people into marriage in the hopes of boosting 
population growth, as doing so would violate their right to freedom of association). But it can 
lose to another right that is part of the complex set, if the two come into conflict, if it is 
successfully demonstrated that favouring the competing right would better express the norm of 
equal respect that they are both derived from. 
  
As a whole, we do not have a straightforwardly simple, trump-like right to not associate with 
unwanted others. Wellman presents the freedom of association as freestanding, and in 
competition with equal respect itself, rather than with other political rights: in this case, the 
right to not be wrongfully discriminated against. However, for Blake, we cannot suspend our 
obligation to uphold equal respect; as I have mentioned, it is constitutive of the liberal ethos, 
rather than a mere guideline or consideration. For the state, what the freedom of association 
must be measured against are other norms that better accord with equal respect. 
  
It seems that our understanding of freedom of association within the domestic context fits 
Blake’s model, rather than Wellman’s construction. For one, it does a good job of explaining 
why private golf clubs, for example, do not have the right to wrongfully discriminate in 
selecting their members, even if individuals do in choosing their marriage partners. The key 
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difference between marriage and golf clubs is that one’s desire to marry another does not fall 
within the scope of justice, even if their life may be affected by the other party’s decision not 
to marry them. As individuals have a basic interest in being able to determine who they have 
intimate relationships with, the special character of marriage demands that the best way to 
treat individuals with equal concern and respect is not for the state to to interfere in such 
choices. We recognise that it is deeply disrespectful to force people to marry or have sex with 
others against their will. For example, Article 16(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights states that “[f]orced marriage is a violation of internationally recognized human rights 
standards. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending 
spouses”. This holds in spite of whether one’s marriage choices may negatively affect the lives 
of other people. As Robert Nozick rightly notes, if four men propose marriage to a woman, 
even if “her decision about whom, if any of them, to marry importantly affects each of the 
lives of those four persons, her own life, and the lives of any other persons wishing to marry 
one of these four men, and so on”, nobody would propose a democratic solution to the issue 
(69). Likewise, even if a decision not to marry someone is rooted in discriminatory beliefs, the 
state ought not to interfere.  
 
But marriage presents a unique case. We may have strong preferences about who we share 
our favoured golf course with, but it is not generally recognized that we should enjoy a 
“morally privileged position of dominion” (Wellman 110) over who we associate with in this 
realm, unlike in the marital one. Having to play golf in the same vicinity as a person we do 
not like simply does not harm our fundamental interests in the same way that forced marriage 
would, and it does not disrespect us to force us to do so. Anti-discrimination norms kick in 
because the large impact of social marginalisation on the self-constitution of the marginalized 
individuals (Blake 2012, 757), and the serious impact it has on their interests, takes precedence 
over the relatively superficial annoyance of playing golf alongside people we dislike. Thus, in 
contrast, the racist members of a golf club may have to admit people they would rather avoid 
on grounds of anti-discrimination. Given the similar character of immigration, the same 
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criticism can be made of wrongfully discriminatory immigration policies. Arguably, the 
serious impact of disrespect on the demeaned group trumps the state’s right to freedom of 
association.  
 
b. Disrespect and qualifying standards  
 
It might be objected that some jobs establish qualifying standards that are necessary for the 
legitimate purposes of the job to be achieved, and that these standards are distinct from their 
engaging in wrongful discrimination. For example, in the sphere of employment, government 
and for-profit employers have a legitimate purpose in offering particular types of goods and 
services (MacKay 132). While it is wrong for them to select employees on the basis of religion, 
as neither government nor for-profit employers have a legitimate purpose in promoting 
certain religious identities, it is nonetheless permissible for them to select employees on the 
basis of skill (ibid). 
 
I agree that selecting employees on the basis of religion is not disrespectful in certain contexts, 
even if it is generally disrespectful to do so. For MacKay, religious employers may do so, as 
the promotion and practice of a particular religious faith is a legitimate purpose of religious 
institutions (132). However, there are three remaining issues with this objection. The first, 
obvious objection is that what makes discrimination wrong is not whether it fails to serve some 
legitimate purpose, but whether or not it is disrespectful. It is not wrong for religious 
institutions to discriminate based on religion because this does not, according to our social 
conventions, express a belief in the inferiority of other religious groups. Secondly, we may 
have a distorted view of which qualifications are truly “necessary” for achieving a job’s 
legitimate purposes. For example, while the possession of an undergraduate degree is still 
widely regarded as a minimum academic qualification for many jobs, several prominent 
companies have recently taken the lead in no longer requiring candidates for jobs to have a 
university degree, and acknowledging that degree-holding is not strictly “necessary” for 
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meeting the demands of the job. Similarly, fire services often only employ firefighters who are 
not overweight, as they believe that firefighters must be sufficiently fit. However, it is not 
obvious that overweight people cannot satisfyingly perform firefighting duties, as weight 
requirements may not track fitness accurately. Many overweight people are perfectly fit and 
able to perform demanding physical tasks. Thirdly, many still believe that it is inappropriate 
for the military to hire women, because they are thought to be physically incapable of 
performing the necessary tasks, or enduring physical hardship that men can. Calls to exclude 
women from the military often involve the suggestion that only men can properly perform 
military jobs, effectively repackaging sexist beliefs in the language of a legitimate rationale for 
exclusion. Thus, while I accept that respect is not the only value, and that there may be job 
requirements that are nevertheless genuinely necessary for important goals to be met, the 
potential to express disrespect places a particularly heavy burden of proof on the 
discriminators. They must fully demonstrate that these criteria must be met for the job to be 
effectively performed, and that they are not actually motivated by spurious stereotypic beliefs. 
As I noted in the previous section, I do not believe that this has been sufficiently demonstrated 
in the case of immigrant selection: it remains an open question whether low-skilled foreigners 
are genuinely bad for countries.  
 
Even more importantly, the comparison between job discrimination and immigration 
discrimination seems to be false. Jobs are purely instrumental in nature; each job has a specific 
function, designed to allow the employer to fulfil its aims. For this reason, it is of paramount 
importance that the applicant is equipped to perform the tasks that the job demands. But 
being a member of the state, whether as a temporary resident or a fully-fledged citizen, is not at 
all like being given a job. It would be strange to say that residency is like occupying an 
instrumental role that applicants must be sufficiently equipped for, e.g. having the necessary 
know-how to contribute to the economy. This functional view of membership would certainly 
exclude many existing citizens from “qualifying”. Furthermore, as I have mentioned earlier, 
states already by-and-large recognise other reasons for admitting people; not everyone is 
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admitted to perform an instrumental function. Asylum seekers and refugees are admitted not 
because of their potential contributions (even though it may be hoped that they will 
contribute), but because of the right to asylum and the principle of non-refoulement. 
Similarly, people are admitted on the basis of family reunification because the state recognises 
the value and importance of being able to live with one’s family.  
 
 c. Contingency 
 
Another objection might take this form: there is no necessary connection between talent-based 
selection and demeaning stereotypes about low-skilled foreigners. Talent-based selection need 
not be inherently wrong, as states could prefer the highly skilled for purely prudential 
purposes, that bear no reference to demeaning messages about the less-skilled. It is simply the 
case that states’ preferences happen to line up with existing demeaning stereotypes about low-
skilled foreigners. At worst, talent-based selection seems to be only contingently bad. 
Consequently, my conclusion has to be a very qualified one: even if talent-based selection 
does demean, it is only demeaning in our current context. If it no longer reinforced 
demeaning stereotypes, states could unproblematically practice talent-based selection. 
  
Unfortunately, accepting this qualification might significantly weaken the relevance of my 
argument to current debates in political philosophy. This is because we can understand much 
of the discourse on the ethics of immigration as an institutional form of ideal theory. By 
“institutional”, following Blake, I mean that we do not “[abstract] from the institutions we 
currently have, and [ask] what sorts of institutions we would endorse if we were starting from 
scratch”, but rather, ask “what the institutions we currently have would have to do to be 
justified” (2001, 261-2). At the same time, by “ideal theory”, I mean abstracting away from 
existing unjust conditions and ask, instead, what an ideal society of liberal democratic peoples 
would have to do to justify its existing institutions (Rawls 1999, 5). Presumably, under such 
ideal circumstances, disrespectful stereotypes about low-skilled foreigners would be totally 
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absent, and talent-based selection would thus fail to have any demeaning expressive effect. 
Given the ideal perspective, it seems, then, that existing immigration-related institutions 
would not need to refrain from talent-based selection in order to be justified. Talent-based 
selection may not be acceptable in the here and now, but it would be perfectly permissible in 
an ideal world: the world that immigration theorists are primarily concerned with. 
  
While I concede that talent-based selection may only count as wrongful discrimination under 
current, real-world circumstances, I disagree that this undercuts the relevance of my 
observations. Sarah Fine notes that there is a significant ambiguity in Blake’s formulation of 
what institutional theory is (2016, 14). By “the institutions we currently have”, and “the 
various states we have now”, Blake might be referring to existing states and their present-day 
borders and populations, or simply the bare concept of an institution that claims a monopoly 
over the legitimate use of violence (2001, 262). If we are talking about existing states and what 
they must do, it would seem odd to ignore the widespread hostility directed at various groups 
of immigrants, a fact which already enters non-philosophical political discussions and exerts a  
strong influence over states’ immigration policies. 
 
Furthermore, the charge of contingency, that talent-based selection would not be wrongful 
discrimination under ideal circumstances seems trivial. Recall that our theory of wrongful 
discrimination is expressive: whether or not an act of discrimination is wrongful can only be 
decided against the backdrop of a particular social context. To reiterate, our common history 
and social conventions determine which actions express a rejection of others’ equal moral 
status. “Ideal circumstances” simply cannot be employed to decide whether or not an act of 
discrimination is wrongful, because it serves to completely wipe out the flags that signal 
wrongfulness in the first place. All instances of wrongful discrimination are “contingent” in the 
sense that they are only wrongful as a result of existing social contexts, and any meaningful 
discussion of wrongful discrimination must refer to existing social contexts in order to draw its 
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conclusions. Of course, a final way around this might be to reject Hellman’s theory of 
discrimination, but it is not within the scope of my paper to consider this possibility. 
 
d. Economic interests 
 
A fourth possible objection could be that talent-based selection is fundamentally different 
from other wrongfully discriminatory policies, not because it does not demean, but because it 
is necessary for the legitimate economic interests of the state, such as the achievement of a 
desired level of economic prosperity. For example, Caleb Yong observes that states are 
permitted to design labour immigration policies led by the aim of generating a higher level of 
economic resources, as “greater access to economic resources generally facilitates the pursuit 
of various personal ends”, and hence allows states to promote their citizens’ autonomy. Put 
differently, economic success “can be reasonably expected to facilitate the realisation of states’ 
legitimate purposes in securing and promoting the freedom, health, and well-being of their 
citizens” (ibid). These domestic considerations should take precedence over any demeaning 
effect talent-based selection might have. The claim I want to consider is not that talent-based 
selection is not wrongful discrimination, but that it is a necessary evil. 
 
One drawback of this view, however, is that almost every other kind of wrongful immigration-
related discrimination can be reformulated in a way that makes them seem necessary for the 
fulfilment of legitimate state interests. Indeed, this is already true of current practice. As Fine 
observes, “Often, the clear targeting of particular groups is thinly veiled behind what states see 
as more legitimate, ‘acceptable’ policy objectives, such as securing their borders from foreign 
terror threats, or from large numbers of undocumented migrants, or for the protection of the 
migrants themselves” (2016, 6). One salient example is the British government’s proposal to 
impose a £3000 ‘migrant bond’ on short-term visitors to the country, which would be 
forfeited if visitors were to over-stay their visas. These bonds were specifically targeted at 
people from so-called ‘high risk’ countries like India, Bangladesh, Ghana, Pakistan, Nigeria, 
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and Sri Lanka, whose nationals were purported to have a tendency to over-stay (ibid). At first 
glance, there is nothing ostensibly illegitimate about this policy; it is a legitimate state objective 
to crack down on visa over-staying, as well as create deterrents by imposing significant costs 
on those who engage in such behaviour. But a quick glance at the groups it directly affects – 
citizens of relatively poor Commonwealth countries who would be unlikely to afford an 
upfront payment of £3000 – will suggest that the actual purpose of the “migrant bond” is to 
discourage their entry to the UK, not just cases of overstaying. This seems to be another way of 
expressing the demeaning belief that there are uniformly “good” and “bad immigrants”, and 
that people from those countries neatly fall into the ‘bad’ category.  
 
In response, it might be pointed out that there is a significant difference between the “migrant 
bond” and talent-based selection. The problem with the “migrant bond” is that it utilizes an 
unnecessary and inappropriate measure, under the pretense of fulfilling a legitimate aim. 
There could be other ways to discourage over-staying that do not unfairly impede the 
opportunities of particular groups to enter the UK. In contrast, talent-based selection may be  
a genuinely effective means of ensuring economic success. However, I do not think that 
insisting on the effectiveness of talent-based selection is particularly helpful, when part of the 
force of anti-discrimination norms is that they cannot be defeated by the positive 
consequences that non-compliance might engender. Even if it is true that eschewing anti-
discrimination norms in general would be to the state’s enormous economic benefit, we do not 
recognise this as an appropriate consideration that counts in favour of permitting wrongful 
discrimination. Returning briefly to my discussion in Section 3, recall how conflicting political 
rights can only be assessed in terms of how well they express the state’s commitment to equal 
respect and concern. Insisting that wrongful discrimination might sometimes 
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5. Conclusion 
 
I have sought to argue that states’ practice of talent-based selection should be viewed as an 
instance of wrongful discrimination that is thoroughly incompatible with the state’s 
commitment to uphold the social equality of immigrants, which is derived from the 
comparative requirement of equal respect for all persons. Firstly, I identified the expressive 
theory of wrongful discrimination as the one that convincingly explains why we consider some 
discriminatory immigration policies to be unacceptable: racist, sexist, or homophobic 
immigration policies are wrong because they demean people of those groups. However, this 
picture has an interesting implication. It seems that an apparently benign form of 
immigration-related discrimination, talent-based selection, is wrong by the same token: it has 
the expressive effect of demeaning low-skilled foreigners.  Finally, I defended my claim against 
a number of objections. If it turns out that Hellman’s account of discrimination correctly 
diagnoses what is wrongful about other discriminatory immigration policies, we must think 
twice about allowing talent-based selection to form a significant part of immigration policy. 
More than this, we have reason to question the idea that states have an expansive right to 
exclude. Even if we adopt the “conventional view”, it seems that states must be heavily reined 
in by their duty to uphold the comparative requirement of moral respect, instead of allowing 
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Chapter Five: The indirect discrimination of skill-selective immigration policies: another 




In the previous chapter, I examined how skill or talent-based selection may count as a form of 
wrongful discrimination. I argued that, despite their condemnation of immigration selection 
on the basis of gender, race, or sexual orientation, philosophers have neglected the possibility 
that the intentional exclusion of low-skilled foreigners from entry is also a form of wrongful 
discrimination, because it serves to reproduce disrespectful stereotypes.  However, I now wish 
to draw attention to a different possibility that has been equally neglected by the philosophical 
literature on immigration discrimination.  
 
While direct discrimination refers to acts or policies that explicitly single out members of a 
particular group for (wrongful) differential treatment, indirect discrimination refers to acts or 
policies that disproportionately affect members of a particular group without explicitly 
singling them out. In these cases, the “differential treatment” is located in the indirect 
consequences of a particular act or policy that may read as group-neutral in theory, bearing 
no direct reference to group identities. In this chapter, I want to suggest that, apart from 
directly discriminating against low-skilled workers, talent-based selection may indirectly 
discriminate against women. As men more easily meet the criteria for “skilled” labour, it has 
an unintended disproportionate impact on women’s likelihood of admission as economic 
migrants, even if women are not explicitly excluded from doing so. I contend that, like direct 
discrimination, disproportionate impact amounts to disrespect towards women, and should 
therefore be condemned by those who already acknowledge the wrongfulness of direct 
gender-based discrimination. This is because immigration policy-makers have negligently 
failed to consider the social significance of women’s difficulty in being admitted under the 
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“skilled” category, which exacerbates the stigma they face in patriarchal societies. As a result, 
it gives us a further reason to object to states’ employment of talent-based immigration 
selection. 
 
I begin, in Section 2, by offering a brief survey of sociological evidence that talent-based 
selection may indirectly discriminate against women. Next, in Section 3, I argue that our 
present concept of indirect discrimination is unsatisfying, and that we ought to approach it 
through a different lens. In Section 4, I expand on my own theory of indirect discrimination. 
Drawing from Sophia Moreau’s work, I argue that while direct discrimination disrespects 
groups through expressing disrespect for them, indirect discrimination disrespects groups 
through such negligent behaviour. Agents who indirectly discriminate breach their duty of 
care to members of subordinated groups, to examine the social meaning of their actions and 
avoid exacerbating stigma. In Section 5, I relate my theory to the present case, and explain 
why talent-based discrimination can be said to disrespect women. Finally, in Section 6, I will 
respond to some possible objections. 
 
2. Gender and skilled migration 
 
In the previous chapter, I noted that states are drawing sharper distinctions between skilled 
foreigners who are welcomed, at least on a temporary basis, and low-skilled foreigners who 
are viewed as problematic (Kofman and Raghuram 295). As Ayelet Shachar and Ran Hirschl 
frame it, “Whereas the ‘unwanted’ are pejoratively presented as exhibiting immutable 
differences that make them unassimilable, quintessential ‘Others’, skilled migration is treated 
functionally and technocratically as a measure to advance the country’s economic, 
reputational, and scientific advantage” (2014, 241). These distinctions often translate into 
“differential possibilities for global circulation, immigration status, right of residence in the 
country of destination, and eventual citizenship” for individual migrants and their families 
(Kofman and Raghuram 296). While privileged migrants have more destination countries 
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they may choose from, with each offering its own set of benefits and incentives (Shachar and 
Hirschl 2014, 232), “unwanted” migrants find themselves blocked by the implementation of 
new obstacles that make it increasingly harder for them to enter (Shachar and Hirschl 2014, 
235).   
 
However, aside from its direct exclusion of low-skilled foreigners, talent-based selection may 
have a disproportionate impact on women’s prospects for admission as economic migrants. 
For the remainder of the paper, I will use the phases “disproportionate impact” and “indirect 
discrimination” interchangeably. Consider, for example, the points-based immigration system 
in the United Kingdom. As Alasdair Murray reports, 
 
One major side effect of the structure of the points based system is that it appears to be 
admitting far more men than women. In Tier 1, two thirds of applicants are male, a 
figure rising to 78 per cent in Tier 2 (where applicants require a job offer) even though 
women now form a small majority in the UK workforce as a whole. This has led to 
concerns that it is structured in a manner which is biased against female workers and 
may not reflect changing UK labour demand. (39) 
 
The “bias” against women that Murray identifies is far from anomalous. The fact that talent-
based selection may indirectly discriminate against women has been well-documented in the 
sociological literature. While the majority of sectors that hire “talented” migrants under the 
UK system points based system are male-dominated (Murray 40), the fact that IT occupations 
were attributed the highest weightings in selection points systems also led to a heavy 
dominance of males entering through the skilled category in Canada and the US (Iredale 2). 
As it stands, “Men overwhelmingly form the mass of those moving within transnational 
corporations and in the Information Technology and Scientific sectors, upon which the 
notion of the highly skilled and the knowledge society has been constructed” (Piper 7). To 
start with, this is at least partially because the “skilled” occupations that are welcomed by 
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receiving states – that is, those in science, engineering, computing, and life and health sciences 
–– tend to be heavily male (Iredale 2). While such occupational segregation may be 
attributable to gendered preferences, a substantial body of social science research has 
suggested that “socialisation in relation to gender norms continues to influence men’s and 
women’s average preferences and behaviour” (Hegeswisch et al 1). Moreover, “much of these 
reflect barriers to entry to occupations, ranging from lack of information about alternative job 
options to active discouragement and harassment” (Hegeswisch et al 2).  
Secondly, societal interpretations of what count as “skilled” or “unskilled” labour, for the 
purposes of migration categories, may already favour male-dominated professions, or those 
involving work that is perceived as traditionally “male”. While the content of female jobs 
differs in some regard from the content of male jobs, there seems to be no objective method of 
establishing standards of complexity across different types of skills, and historical studies have 
shown that employers have neither defined women’s work as skilled nor compensated it in 
accordance with its occupational content (Steinberg 452). Instead, “the evaluation of skill is 
shaped by and confounded with a worker’s sex” (ibid); they are, to quote Anne Phillips and 
Barbara Taylor , “saturated with sexual bias” (79). As Phillips and Taylor write, 
The work of women is often deemed inferior simply because it is women who do it. 
Women workers carry into the workplace their status as subordinate individuals, and this 
status comes to define the value of the work they do. Far from being an objective 
economic fact, skill is often an ideological category imposed on certain types of work by 
virtue of the sex and power of the workers who perform it. (79) 
Thus, the problem is not only that women find it challenging to enter “skilled” occupations. A 
deeper issue is that labour tends to be categorized as “skilled” when it does not involve 
typically feminine modes of labour, which are regarded as less complex, and accorded less 
value than stereotypically “male” work. In light of the difficulty in defining what “skill” 
amounts to, Bridget Anderson points out that the centrality of skill categorization to labour 
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migration policy overlooks the ways in which work and jobs are “socially constructed, 
imagined as suitable for different races and genders” (2013, 59).  
                              
Thirdly, even if male-dominated occupations are not given the highest weightings in point 
systems, generic skills categories that use years of labour market experience and income levels 
to allocate points are also likely to place women at a disadvantage, because they are more 
likely to take career breaks, earn lower salaries, and experience difficulties in breaking through 
the glass ceiling (Kofman et al [cited in Kofman and Raghuram 293]). For example, the UK’s 
minimum salary requirement tends to disadvantage female applicants, because women are 
paid less even when they work in the same sector; it was discovered that, in India, women 
earned an average of 40% less than men. At the same time, the high costs of migration, which 
skilled migrants are expected to be able to pay, include “petitioning fees” (which applicants 
must pay for the processing of applications) and entry fees that specifically deter women from 
initiating migration attempts (Boyd and Pikkov 10). As Monica Boyd and Deanna Pikkov put 
it, “[s]ince gender hierarchies in source countries are usually associated with low earnings of 
women compared with men, women who seek to immigrate as principal applicants or as 
autonomous migrants bear a higher relative financial burden than their male counterparts” 
(11).                   
                               
Finally, even if women hold “skilled” occupations in their home countries, they are also more 
unlikely to be sent abroad to work. It seems that relatively few women are sent on overseas 
assignments, as decisions are made within male-dominated, top-level networks (Forster and 
Johnsen 186). It has also been suggested that the valorization of stereotypically male skills by 
corporations ensures that few women are likely to make up the ranks of workers who are sent 
abroad for international assignments, and that in contrast to men, women are often viewed as 
better able than men to deal with “soft” assignments in their home countries, and less able to 
perform well in “upper level” jobs in different settings (Purkayastha 182).    
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It should come as no surprise, then, that when women migrate for work, they usually take up 
jobs in unskilled sectors, especially domestic work (Anderson 2000, 305) – precisely the 
category of workers that states, in contrast to highly skilled workers, are trying to keep out. 
Most migrant women tend to be concentrated in non-skilled personal service work, generating 
income through occupations that are regarded as unskilled, are poorly paid, and often 
performed in the domestic/private domains or linked to the expansion of the service industry. 
Again, these are occupations that have a tendency to be looked down upon socially and 
economically devalued (Piper 5), and tend to conform to oppressive conceptions of women’s 
gender identity (Bowlby et al 346). To be sure, it would be a mistake to say that women are not 
entering at all as skilled migrants. The bursting of the IT bubble, alongside a move towards 
recruiting workers for the largely feminized welfare and social professions have led to a 
growth in both the number and proportion of skilled female migrants, hence altering the 
gender balance in skilled migration (Kofman and Raghuram 292). While nursing is the most 
female dominated sector, with the vast majority of the nursing workforce comprised of women 
(Piper 7), women also form part of some flows that are usually deemed to be masculine or 
perceived in gender neutral terms, such as migrant doctors in the UK (Kofman et al [cited in 
Kofman and Raghuram 292]).   
 
Nevertheless, women are still considerably more likely to enter under the family reunification 
category, than as skilled workers; they “comprise the majority of family migrants” (Anderson 
2013, 68). In both North America and Western Europe where “family reunification” is an 
important mode of entry, migrant workers often enter as wives and dependents of men, and 
have their admission sponsored by them (Piper 2). Significantly, large numbers of highly 
educated and professional women enter as family migrants and dependents of principal 
applicants, not as economic migrants (Birrell 42). This classification also serves to 
disadvantage women in several ways, as their entry will be predicated on rules governing how 
and when the primary migrant is allowed to sponsor his wife. For example, in the US, they 
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are subject to family reunification caps that impose a waiting period of about two years on 
them (Purkayastha 187), hence creating an automatic hierarchy where “the female is, despite 
her inclinations, aspirations, and experiences, a later entrant into the US labour market” 
(ibid). At the same time, some altered visa structures (like the H1-B visa in the US) do not 
permit them to work, forcing them to either live in a split household to continue her career, or 
accompany their husbands to the US and become full-time homemakers (ibid).  
              
To sum up, the use of talent-based selection disproportionately disadvantages women for 
myriad reasons that connect to persistent gender inequalities in society. Under the new “talent 
regimes”, women experience significantly more difficulty than men in gaining admission 
under economic immigration categories, and are far more likely to enter as family migrants.
               
3. Indirect discrimination and disrespect       
                            
Assuming that talent-based selection does indirectly discriminate against women, where does 
it stand in relation to direct immigration discrimination against women, which philosophers 
widely regard as wrongful? I believe that we have three possible options. One is to say that, 
while direct immigration discrimination against women would be wrongful, indirect 
immigration discrimination against women is not. Another is to say that, while both direct 
and indirect immigration discrimination against women would be wrongful, they would be 
wrongful for different reasons. Thirdly, we might say that both direct and indirect 
immigration against women would be for the same reason. In this chapter, I argue for the 
third position. While I established, in the previous chapter, that direct immigration 
discrimination is wrong because it expresses disrespect, I aim to show that indirect 
immigration discrimination is also wrong because it is disrespectful. Before I sketch out my 
disrespect-oriented account of indirect discrimination and examine its implications for talent-
based selection, I will first respond to skepticism about the concept of indirect discrimination.
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a. Scepticism about indirect discrimination       
                  
Consider, as a paradigm example of indirect discrimination, the Griggs case, where a public 
utility corporation required its employees to possess a high school diploma, or to pass 
intelligence tests, in order to take on higher-ranked positions. These requirements had the 
effect of “disqualifying” black applicants at a “substantially higher rate than white applicants” 
(Griggs v. Duke Power Co.), trapping them in low-ranked labourer positions, due to their poorer 
levels of education resulting from poverty and segregation. Thus, even though race itself was 
not a criterion for employment, and the tests had to be taken by all would-be employees, they 
had the effect of disproportionately affecting a particular group. The tests were hence described 
as “operat[ing] invidiously to discriminate on the basis of race” (ibid), and the Griggs case was 
recognized as an instance of wrongful discrimination.      
                     
Here, it might be noted that the judgment on the Griggs case was motivated by the sense that 
the education tests were in fact a poorly-masked intentional attempt to exclude black 
employees. As Michael Selmi observes, “[t]he timing of the company’s implementation of the 
new practices – literally the day after the [1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibited racial 
discrimination] – has always aroused suspicions that the company’s intent was to keep its 
African-American employees on the lowest rung of jobs…there was [also] another fact that 
pointed towards an intent to discriminate, namely all of that incumbent white employees were 
exempted from the new requirements” (252-3). Therefore, it seems possible that the 
“disparate impact” of the Griggs case was only regarded as discriminatory because the racist 
intent was too difficult to prove (Selmi 253). If we accept this logic, this creates a serious 
problem for how I have framed indirect discrimination. Perhaps indirect discrimination is 
only wrong when it is actively intended to affect a particular group, and basically akin to direct 
discrimination that has been craftily obscured. The fact that the Griggs ruling did not rely on 
establishing intent should be interpreted as the court’s trying to make the best of a situation 
where intent could not be satisfactorily proven, and not as evidence that disproportionate 
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impact, in the absence of intent, can stand on its own as an alternative form of wrongful 
discrimination.          
             
But also consider a very different case. In SG v. St Gregory’s Catholic Science College, a young boy 
of African-Caribbean ethnicity took his school to court to challenge its ban on boys wearing 
their hair in cornrows. The school only permitted a conservative “short back and sides” 
hairstyle for boys (Taylor), with an explicit ban on “braids”, along with a more general 
prohibition on “peculiar and bizarre styles” (SG v. St Gregory’s Catholic Science College), which the 
school was concerned would encourage the proliferation of “gang culture” (Taylor). SG 
protested the school’s strict policy on the grounds that he wore his hair in cornrows as part of 
a family tradition, and that it was “of great importance to his cultural and racial identity” 
(ibid).  In response, the judge rejected the school’s submission that it needed to be shown that 
a practice was of ‘exceptional importance” to the person alleging disadvantage (SG v St. 
Gregory’s Catholic Science College). Rather, the relevant question was simply whether or not SG 
had faced a “particular disadvantage” – and it seemed that the school had imposed one on 
him by restricting his family and social customs (ibid). Consequently, the school’s ban on 
cornrows was eventually ruled as a case of indirect racial discrimination, despite the judge’s 
statement that “[t]here is no question of this school being in any way racist. This was an 
honest mistake…it was an error” (Taylor).                   
                       
This ruling casts serious doubt on Selmi’s assertion that indirect discrimination rulings merely 
function to take agents to task in situations where their racist intent cannot be fully 
established, and they hence cannot be charged with direct discrimination. As we have seen, it 
was made explicit that the school wrongfully discriminated against SG even if they merely 
made an “error” or mistake; they did not have to be in “any way racist” for the ruling to hold. 
So indirect discrimination does not seem reducible to direct discrimination that has been 
artfully concealed in race-neutral terms. Of course, this does not mean that there are no 
important differences between the Griggs and St. Gregory’s cases. It seems plausible that the 
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Griggs case could involve two distinct wrongs, on account of the intent to disadvantage black 
employees through indirectly discriminatory policies, and the indirect discrimination itself, 
while the St. Gregory’s case involved only one. Nevertheless, I simply aim to show that the 
wrongfulness of indirect discrimination does not turn on the presence of racist intent. 
                          
To further illustrate this point, consider Susan Okin’s description of the labour market’s 
demands: 
The constraints placed on wives as workers are strengthened by the tact that many full-
time employers assume, in innumerable ways, that someone is at home at least part-time 
during the day to assume primary responsibility for children. The traditional or quasi-
traditional division of labor is clearly assumed in the vast discrepancy between normal 
full-time working hours and children's school hours and vacations. It is assumed by the 
high degree of geographical mobility required by many higher-level management 
positions. It is also implicit in the structure of the professions, in which the greatest de- 
mands are placed on workers at the very peak of the child-rearing years. Academia and 
the law are two clear examples; both tenure and partnership decisions are typically made 
for a person between the ages of thirty and thirty-five, with obvious discriminatory implications 
for the professional parent (almost always a woman) who does not have a partner willing 
to assume the major responsibility for children. (Okin 155-156, my emphasis) 
While Okin explicitly names these constraints on women as examples of discrimination, like in 
the St. Gregory’s case, the policies that exclude women from the workforce do not seem 
intentionally designed to keep women out of it. It is safe, I think, to assume that the requirement 
of geographical mobility was in most cases not contrived to make sure that women continued 
to be unemployed, but truly considered a necessary part of the scope of higher-level 
management positions. Rather, women are disproportionately disadvantaged by these 
requirements, which translate into work policies unfriendly to the lives of many women. This 
is because basic criteria like “normal full-time working hours” and the expectation of 
geographical mobility are utterly incompatible with caregiver duties, which weigh particularly 
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heavily on the shoulders of women, because of deeply entrenched gendered expectations. 
Okin doubtless regards such indirect discrimination as wrongful, but why is it so? I will attempt 
to answer this question.         
                            
b. A disrespect-based account of indirect discrimination      
                 
I will now construct a disrespect-oriented account of indirect discrimination. While much 
philosophical work has been done to link direct discrimination and disrespect, we seem to lack 
a similar explanation for why indirect discrimination is disrespectful. Although I have shown, 
in Chapter 3, that we can explain why direct discrimination offends against moral equality, it 
is significantly more difficult to show that indirect discrimination is wrongful for the same 
reason. First, I will outline three challenges for a disrespect-oriented account of indirect 
discrimination. Next, I will critically examine Moreau’s account of indirect discrimination as 
negligence, which she understands as the unreasonable imposition of risk. I conclude that, 
while it satisfies the first challenge, it fails to meet the other two. Finally, I will suggest an 
alternative: that we can conceptualise negligence as the failure to discharge a duty of care. 
              
To start with, it is not obvious how the disproportionate disadvantage suffered by women, in 
Okin’s passage, is disrespectful. To reiterate, far from originating in a desire to pick out women 
and treat them differently, much less deny their equal moral status, an employer may require 
people who can work “normal working hours” simply because they need to be as productive 
as their competitors, or because their employees must be available during those hours to carry 
out their roles. These reasons do not seem disrespectful with relation to existing cultural 
norms. The same might be said of the reasons that St. Gregory’s offered for only permitting 
conservative male haircuts. The aim, which was accepted by the judge, was to “make the 
school a place where children ‘are first and foremost safe and valued equally’” (Wagner), and 
keep them safe from the influence of gang culture.     
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Secondly, indirect discrimination seems to be overly indeterminate. Let us take for granted that 
indirect discrimination is wrong because it expresses disrespect. Yet there remain cases where 
the conditions of indirect discrimination are met, but we would not call them instances of 
disrespect. It does not seem disrespectful, for example, for particular ethnic groups to be 
disproportionately excluded from playing in a basketball team because they tend to be 
significantly shorter, across the board, than people from other groups. But what separates the 
basketball case from Okin’s, where women are disproportionately excluded from many 
careers, because of working hours uncongenial to women’s lives? One answer could be that it 
has to do with availability of options. It is acceptable for people from statistically shorter ethnic 
groups to be excluded from joining basketball teams if there are other sporting activities they 
can participate in. On the other hand, if many employers posit demands that women cannot 
meet, they will be unable to pursue careers. This seems to be Okin’s point. However, suppose 
that SG, the boy in the St. Gregory’s case, had the option of going to school in five other 
equally prestigious academic institutions, which would allow him to retain his cornrows. But 
this hypothetical wealth of further options for him, does not seem to change how the school’s 
policy on haircuts amounts to disrespect.       
                  
Thirdly, we might believe that indirect discrimination is conceptually distinct from direct 
discrimination. The first two problems aside, indirect discrimination is primarily identified in 
terms of its consequences for a particular group, namely, the fact it disproportionately 
disadvantages them. Presumably, Okin believes that the structure of the labour market 
reinforces or even worsens the subordinate position of women, making it extremely difficult for 
them to achieve economic independence. But, as we have seen in the last section, direct 
discrimination is primarily wrong because it expresses disrespect, not because it leads to 
disadvantageous consequences. What, then, is the conceptual relation between direct and 
indirect discrimination? One possibility is that indirect discrimination is not actually 
discrimination at all; as Selmi puts it, “[the theory of indirect discrimination] has never been 
widely accepted as consistent with our basic definition of discrimination”. Similarly, Iris 
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Marion Young concludes that, “[T]he concept of discrimination…should be restricted to the 
explicit exclusion or preference of some people in the distribution of benefits, the treatment 
they receive, or the positions they occupy, on account of their social group membership” 
(196). A more effective strategy for addressing the injustice suffered by disadvantaged groups, 
she argues, is “to restrict the concept of discrimination to intentional and explicitly formulated 
policies of exclusion or preference, and to argue that discrimination is not the only or 
necessarily the primary wrong that women and people of colour suffer” (ibid).   
                  
Overall, we have three challenges that a successful disrespect-oriented theory of indirect 
discrimination should aim to meet. Firstly, we need to show how “disproportionate impact” 
expresses disrespect. It should also be sufficiently determinate, allowing us to draw a line 
between indirect discrimination and harmless instances of disproportionate impact on certain 
groups. Thirdly, a theory of wrongful indirect discrimination must be conceptually similar to that 
of direct discrimination, or be open to Young’s charge that we are actually talking about 
something else.          
                            
c. Negligence as the unreasonable imposition of risk      
                       
One possibility is to think of wrongful indirect discrimination as a form of negligence, 
understood in tort law as unreasonably imposing a risk on someone else (Moreau 135). 
Moreau avers that discrimination is negligent when the discriminator unreasonably fails to 
accommodate the discriminatee, thus allowing them to be disadvantaged or excluded because 
of a feature such as their race, gender or disability (138). The test for unreasonableness, 
Moreau believes, is quite straightforward: if the discriminator’s other interests at stake are 
more important than the discriminatee’s interest in not being disadvantaged, requiring them 
to adjust their policies would amount to undue hardship (Moreau 139). However, if the 
discriminatee’s interest in not being disadvantaged outweighs the discriminator’s interests, it 
would be unreasonable for the discriminator not to accommodate them. In sum, indirect 
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discrimination is an “act that excludes someone in circumstances where there is some 
reasonable way of accommodating this person short of undue hardship” (Moreau 134).  
               
To illustrate this in practice, consider a scenario where a visually impaired person, who 
requires her guide-dog’s presence at all times, attempts to have lunch at a local café. The café 
shuns her because they have a strict policy that no animals are to be allowed on the premises, 
because allowing so would cheapen the café’s ambience (Moreau 133). This would constitute 
indirect discrimination, as “it seems unreasonable of the restaurant to refuse to serve this 
client when doing so would not materially harm the premises or substantially interfere with 
the running of the restaurant” (ibid). On the other hand, if the café staff are religiously 
motivated, and ban dogs from the premises because they believe that coming into contact 
with a dog would render them ritually impure and require them to cleanse themselves 
repeatedly after, it would be substantially difficult for a waiter to have to cleanse himself 
frequently due to his encounters with the guide-dog. As this would truly result in undue 
hardship for the café, the staff’s refusal to serve her does not amount to indirect discrimination 
(Moreau 134). Indeed, a similar judgment was also ruled with regard to the Griggs case. Duke 
Power Company was found to be guilty of indirect discrimination because it failed to show 
that the required tests were “job-related and governed by principles of business necessity” 
(Hunter 113); in short, they were unreasonable because they did not reflect legitimately 
important interests on the part of the firm.                   
                       
How, then, does Moreau’s account succeed in meeting the three challenges I have laid out?  
Pertinently, Moreau suggests that discrimination-as-negligence might count as an instance of 
disrespect, as “it seems plausible to suggest that demeaning someone amounts to behaving 
unreasonably, or negligently, towards them” (136). But why, exactly, would unreasonable 
behavior amount to disrespect? Returning briefly to the non-comparative and comparative 
requirement of respect I discussed in Chapter Two, recall that the non-comparative 
requirement demands that every person’s treatment must be justified through the use of 
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reasons that adequately reflect our recognition of their interests, while the comparative 
requirement demands that we eschew modes of treatment that reject the equal worth of all 
persons. First of all, unreasonably imposing a risk on individuals seems to violate the non-
comparative requirement; their unreasonableness means that the agent in question has failed to 
appropriately weigh their interests. But does the unreasonable imposition of risk violate the 
comparative requirement? Perhaps we might say that it does so because it burdens some 
groups and not others; it betrays a lack of regard for the interests of the members of those 
groups in comparison to others. Yet, the restaurant owner who is overly concerned about 
maintaining an upmarket ambience, and prioritises it over the important interest that visually 
impaired people have in visiting public spaces with their guide dogs, does not seem to do this. 
We generally do not view the treatment of one’s own interests as more important than other 
people’s as a violation of the comparative requirement of respect; I may act wrongly in 
insisting that we go to the cinema instead of a restaurant to satisfy my superficial curiosity 
about a film, while ignoring your desperate hunger, but I do not show contempt for your 
equal moral worth. Matters might be different if I am white and you are black, and I decide to 
go to the cinema instead of a restaurant because I believe that the interests of white people 
(including myself) always trump those of black people. Here, I violate the comparative 
requirement because I view the interests of white people as warranting more regard than those of 
black people, while the restaurant owner does not prioritise the interests of any one group over 
that of visually impaired people. Thus, while the “unreasonableness” test meets the first 
challenge of showing why indirect discrimination is disrespectful, it only does so in the non-
comparative sense.                
                                        
However, the “reasonableness” test founders on the issue of determinacy. It remains unclear 
how we can distinguish cases of indirect discrimination from harmless incidents of 
disproportionate disadvantage. For Moreau, acting reasonably entails weighing the 
discriminator’s interests against the discriminatee’s. We may say, for example, that firms 
unreasonably fail to accommodate women, as the interests that women have in not being 
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excluded from employment outweigh the firms’ interests at stake. However, it is crucial to 
examine how, or why, one reason can outweigh another in the first place; we must take a step 
back and first consider what gives them their purported weight. Without this framework in 
place, talk of weighing interests merely raises a wave of further questions. Is it true, for 
example, that women’s interest in employment necessarily outweighs firms’ competing 
interests (e.g. profit-making, coordination with other firms)? Setting this issue aside for now, it 
seems highly plausible that women have a very strong fundamental interest in seeking 
employment and achieving financial autonomy. On this view, their interest cannot be 
outweighed by any amount of economic gains that accrue to the firms in question, or the 
economy at large, and we may conclude that firms’ failure to respond to this interest is an 
expression of disrespect towards them. However, the waters are considerably muddier in the 
St. Gregory’s case. It is far less obvious that black students had an extremely strong interest in 
preserving their hairstyles, which effectively outweighed the school’s interest in maintaining a 
code of conduct that they deemed conducive to the students’ safety. Furthermore, recall how 
SG did not need to show that the practice of keeping his hair in cornrows was of “exceptional 
importance” to him; it was enough for the judge that it imposed on him a particular kind of 
disadvantage. Similarly, it is at least conceivable that short students excluded from basketball 
have a strong enough interest in participating in a sporting activity of their choice, for reasons 
of social inclusion and self-esteem, that outweigh the school’s interest in setting up a prize-
winning basketball team. In short, while the “reasonableness test” offers clear-cut answers for 
some cases, it does not do so for all of them.       
                              
Thirdly, the “reasonableness” test seems to fail at establishing conceptual similarity between 
direct and indirect discrimination. While I have shown why the unreasonable imposition of 
risk can be understood as disrespectful, it seems to be referring to a significantly different kind 
of disrespect from the kind that direct discrimination is identified with. This is because 
wrongful direct discrimination is a paradigmatically comparative form of disrespect: as I have 
explained in the previous section, it expresses a rejection of the equal moral worth of the 
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groups that are differentially treated. In contrast, as I noted above, Moreau’s reading of 
indirect discrimination is only non-comparatively disrespectful. The two seem to be identifying 
very different phenomena. At the same time, in assessing whether an act of direct 
discrimination is wrongful, we are primarily concerned with whether or not it serves to 
reproduce social meanings and cultural conventions that demean groups and reject their moral 
equality, while wrongful indirect discrimination is said here to occur when agents fail to weigh 
interests appropriately. Even if they are both instances of disrespect, there are many different 
ways of expressing disrespect, and it is not at all clear why we should think of them as the 
same concept. Overall, while Moreau’s theory seems to meet only the first challenge. 
 
d. Negligence as the failure to discharge a duty of care 
 
I will now suggest an amendment to Moreau’s view that I believe will allow us to preserve the 
useful idea of negligence, while avoiding the shortfalls I identified. We can look to another 
available meaning of negligence: the failure to discharge a duty of care. Normally, in order to legally 
determine negligence, a three-part test must be satisfied. It must be established that a person is 
owed a duty of care; that the duty of care has been breached; and that as a result of that 
breach, harm has been caused (Bryden and Storey 124). Consider a case where an elderly 
person, who has been admitted to a hospital, dies of sepsis because a serious bedsore has gone 
untreated, due to his doctors failing to perform a routine bedsore check. Here, the hospital 
staff owe him a duty of care; “it has been argued by medical law academics that any patient 
[doctors] come across in our professional environment is owed a duty of care, not only by the 
doctors the patient comes into contact with, but also by those who are employed…to deliver 
patient care” (Bryden and Storey 125). At the same time, the doctors’ duty of care has been 
breached because they failed to adhere to the “standard of comparable professional practice” 
(ibid). Finally, the patient suffered harm precisely because the doctors failed to perform the 
routine check; he would not have died otherwise.  
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I propose that wrongful indirect discrimination is structurally similar to negligence because it 
involves the failure to discharge a duty of care. Agents owe a duty of care3 to culturally 
subordinated groups, to examine the expressive significance of their actions, and avoid 
reinforcing existing stigma. When an agent fails to observe the cultural impact of their actions, 
they can be understood as breaching this duty of care. Furthermore, harm – in this case, 
“disproportionate impact” that carries a particular social meaning – ensues as a result of the 
breach. It may be argued, at this point, that I have ignored a clear disanalogy between 
indirect discrimination and medical negligence. Doctors acquire a professional duty of care 
when a patient, for example, is admitted to hospital; by virtue of their role, they begin to stand 
in a particular relation to the patient. But where does the duty of care to culturally 
subordinated groups stem from? This is where the idea of equal respect for moral equality 
comes in – because we have a basic duty to treat all persons with equal respect, we have a 
secondarily derived duty of care to protect those who have endured persistent disrespect, and 
remain vulnerable to it, from suffering further disrespect. While we must refrain from directly 
expressing disrespect, as in the case of direct discrimination, we must also avoid indirectly 
exacerbating existing subordination. 
 
Four more clarificatory points must be made. Firstly, by “agents”, I refer both to individual 
and collective agents, including institutions and corporations. Secondly, it must be noted, 
again, that this is not a straightforward status-harm view, where indirect discrimination will be 
wrong when its disproportionate effect worsens the position of a historically disadvantaged 
group. But I want to argue that it is insufficient that their position is worsened; rather, it must be 
worsened in a particular way. The disproportionate effect must have the additional impact of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 It has been suggested that my claim that agents owe a “duty of care” to culturally subordinated groups 
is potentially infantilizing to those groups. It marks them out as helpless, weak, and in need of coddling 
by those who are stronger and more powerful. However, the term is a purely technical one that need 
not contain such implications. That I owe a “duty of care” to my employees does not mean, for 
example, that I have such an orientation towards them. Similarly, the fact that my favourite 
manufacturer of spaghetti sauce owes me a duty of care to produce uncontaminated cans of sauce need 
not imply that it treats me in an infantilizing way.  
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reinforcing stigmatized (or “spoiled”) identities, in a manner irreducible to material harm. Thirdly, 
while we determine whether doctors have breached their duty of care according to current 
professional standards, the “professional standard” for discrimination is our existing 
knowledge of harmful cultural norms pertaining to stigmatized groups. Doctors cannot escape 
charges of negligence by claiming ignorance of how they should have acted (unless, of course, 
the relevant fact is extremely obscure); the retort is that they should be aware of standard 
medical practice. Likewise, agents cannot insist that they have not breached their duty of care 
because they were ignorant of a particular strain of stigma, when they should have taken the 
necessary steps to educate themselves. Finally, the disproportionate impact must be foreseeable. 
It remains possible that a very well-deliberated policy, where the agents dutifully took existing 
cultural meanings into account, might somehow have the completely unexpected effect of 
excluding a culturally subordinated group in a way that reinforced demeaning stereotypes. I 
grant that such cases will not count as instances of negligent behavior. While the agents 
remain obliged to amend or replace the exclusionary policy, and may be held responsible for 
failing to do so after the problem has been identified, they have not wronged the culturally 
subordinated group by implementing it – although they may if they do not make the 
necessary changes afterwards.  
 
With these suggestions in mind, we can now understand Okin’s complaint in a new light. The 
labour market’s indirect gender discrimination is wrongful, because it involves negligence on the 
part of firms; their failure to consciously observe the social meaning of their actions exposes 
female workers to further stigma. By failing to accommodate those with caregiving 
responsibilities, firms send the message that the realm of employment and the realm of 
caregiving duties are wholly irreconcilable. To pursue a career, a woman must avail herself of 
the roles that impose such duties, particularly that of motherhood. (Perhaps a closely related 
case of discrimination is when women have their job applications thrown aside because of the 
suspicion that they may soon become pregnant.) This is a familiar trope in film and fiction; 
women are often depicted as having to give up their hopes of having children, or shunting 
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their children to one side, if they want to be taken seriously as real career people.  In the 
popular television series Mad Men, the character Peggy Olson gives up her child for adoption 
in order to focus on her demanding career as an advertising executive. The source of stigma 
against women becomes evident upon further examination: this hard-nosed dichotomy 
between home and work life reveals a contempt for the feminine, through the rejection of 
features that are culturally associated with women, such as possessing the desire to, or finding 
value in, caring and nurturing. Similarly, we might say that St Gregory’s negligently failed to 
avoid subjecting black people to more stigma. This is because the school rules, in failing to 
distinguish between cornrows and gang-related hairstyles (like the “skinhead” haircut), 
inadvertently reinforces existing demeaning stereotypes about Black culture: for example, that 
it primarily revolves around violent gang activities and criminal mindsets, and distinctively 
Black hairstyles like dreadlocks mark out one’s participation in such aberrant behaviour.  
 
I believe that my model of negligence meets the three challenges I have listed, filling in the 
gaps in Moreau’s construal. Firstly, it forges a clear link between disrespect and negligence. 
Negligence is disrespectful because the relevant duty of care derives from our general duty to 
treat all persons with equal respect. Next, it brings out the conceptual similarity between both 
types of discrimination. Both are concerned with how one’s actions can carry a particular 
expressive significance that replicate or reinforce disrespectful conventions, even if direct 
discrimination acts through intentional differential treatment, and indirect discrimination 
through failing to avoid disparate impact. Finally, my model of negligence is much more 
determinate. We no longer need to rely on the “unreasonableness test” to determine whether 
a case of disproportionate impact is disrespectful. No “weighing of interests” needs to be 
performed; agents simply have a pre-existing duty to avoid exposing culturally subordinated 
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4. Talent-based selection, revisited 
 
Now that I have laid out my alternative explanation for why wrongful indirect discrimination 
is disrespectful, I will return to the case of talent-based selection. Again, the disproportionate 
impact on women I discussed in Section 2 seems like a textbook example of indirect 
discrimination. While talent-based selection is gender-neutral on paper and does not explicitly 
exclude women, I also presume that states do not set out to intentionally exclude women from 
entry. Like the St. Gregory’s case, it may simply be an “error” or “honest mistake” on the part 
of immigration authorities. But does it meet my criteria for wrongful indirect discrimination? 
 
To re-iterate, indirect discrimination is wrongful when the discriminator neglects to pay 
attention to the social significance of their actions, and fails to avoid reinforcing the 
stigmatization of a group. Vis-à-vis talent-based citizenship, we might say that immigration 
policy-makers failed to consider the foreseeably disproportionate impact on women that the 
tiered system would have, when it carries expressive significance that reinforces women’s 
stigmatized collective status. In the existing social context, women face at least three kinds of 
stigma. Firstly, as my remarks in Section 2 have suggested, women are viewed as naturally 
suited for stereotypically “feminine” types of labour, which centre around “soft” interpersonal 
skills, while presumed to be naturally “unsuited” for, or less capable than men at doing jobs or 
tasks that are perceived as “masculine”, which creates barriers to their employment in 
occupations of their choice, as well as restricts their success even within those occupations. At 
the same time, the jobs and tasks read as “masculine” are often regarded as prestigious or 
important, while the labour commonly performed by women – such as caregiving work – is 
poorly valued. It is widely presumed that “soft skills” require less ingenuity or effort to 
perform than “masculine” forms of labour, and does not constitute “real work” that merits 
recognition. Again, these views demonstrate contempt for women’ abilities, and the various 
skills and dispositions that are culturally associated with them. Thirdly, women are often 
regarded as passive, helpless, and reliant on men. Under the ideology of protective 
	   165 
paternalism, they require male protection and help (Wakefield et al 1). On one hand, this 
leads to benevolent sexism, where men provide unrequested assistance to women in unequal 
“helping transactions” that position one individual as capable and the other as reliant on 
them, therefore conveying the power and authority of men (Wakefield et al 1) and the 
weakness of women. On the other hand, these social norms are also used to justify outright 
misogyny: chiefly, the denigration of women as lazy and useless, and only capable of 
achieving their ends by manipulating men into doing their work. Despite the belief that 
women are better-suited to domestic labour than taking up “actual” work, there also exist 
demeaning stereotypes about housewives: that they live lazy and leisurely lives at the expense 
of men’s hard work. At first blush, these cultural beliefs may seem incongruous with the others 
I have described, as surely housewives are doing what patriarchal societies believe they ought 
to. However, I think it is evident that housewives are viewed as lazy precisely because the 
domestic labour they engage in daily is considered extremely easy and worthless in 
comparison to the labour that men perform in the workforce.  
 
The exclusionary structure of the points-based systems serves to perpetuate these three forms 
of stigma. Women’s difficulty in entering through the “skilled” immigration categories delivers 
the message that female workers are unwanted by receiving states, because their contributions 
are inferior to those of men. Moreover, the fact that women end up most frequently admitted 
as “family” confirms the disrespectful stereotype of them as passive or helpless dependents, 
who only achieve their goals through reliance on men.  It may be said, then, that immigration 
policy-makers disrespect women through negligently failing to consider the cultural significance 
of women’s exclusion from the “skilled” category, which worsens the existing stigma they are 
subjected to. Furthermore, the indirect discrimination of talent-based selection wrongs women 
in general, not just foreign women, as the same disrespectful stereotypes apply to women at 
large, even if on an intersectional analysis, they have a more serious impact on the lived 
experience of some sub-groups, due to their country of origin, race, or class. It should also be 
clarified that my claim is not contingent on the assumption that home countries have a special 
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responsibility to remedy distributive injustice abroad. The wrong I have identified is not that 
talent-based selection contributes to patterns of existing distributive gender injustice in other 
countries, but that it worsens demeaning cultural beliefs about women at large. Suppose it can 
be shown that, for some reason, women who are citizens of the home country are immune to 
such stigma, and that it does not affect them in the same way. Might it then be argued that 
only those of a cosmopolitan bent are allowed to find fault with talent-based selection? I don’t 
think so; we have already observed that the duty of equal respect holds between all humans, not 




a. A cultural solution to a cultural problem? 
 
In my account, I have primarily framed wrongful indirect indiscrimination as a problem of 
cultural subordination. However, if discrimination is a cultural problem at its core, does this 
not imply that it can be remedied with a purely cultural solution? Return to the case of women 
facing indirect discrimination in the workforce. Assuming that my theory is correct, states 
wrong women because they risk reinforcing the stigmatic beliefs that stereotypically 
“feminine” forms of labour are unwanted and lack value, and that women are passively 
reliant on men. Instead of doing our best to avoid indirectly discriminatory practices, why not 
resolve this problem by elevating “women’s work” in popular culture? If a project of revaluation 
succeeded, caregiving roles might become more culturally valued than “men’s work”, rather 
than perceived as inferior, and women would no longer be culturally subordinated. 
Consequently, their disproportionate exclusion from skilled immigration categories would no 
longer count as wrongful indirect discrimination.  That we would rightly regard this solution 
as inadequate seems to strongly indicate that indirect discrimination, or possibly 
discrimination as a whole, is not primarily a cultural problem. 
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However, the fact that we cannot reduce cultural subordination to material harm does not 
mean that the two are not closely linked. For example, the material consequences of an 
indirectly discriminatory policy, like black people being disproportionately prevented from 
gaining employment in respected jobs like academia and legal professions, can nevertheless 
play a salient role in perpetuating stigma against black people, as there is a component of their 
“spoiled collective identity” that relates strongly to their poor economic status, and how they 
are particularly suited for low-ranked forms of work. At the same time, even if some campaigns 
might have some degree of success in changing cultural beliefs, culture is only one dimension. 
Consider the ongoing “Black Lives Matter” campaign that underlines the equal value of black 
people’s lives in the face of disproportionate police brutality against them. It calls for both 
cultural and material change because it is difficult to imagine how black lives could come to be 
equally valued and respected, even if attitudes towards them changed, if black people 
continued to be disproportionately subjected to police profiling, violence, and incarceration. 
Furthermore, while campaigns about the importance and value of domestic labour and 
caregiving occupations might play some role in shifting the cultural consciousness, particularly 
ham-fisted campaigns might even risk being more disrespectful to women by promoting 
stereotypical or essentialist beliefs about them. For example, an advertisement praising 
women’s ability to cope with difficult domestic work might inadvertently reinforce the notion 
that they are more naturally suited to such activities.  In sum, it is simply not true that a 
“cultural solution” is a sufficient response to discrimination, even if it is primarily identified as 
a cultural problem.  
 
b. The role of unreasonableness 
 
In Section 4, I rejected Moreau’s account of wrongful indirect discrimination because of how 
much it leans on the notion of unreasonableness, which I consider more confusing than helpful. 
For Moreau, indirect discrimination is wrongful when the interests of the discriminatee 
outweigh the interests of the discriminator, and the discriminator acts unreasonably because 
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they could, in fact, accommodate the discriminatee without subjecting themselves to undue 
hardship. On the other hand, my own account does not rely on establishing unreasonable 
behaviour on the part of agents, but that they have violated a duty of care owed to all persons 
who suffer from cultural subordination. 
 
A second objection might argue that I am mistaken in removing considerations of 
reasonableness and the weighing of interests from my theory of indirect discrimination. This is 
because such considerations are central to our solutions to indirect discrimination. For 
example, most lectureship positions require a doctorate. Unfortunately, as some groups are 
disproportionately excluded from admission to doctorate programs, they are by extension 
disproportionately excluded from taking up lectureship positions. Arguably, the comparative 
absence of people of colour from academic jobs sends some demeaning messages about them; 
that they are by nature not as intelligent or capable of grasping complex concepts as white 
people, for example. However, it is very unlikely that we would act to resolve the issue by 
removing the doctorate requirement, and it seems that our rationale for not doing so would 
be motivated by students’ interest in having capable and qualified lecturers, not amateurs. 
Moreau’s theory seems to supply a good explanation for this: we have weighed the interest of 
people of colour in getting jobs as lecturers against the interest of university students in being 
taught by qualified lecturers, and the students have emerged the winner. Therefore, it is not 
unreasonable or wrong that lectureships are only available to people with doctorates, even if 
they do lead to disproportionate exclusion. Contrary to what I have suggested, the 
“unreasonable test” seems to supply the most intuitive guidelines for action.  
 
This objection confuses the criteria for identifying wrongful indirect discrimination with the 
criteria employed in responding to wrongful discrimination. According to Moreau, indirect 
discrimination is wrong when the agent acts unreasonably. It is not wrongful if they do not. In 
contrast, I think that indirect discrimination is wrong when the agent acts in a way that 
reinforces stigma, regardless of whether or not they are “unreasonable”. While 
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unreasonableness does not play a role in how I identify wrongful indirect discrimination, this is 
not to say that it cannot play a role in how we ought to address it. Certainly, the interests of 
students are worth keeping in mind when deliberating over how to tackle indirect 
discrimination in the academic sphere.  But these interests do not enter the equation in 
determining whether or not a particular case of indirect discrimination is wrongful.  
 
c. Why should individual agents pay the cost of a structural problem?  
 
A third objection might relate to a fundamental difference between direct and indirect 
discrimination, and why they create responsibilities on the part of agents. As Selmi suggests, 
while direct discrimination typically implies some element of individual fault, disparate impact 
theory shifts away from “issues of fault to distributive remedial concerns” (250). In his words, 
 
Indirect discrimination focuses on results, an issue of equality, and requires employers to 
justify their employment practices that disproportionately affect groups that are protected 
by anti-discrimination laws. Implicit in this theory is that neither the employer or the 
employees (or applicants) have acted wrongfully but there is instead a social inequity that 
collectively we have determined should be addressed or justified. (Selmi 253) 
 
If we accept this distinction between direct and indirect discrimination, the absence of liability 
has serious consequences for the issue of responsibility; in particular, the duty to compensate 
the victims of wrongful discrimination. While I have preferred to focus on social stigma, 
rather than distributive equality, Selmi’s criticism still applies. Suppose that an employer 
directly discriminates against its non-white employees on the basis of race, awarding non-
white employees a significantly lower salary than white employees, despite being given the 
same job titles and duties. Here, we might say that the employer has committed a fault; it is 
liable for compensation to its non-white employees because it demeaned them. But suppose 
that, in another case, an employer awards significant year-end bonuses to full-time employees, 
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and not to part-time employees, even if the latter have worked for the same number of hours. 
This indirectly discriminates against women, because women are disproportionately 
employed part-time due to their caregiving responsibilities. But why should the employer be 
responsible for compensating those women? After all, unlike in the previous case, 
disproportionate impact only occurs because of pre-existing stigma against women, where men 
and women alike assume that women ought to be primary caregivers, and through no fault of 
the employer. In other words, it is unclear why employers should pay the cost of those 
accommodations, since they have little to do with creating those societal presumptions (Selmi 
260).  
 
I believe that my theory of indirect discrimination actually shows how we can resolve this 
issue. To start with, it is not true that we cannot bear responsibility to other agents, in the 
form of compensatory duties or otherwise, if our actions only harm them because of some pre-
existing conditions that we played no part in creating. Imagine that I am a strict gym teacher. 
As part of my syllabus, all my students must warm up by doing a set of jumping jacks at the 
beginning of every class. I neglect to remember that one of my students has a serious knee 
injury he sustained many years ago. The jumping jacks aggravate the knee injury and he must 
undergo further surgery. In this case, it seems likely that the school is responsible for the 
aggravated knee injury, and ought to pay some degree of compensation to the unfortunate 
student, even if the student’s predicament only arose because of a pre-existing condition that I 
played no role in creating. Denying this possibility means that we might be able to absolve 
many agents of responsibility by simply reframing instances of harm, so as to trace their origin 
to a pre-existing condition (“I am not responsible for breaking your heart, given how fragile it 
was even before I met you”). In fact, this may even apply to cases of direct discrimination. An 
employer liable for racial discrimination – for example, by racially segregating their canteen - 
may retort by insisting that they played no role in creating the social meanings that make the 
act of racial segregation demeaning. 
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Keeping this in mind, we can now understand how agents may be liable for wrongful indirect 
discrimination, even if they did not bring about the social conditions that lead to disparate 
impact. As I have argued, agents are liable because they act negligently by failing to discharge 
their duty of care to culturally subordinated groups. While they are not responsible for the 
background of cultural subordination, they are responsible for negligence; the same way that 
a gym teacher may be responsible for negligence, even if they are not responsible for causing a 
student’s old knee injury. Furthermore, it is highly misleading to suggest that there is a one-
way relation between the context of social stigma and the current actions of agents, where 
stigmatic meanings affect the consequences of agents’ actions, but remains static regardless of 
how agents behave. As my account tries to underscore, the actions and omissions of agents, 
especially those who are powerful and influential, continue to breathe life into disrespectful 
social meanings. 
 
d. Inattention to structural problems 
 
Finally, we might lose a lot by insisting that direct and indirect discrimination are the same 
concept. For example, Young complains that discrimination has a tendency to focus attention 
on the perpetrator and a specific action or policy, and not on victims and their situation. 
Moreover, discrimination “present[s] the injustice groups suffer as aberrant, the exception 
rather than the rule”, with the effect of obscuring oppressive structural and institutional 
frameworks” (195-6). So it appears that Young is primarily concerned with the instrumental 
drawbacks of framing disproportionate impact as discrimination (Lippert-Rasmussen 51).  
 
I am not convinced that defining disparate impact as a form of discrimination would 
necessarily have such drawbacks.  It is not clear to me, for example, why employing the word 
“discrimination” to describe such cases would in itself suggest that disproportionate impact is 
aberrant or exceptional, or why it would leave us unmotivated to examine oppressive 
structures and institutions. While my account shows that individual agents can be held 
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responsible for wrongful indirect discrimination, it is concerned with the interaction between 
agents and the existing oppressive social context, rather than treating individual agents as if 
their actions are located in a vacuum. Furthermore, Young’s criticism is double-edged; could 
we not argue that excessive attention to structural and institutional oppression might end up 
absolving agents who have acted negligently on an individual basis? I think it is more helpful 
to focus on emphasizing how the fact of oppression can effectively give rise to important 




In this chapter, I have sought to provide an account of wrongful indirect discrimination that 
connects it to the disrespect-oriented theory of direct discrimination I have endorsed in the 
previous section. I contend that indirect discrimination is disrespectful because it is negligent; 
agents breach their duty of care to members of stigmatized groups, to examine the social 
meaning of their actions and avoid exacerbating stigma. This duty of care is derived from our 
basic duty to treat all persons with equal respect; while we must refrain from directly 
disrespectful behaviour, we must also avoid indirectly worsening cultural subordination. 
Additionally, it fulfils two other important desiderata: it is not only determinate, allowing us to 
distinguish between disrespectful and non-disrespectful forms of disproportionate impact, but 
also conceptually similar to direct discrimination. I have also explored how my account of 
indirect discrimination can be applied to the case of talent-based citizenship; specifically, it 
leads us to the worrying conclusion that talent-based citizenship is a form of wrongful indirect 
discrimination, because immigration policy-makers have neglected to avoid worsening existing 
stigma against women that relates to their capacities and the value of their work, in 
comparison to men’s. If philosophers regard direct immigration discrimination against women 
as wrongful, they should also be concerned about talent-based selection and its potential for 
gender-based indirect discrimination. 
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The previous three chapters have focused on the state’s right to exclude non-citizens from 
entering its territory, settling within its territory, or become members of the state. In my final 
chapter, I consider a very different possibility: that the state’s right to exclude may also 
include the right to exclude current citizens by revoking their citizenship, which I will term 
“denationalization”. While citizenship is a broad concept (for example, European Union 
membership is commonly described as a form of “citizenship”), I will focus exclusively on the 
revocation of national forms of citizenship. Although the question of the right to exclude has 
not enjoyed as much philosophical attention as the exclusion of non-citizens in recent years, 
there seems to at least be a prima facie case for the revocation of citizenship. For example, 
Christopher Heath Wellman has suggested that the freedom of association, which he regards 
as grounding for the right to exclude, includes “the right not to associate and even, in many 
cases, the right to disassociate” (109). It is not automatically obvious, here, why the state 
should not be able to disassociate from people who are its citizens. Matthew Gibney has also 
observed that the expulsion of unwanted members seems to also be a right typically granted 
to other associations (2011, 12), and it seems possible that this could be straightforwardly 
extended to the state, especially when states have claimed this right, both historically and 
presently.  
 
Today, denationalization by the state, and not as a matter of personal choice (as some 
voluntarily renounce their previous citizenship) is largely enforced in the name of national 
security. Motivated by the fear of Islamic terrorism, several liberal democratic states have 
passed, strengthened, or considered legislation that would enable their governments to strip 
certain persons of their citizenship (Barry and Ferracioli 1). A recent publicized instance of 
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denationalization involved an Afghan dual citizen whose UK passport was removed by the 
Home Secretary after his detention by British forces in Afghanistan in 2011. The suspect is 
believed, according to “absolutely conclusive evidence”, to be a member of a network of 
extremists, and to have fought against Afghan and coalition forces in the border area 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the words of a Home Office spokesman: 
 
We are determined to detect and disrupt all terrorist threats and take 
action against those we believe pose a national security risk. We are peased that 
the court found the Home Secretary was ‘fully justified’ in her assessment of the 
threat posed by this dangerous individual, and that it was proportionate to 
pursue deprivation action. (Press Association) 
 
However, certain aspects of the UK’s current denationalization practices have proven 
controversial. One problematic issue for UK law at present is the fact that dual nationals are 
especially vulnerable to having their citizenship revoked. Previously, many denationalization 
laws, including those that of the UK between 1914 and 2002, allowed governments to strip 
citizenship only from naturalized citizens, and not from those who are native born citizens; 
during World War I, measures to strip naturalized citizens of German descent of their 
citizenship were considered (Gibney 2011, 12). Historically, Gibney attributes this to the 
“(in some cases racist) anxiety about the loyalty of those born outside the state” (ibid). One 
potential objection was that this wrongfully discriminated between naturalized citizens and 
native-born citizens, and implied that naturalized citizens held a “second class status” in 
comparison to the native born (Gibney 2011, 13). In response, through its amendment of 
the British Nationality Act in 2002, the UK government collapsed the distinction between 
naturalized and native-born citizens in its provisions for denationalization (ibid), defending 
their decision to enlarge the purview of denationalization by presenting it as an “anti-
discrimination measure” that would uphold the equality of all citizens (Gibney 2011, 17). 
However, combined with the amendment that the Secretary of State could not deprive 
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individuals of their citizenship if it would make them stateless (ibid), this created a new 
distinction; citizens with a dual citizenship could be denationalized, while citizens with a 
non-dual citizenship could not.4  Significantly, France looks set to go down a similar path. In 
February 2016, as part of its raft of counter-terrorism measures, France’s lower house of 
parliament approved a bill to strip French-born dual citizens convicted of terrorism of their 
French citizenship (The Economist).  
 
In this chapter, instead of engaging in a more general ethical analysis of denationalization as 
a practice, I want to restrict the scope of my argument to the policies that I have identified. 
In particular, I will defend Gibney’s view that the denationalization of dual citizens is 
wrongful because it violates the principle of equal respect and generates a group of second-
class citizens (2011, 12). I do this by developing an account of the constraints that equal 
respect places on the pursuit of national security, and demonstrating that this is violated by 
the denationalization of dual citizens. What, then, does my claim mean for denationalization 
as a whole? Notably, I do not attempt to rule out the possibility that denationalization, in 
select cases, may be morally permissible. After all, I only aim to show that it is wrong to 
denationalize only dual citizens in the current social context. This does not mean, however, 
that I endorse the view that denationalization would become permissible if the field was 
levelled and both dual and single nationals were eligible for denationalization. It may be 
wrong to do this for other reasons (e.g. because it would make them stateless) that I will not 
address. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 A further change to this law has been made. Section 66 of the Immigration Act 2014 has given the 
British state the power to denationalize naturalized single nationals who have “engaged in conduct 
‘seriously prejudicial’ to the UK’s vital interests”, and the “Home Secretary has reasonable grounds 
to believe that they could acquire another nationality” (Gower 1). For example, consider the case of 
Minh Pham, a naturalized British citizen who originally held Vietnamese citizenship. Upon suspicion 
that he was a supporter of the terrorist group Al-Qaeda, and had visited the group’s base in Yemen, 
the Home Secretary issued an order that his citizenship be withdrawn in December 2011 (RT). 
Shortly after, she ordered that he be deported directly to Vietnam, where he was subsequently 
detained in (ibid). Importantly, he was stripped of his citizenship even when it was claimed to be 
unlikely that his previous state of citizenship, Vietnam, would accept him back, and he was detained 
there as a stateless person (ibid). However, it remains considerably easier to denationalize dual 
nationals insofar as there is no need to prove that there are “reasonable grounds” for believing they 
can acquire another nationality. 
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The chapter will proceed in four further sections. In Section 2, I outline two justifications for 
the importance of national security to states. Next, in Section 3, I argue that anti-terrorist 
national security measures do not override the demands of social equality, and must still be 
reined in by the state’s duty to uphold social equality between all persons on its territory, 
non-citizens and citizens alike. In Section 4, I explain why the denationalization of dual 
citizens violates the constraint of social equality, in the current social context, by making an 
amendment to Gibney’s claim. Specifically, it expresses disrespect for British Muslims by 
reinforcing the Islamophobic stereotype that they are permanent outsiders hostile to British 
society, by dint of their ethno-religious identity.  
 
2. National security 
 
As a starting point, we should first understand why national security is valuable for states, to 
the extent that it might presumptively justify the exclusion of citizens in the form of 
denationalization. The notion of national security has gained somewhat of a bad reputation 
over the years. For example, Henry Shue refers to the “cancerous growth” of the concept 
(168), and how it has become increasingly detached from the physical security of people in 
the nation (169). Rather, it has expanded to include “such objectives as national affluence 
and power, military preparedness, and entrenchment of preferred ideologies” (Nickel and 
Hasse 1586). This is not to say, however, that there is no legitimate merit to the idea. In this 
section, I will unpack two arguments for the importance of national security. While both 
accounts focus on normative significance of individual security, I will show that we can 
extrapolate from these to see the value of national security. 
 
a. Shue: the right to security as the precondition for other rights 
 
Shue has described the right to security as a right “not to be subjected to murder, torture, 
mayhem, rape, or assault” (20). This bears strong similarity to Emma Rothschild’s 
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definition, which characterizes security as the ‘freedom from the prospect, and therefore the 
fear, of personal violation” (62). This, I think, captures a very intuitive understanding of 
what individual security is. Interestingly, Shue has distinguished the right to security from 
other less fundamental rights by describing it as basic; to him, it is a “line beneath which no 
one is to be allowed to sink” (18), and one of “everyone’s reasonable demands upon the rest 
of humanity” (Shue 19). But what, exactly, is so important about the right to security? 
Shue’s instructive response is that security provides a precondition for all other rights: 
 
No one can fully enjoy any right that is supposedly protected by society if someone can 
credibly threaten him or her with murder, rape, beating, etc., when he or she tries to 
enjoy the alleged right. Such threats to physical security are among the most serious 
and – in much of the world – the most widespread hindrances to the enjoyment of any 
right. If any right is to be exercised except at great risk, physical security must be 
protected. In the absence of physical security people are unable to use any other rights 
that society may be said to be protecting without being liable to encounter many of the 
worst dangers they would encounter if security were not protecting the rights. (21)  
 
In other words, being physically secure is an important condition for the exercise of any 
other rights, and if we are to guarantee anything else as a right, guaranteeing physical 
security must be part of it (Shue 21-2). To use one example by Shue: suppose that the state 
purports to recognize the right to peaceful assembly, but it is not unusual for these 
assemblies to be broken up, or for violence to be exerted on their participants (22). Shue 
argues that it would be a mistake to say that people have a right to peaceful assembly even if 
they could still try their best to assemble, and succeed on occasion, as they remain 
vulnerable as ever to the threat of physical violence (ibid). The point is we have a right to a 
secure environment, as a type of public good, in order to secure other rights (Waldron 2009, 
214), and this right may warrant “activities and institutions” aimed at providing social 
guarantees for individuals’ security, such as police forces, criminal courts, penitentiaries, 
guards, and taxes that uphold a large system for the ‘prevention, detection, and punishment 
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of violations of personal security” (Shue 37-8).  
 
Shue’s claim that we cannot exercise our other rights without security may seem to be a bit 
of an overstatement. As Jeremy Waldron points out, “security is not an all-or-nothing 
matter, but a matter of more or less. I may be provided with a guarantee of protection but 
not a cast-iron guarantee” (2009, 218). The fact that the provision of security as a public 
good is less than perfect, or falls short of what is reasonably required under certain 
circumstances, does not seem to make the enjoyment of rights impossible (ibid). One way 
around this, I think, is that we should not take Shue as literally saying that our effective 
exercise of a particular right (e.g. the right to assemble peacefully) is automatically curtailed 
the instant we lack some degree of physical security against attack. Rather, his claim is that 
that we cannot be committed to the protection of such rights if we are not also simultaneously 
committed to the protection of individual security, because of the deep connection between 
the two, even if there is no way for us to guarantee perfect security. We may continue to 
exercise the right to peaceful protest even if we are insecure to some degree, but the state 
cannot meaningfully claim to recognize the right, if it will not also recognize the right to 
securely exercise it. 
 
b. John: Security and “reasonable planning” 
 
Moving away from the focus on rights, a second important suggestion comes from Stephen 
John, who claims that physical security is a necessary condition for agents to function as 
“reasonable planners”, which he believes that all persons have a basic interest in. I will now 
sketch out his view. 
 
Interestingly, distancing himself from the notion of physical security as freedom from attack 
or violation, John contends that an agent will enjoy physical security iff “there is warrant for 
her to believe that she will continue to achieve normal human physical functioning across 
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the range of plausible futures, and this belief would be true” (73). In turn, this warrant 
depends on the reliability of the mechanisms that we use to meet our needs for normal 
physical functioning (John 74). Reliability can be understood to hold when the destruction 
of security cannot be foreseen in the near future; when it is ensured that we will swiftly 
regain security even if it is temporarily compromised; and lastly, when threats to it are 
highly improbable (Herington 18-19). Our security is positively correlated with the 
reliability of the mechanisms that we rely on for needs fulfillment, as reliability means we 
are likely to continue to meet our needs, and the belief that we will continue to function in 
the future is warranted (John 75). Thus, physical security is read as the reliable fulfillment of 
our “vital” physical needs – the broad range of goods that are necessary to our achievement 
of a normal level of physical functioning (John 74), and not only to freedom from physical 
violation. Nevertheless, his analysis can be nicely applied to cases of physical violation. 
Bodily integrity is quite evidently necessary for our normal human physical functioning; we 
cannot function properly if we are injured or maimed. And the more reliable the 
mechanisms that we use to guarantee our preservation of bodily integrity (e.g. the “activities 
and institutions” that Shue suggests) are, the more physically secure we become.  
 
From here, John argues that human agents have a basic interest in being able to function as 
“reasonable planning agents” – that is, agents who are able to make reasonable plans about 
the future (76). One significant way that plans can fail to be reasonable is if they are based 
on beliefs that are unlikely to be true (ibid). For example, my plan to visit the zoo on 
Monday is not a reasonable one, on John’s view, if it is premised on the false belief that the 
zoo is open on Mondays. In order for us to be able to function as reasonable planners across 
the board, the presupposition that we will continue to achieve normal physical functioning 
must be likely to be true; like in the previous case, it would be unreasonable for me to make 
plans to visit the zoo on a Monday, if my belief that I would continue to enjoy normal 
physical functioning on Monday turns out to be false. However, this is only likely to be true 
if the mechanisms on which we rely for meeting our vital needs are reliable (John 77). To 
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sum up, “if we assume that we have an interest in being able to function as a reasonable 
planner, then the extent to which this interest is met turns on whether or not the 
mechanisms on which we rely for future needs fulfillment are, in fact, reliable” (John 78).  
Put differently, it seems that security, defined as the reliable fulfillment of our physical needs, 
is essential for our functioning as reasonable planners. 
 
c. National security as a collective right 
 
In the above sub-sections, I have sought to summarise two reasons why individual security 
might be so valuable to us: it is necessary for the fulfillment of our rights, as well as our 
ability to function as “reasonable planners”. How, then, can these insights be applied to the 
concept of national security? 
 
At this point, we should draw a distinction between individual and collective accounts of 
national security. Insecurity on Shue’s account “just is an individual’s being directly subject 
to evils like rape or murder or the threat of them”, and the “absence of physical violence 
directed specifically at the right-bearers, considered one by one” (Waldron 2009, 211). Likewise, 
insecurity on John’s account is the unreliability of the mechanisms that help individuals to 
achieve normal physical functioning. On these views, national security would be something 
like the prevention of threats that violate each person’s right to security on a national scale. 
However, as Waldron points out, those who say that we must give up some of our rights for 
the sake of security, in the wake of terrorist attacks, are not necessarily referring to security 
against the physical attack of each and every right-holder.  Rather, they mean a more 
collective sense of security, as in the “general security of the nation against attacks of this 
kind” (ibid). For example, while it is said that a loss in “homeland security” is suffered when 
terrorist attacks occur, or when their danger is heightened, but the impact of those attacks 
may affect only a tiny proportion of citizens (Waldron 212). Looking at an event like 
September 11, or even the Paris attacks in 2015, through the lens of the individual account, 
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might force us to reach the conclusion that the true extent of insecurity stemming from the 
attack is low (ibid). At the same time, “the probability of any of us actually suffering the evil 
that is threatened is somewhat smaller than the insecurity that we all accept when we drive 
on the freeway or engage in physical labour in a factory or construction site” (ibid). As we 
continue to regard these events as catastrophic, even if they leave average citizens with an 
extremely low probability of suffering death and injury as a result, it seems that the notion of 
national security is not a simple function of individuals’ security being threatened (ibid).  
 
In this vein, James Griffin states that “it is plausible that there should be a collective right to 
security”, and that “such a right can be seen as grounded in individual rights to security of 
person” (9). Perhaps a parallel can be made to the (presumed) collective right to self-
determination. The state’s right to self-determination may be premised on the same values 
(e.g. the intrinsic value of autonomy) as the individual right to self-determination, but it is 
not reducible to the individual right to self-determination; it is commonly understood as the 
citizens’ right to determine the future of their collective life together, and not the sum total 
of each citizens’ capacity to being able to determine their individual futures. Likewise, even 
if the collective right to security is premised on the same values as the individual right to 
security, which I will attend to shortly, it is the citizens’ right against physical attack as a 
collective entity, and not the sum total of each citizen’s right against physical attack. Collective 
security can be severely diminished by a terrorist attack, even if there is hardly any dent in 
the individual security of many citizens – much like how an American moon landing may 
increase the world’s admiration for the United States as a collective entity, but this does not 
translate into increased admiration for individual Americans (Margalit and Raz 450). For 
the remainder of this chapter, I will assume that national security refers to the state’s collective 
right to security against physical attack, rather than the individual one. 
 
The next question to ask is this: does it make sense to say that states have a collective right to 
security, in order to fulfill other rights, or to be able to make reasonable plans, in a way that 
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is conceptually distinct from the individual right to security? This seems likely. For example, 
consider states’ right to self-determination. We might say that the right to national security 
is a necessary precondition for states to exercise this right. In the same way that the 
individual right to peaceful protest cannot be fully exercised if peaceful protests are 
constantly subject to violent attacks, states cannot fully exercise their right to make 
autonomous decisions about their future if certain decisions are constrained, or if their 
hands are forced, by the threat of war by neighbouring states, or the risk of terrorist attacks. 
It is part of the FBI’s definition of terrorism, for example, that it must appear to be intended 
to “influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion”, or “to affect the 
conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping” (FBI).  
 
The idea of “reasonable planning” is also highly pertinent to the state as a collective agent. 
It is plausible that the state also has a basic interest in “reasonable planning”, as it has to carry 
out the maintenance and improvement of its basic infrastructure, to ensure the continued 
well-being of its citizens, and it seems important that these plans be based on beliefs that are 
true, as basing plans on false beliefs might be severely harmful for its citizens. For example, 
the state would fail to be a reasonable planner, thus endangering citizens’ lives, if 
policymakers were convinced that a severe drought was about to take place, and intricate 
plans were made to cope with it, and in fact serious floods were actually going to occur. 
Much like reasonable planning on the individual level, the state obviously cannot engage in 
large-scale reasonable planning without the warranted belief that national security will 
prevail, e.g. that there will be no major disruptions to the schedule like mass injury and 
death, the collapse of buildings, or the destruction of transport networks. Furthermore, 
while states structure their plans around what they believe might happen, it is also possible 
that threats to national security can make the act of planning itself impossible, or very 
difficult. Thomas Hobbes’s forceful statement about the state of nature seems relevant here. 
In these insecure conditions, where “every man is enemy to every man” and is under the 
constant risk of attack, 
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…there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and 
consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that 
may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of  moving, and 
removing; such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no 
account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, 
and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and 
short. (Leviathan I, 13) 
 
While Hobbes makes several different claims in this passage, I want to focus on the first few 
lines, where the suggestion is that the state of nature brings about tremendous uncertainty. 
There is no room for industry precisely because the risk of continuous violence and war 
means the inability to know whether we will receive returns for our hard work, and our 
constant fear of violence distracts us away from engagement in projects like “commodious 
building”, or the pursuit of knowledge. Similarly, it becomes challenging for states to 
construct future plans if they are unsure when projects will be stalled or destroyed by 
violence, or when insecurity is so rife that they can only channel their resources towards 
security measures and damage control.  
 
To conclude this section, national security might be vital for two reasons: firstly, states’ 
ability to exercise their self-determination, and secondly, their ability to engage in 
reasonable planning. 
 
3. National security and equal respect  
 
a. Can equal respect be overridden? 
 
I will now turn to the question if what constraints, if any, there must be on the state’s pursuit 
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of national security. The three previous chapters in this thesis have operated on the 
assumption that states’ policies must be constrained by their duty to uphold the social 
equality of all persons on its territory, including citizens and non-citizens. I have argued that 
this duty calls into question the state’s practices of detention and deportation, as well as its 
selective admission of highly-skilled immigrants, combined with the exclusion of low-skilled 
would-be immigrants. It would be easy to assume that the same duty must constrain the 
policies that states introduce to preserve national security. However, I begin by examining 
an argument that may point us in the opposite direction. 
 
Michael Walzer considers the possibility that “supreme emergencies” may, out of necessity, 
require the adoption of extreme measures (2000, 253) that are otherwise barred by moral 
convention (2000, 51). Notably, Walzer does not provide a cut-and-dried definition for what 
constitutes a “supreme emergency”, other than to say that it must place us in imminent 
danger of an “unusual and horrifying kind” (2000, 52). After acknowledging that the 
perception of supreme emergency is often a result of war-time propaganda and rhetoric that 
we ought to be skeptical of, he suggests that we need to “search for some touchstone against 
which arguments about extremity might be judged”, and one way to do this is to draw up a 
map of human crises, and indicate those that fall into the realm of “desperation and 
disaster”. (Walzer 2000, 253). As he puts it, it is “[t]hese and only these [that] constitute the 
realm of necessity”, truly understood (ibid). The quintessential example of a supreme 
emergency that Walzer presents is Nazism, which he vividly describes as “an ultimate threat 
to everything decent in our lives, an ideology and a practice of domination so murderous, so 
degrading even to those who might survive, that the consequences of its final victory were 
literally beyond calculation, immeasurably awful” (ibid). It is in these circumstances, if there 
is no other way of avoiding the evil, that a “determinate crime” like the killing of innocents 
can be justified (Walzer 2000, 259-260). This because there is simply no other option, 
Walzer believes, than to “accept the burdens of criminality”, as the alternative is for our 
history to be nullified, and our future condemned (2000, 260). 
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We may choose to accept a similar logic for the dangers of Islamist terrorism, for example, 
in the current context. The spectre of terrorism is so dreadful, it might be said, that it 
constitutes a “supreme emergency” of the kind that Walzer was concerned with. In this 
climate, we are justified in overriding ordinary moral rules that would otherwise apply, in 
order to avert the imminent danger posed to us. As Tom Sorell writes, in the case of a 
genuine emergency, “extraordinary uses of power seem to me to be in order: they reflect the 
departure from the ordinary of the situation they are applied to” (33). If this is the case, why 
bother talking about social equality at all? Isn’t the requirement to treat all subjects as social 
equals overridden under conditions of supreme emergency, when there are far more serious 
harms at stake? To resist this argument, we may take two paths. One is to disagree firmly 
with Walzer, and insist that we cannot adopt extreme measures even if when we are faced 
with what he calls “immeasurable evil” (259). Another is to accept his argument, but deny 
that the demand for social equality is overridden in the case of terrorism. 
 
I will go down the second route. It seems that supreme emergencies, for both Walzer and 
Sorell, are defined as events that place us in imminent danger, and it is this sense of imminence 
that seems to drive the overriding of moral rules. In Sorell’s words, “much of everyday 
bourgeois morality could seem pointless if the emergency were imminent enough, 
enveloping enough, and final enough” (26). We are placed in a situation where we must act 
now or forever live with the consequences. But even if terrorist attacks do give rise to such 
emergencies (the ISIS attack on the Bataclan theatre, which involved hostage-taking and 
mass shooting, certainly seems like one), the threat of terrorism does not place us in a constant 
state of emergency. More accurately, we are positioned outside the realm of imminent 
danger, and trying to figure out how best to avoid future instances of it. This seems like a 
separate matter altogether, and to bring out the difference, I will use a smaller-scale 
example:  
 
An elderly man and his adult son are out for a walk after a visit to a pub. The elderly 
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man has a heart condition and starts to experience chest pains. There is no quick means 
of summoning an ambulance, which may in any case take too long to get there. The son 
breaks into the nearest car, jump starts the engine, and drives his father to the nearest 
Accident and Emergency department, breaking the speed limit dangerously, and nearly 
running over a child along the way. How are we to judge the agent in such a case? 
Probably not unsympathetically. Admittedly, he has damaged and stolen other people's 
property and nearly killed someone, but only because he thought he had to act quickly to 
save his father's life. What is more, he has succeeded in getting his father to people who 
are in a position to save his life if the chest pains are a heart attack. What is even more, 
he has shown presence of mind and ingenuity in a situation where other people might 
have panicked or succumbed to indecision. Far from having done anything wrong, it 
might be said, he has only done what is necessary in an emergency. (Sorell 22-23)  
I agree with Sorell that the emergency presented by the old man’s death means that his son is 
justified in his actions. However, we would judge his son very differently, I believe, if his son 
pre-emptively stole cars and sped them around on a regular basis, for the reason that he needed 
to always be prepared for his father’s potentially suffering a heart attack. It seems that the 
son’s exceptional conduct is only justified within the confines of the ongoing emergency, and not 
simply to avoid future instances of imminent danger where his father suffers a heart attack 
without a car in hand; his avoidance of emergencies remain constrained by ordinary moral 
rules. Likewise, the aim to avoid or deter future terrorist-related emergencies does not seem 
sufficient to justify overriding the moral rules that would otherwise apply.   
                
Secondly, even if you might disagree that the constant threat of terrorist attack does not 
constitute an ongoing, interminable emergency, Walzer clearly states that exceptional 
measures are only warranted if they are the only remaining option: “Obviously, if there is 
some other way of avoiding the evil or even a reasonable chance of another way, I must wager 
differently or elsewhere” (2000, 260). He is not saying that a supreme emergency in itself can 
justify exceptional measures. Rather, the burden is on us to prove that we are doing 
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something necessary. So the suspension of ordinary morality, at least for Walzer, is not 
something that is warranted the instant we come face-to-face with an emergency. Rather, it 
happens when we have reached a stage where it is clear that no other feasible alternatives will 
succeed in averting the crisis. Thus, according to this standard, it would be inadequate to say 
that terrorism, by its nature, overrides the state’s duty to uphold social equality. In order to 
make this claim, an extra step must be performed to show that we have no choice but to do so 
under present circumstances. Whether or not this is true is beyond the scope of the chapter, 
but I suspect that it is unlikely, and past historical events seem to dissuade us from believing 
so. One such event is the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II, where 
people of Japanese descent were rounded up by the military, uprooted from their 
communities, and forced into hasty tent cities – a clear-cut example of wrongfully 
“stigmatizing an entire population over suspicions of people who share their ethnicity) 
(Washington Post). Although mass removal of Japanese-Americans was admittedly a drastic step, 
it was publicly “deemed the only effective way to clear up a situation that was becoming more 
critical and chaotic with every passing week of the war” (ibid). However, it has since been 
revealed that the government knew that they posed little security threat, and were 
incarcerated mainly to quell public fears about the “sly and treacherous” nature of Japanese 
people (ibid). The one-time president George H. W. Bush was quoted as saying that “The 
internment of Americans of Japanese ancestry was a great injustice, and it will never be 
repeated” (ibid). This cautionary tale illustrates the dangers of violating the requirements of 
social equality on the grounds that it appeared to be warranted by a national security 
emergency.          
                                                     
b. National security and social equality       
                               
Having shown that we have good reason to think that the demands of social equality continue 
to apply even in the present case, I will now lay out the consequences that a commitment to 
social equality may have for national security. To be clear, I do not think that social equality is 
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the only constraint on the pursuit of national security. There may be many others, but my 
chapter will focus only on social equality.       
                         
My account is guided by Waldron’s critique of the “maximizing” aspect of conventional 
understandings of national security. It would be a mistake, Waldron asserts, to “treat the 
security of a whole society in a straightforwardly aggregative way, simply summing or 
averaging over individual safety to define a measure of security for society as a whole” (2006, 
477). This seems to suggest, in a Hobbesian vein, that states should aim to protect the security 
of as many people for as long as possible, and this could be compatible with minorities doing 
badly for the sake of the majority (Waldron 2006, 478). In contrast to the maximizing 
approach, Waldron argues that the distribution of security should be “governed and 
constrained by egalitarian principles similar to those with which we control the distribution of 
liberty”  (2009, 479). If we view security as a right, it has to have the egalitarian distributive structure 
of rights (ibid), as we typically do not think it justifiable to curtail the rights of minorities in 
order to maximize the number of people who can enjoy the same right. For example, many of 
us do not think that black people can be rendered insecure, through the regular employment 
of police brutality, to maximize the security of the white majority. In light of this, Waldron 
proposes that national security must be limited by equal concern for all nationals. This means that 
states must demonstrate equal concern for the security of all citizens, rather than exposing 
select groups to security risks to increase security for everyone else. On this view, the rights of 
minorities cannot be traded off against the maximal benefit of the majority. In Waldron’s 
words, “[t]he state must have regard to all of those whose security it is bound to protect and 
that necessarily qualifies what it can do for any one of us” (2006, 482).  
 
While this is an appealing idea that underscores the importance of protecting minorities 
from the disproportionate use of force, the notion of “equal concern” risks being overly 
vague. Firstly, equal concern cannot mean the same thing as ensuring equal levels of safety for 
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every territorially present person, at any given moment. This would be difficult to enforce, 
given the fact of limited state resources and the individual choices of people that might lead 
to higher or lower levels of individual safety. Furthermore, we do generally accept that it is 
permissible for the security of some people to be decreased, in pursuit of maximizing overall 
security – sending out members of the military to war, for example. Next, the state already 
does seem to show more concern for the safety of particular groups, such as the existence of 
hate speech laws that aim to specifically protect vulnerable groups, rather than being 
applicable to every person, and this does not seem morally problematic. Thirdly, for 
example, the policeman who profiles and targets black people with extra force and 
aggression may deny that he fails to show equal concern for them. While he would jump to 
their rescue just as quickly, were they victims of robbery or battery, his special suspicion of 
them is warranted by empirical evidence linking race with criminal behavior.  
 
Instead of “equal concern”, I suggest that the state should be guided by equal respect. It must 
uphold the equal moral status of each territorially present person, ensuring that national 
security measures do not offend against this. Respecting each person’s equal moral status 
need not entail the onerous task of ensuring equal degrees of safety at all times, or uniformly 
applying types of legal protection specific to vulnerable groups. Rather, in line with other 
arguments I have made throughout the thesis, it means avoiding the use of security 
measures that subject people to demeaning or humiliating treatment. Consider, for 
example, the racist police brutality mentioned above. Firstly, it is well-documented that 
police often subject black people to disproportionate levels of violence. In 2015, U.S. police 
killed unarmed black people in the U.S. at five times the rate of unarmed whites (Mapping 
Police Violence). This expresses disrespect for black people because of the disregard for their 
rights in comparison to other people, who would not be treated as violently for the same 
offences; it betrays a lack of regard for the pain suffered by black bodies, relative to others, 
as if their lives are more disposable, or their well-being has less value. At the same time, in 
specifically targeting them and treating them as special objects of suspicion, police send out 
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the insulting message that black people are inherently more dangerous or criminally 
disobedient than others. Or recall the example of Japanese internment I described in the 
previous section. Again, the issue was not that the US Army showed less concern for the 
safety of Japanese Americans, but that detaining them disrespectfully cast them as enemy 
aliens who could not be trusted, rather than equal citizens.  
 
To sum up, despite the appeal of “emergencies” and the overriding of moral rules that they 
may seem to justify in some cases, the pursuit of anti-terrorist security measures must 
remain reined in by the demands of social equality. This does not rule out denationalization 
as an option where all are equally subject to it, but only in instances where some are singled 
out. 
 
4. Denationalization and social equality 
 
In the previous sections, I have sought to show that we have legitimate grounds for valuing 
national security, but that our pursuit of national security must continue to be reined in by 
respect for social equality. Keeping this constraint in mind, I will proceed to evaluate the 
second aspect of UK’s denationalization policy.  
 
Recall that, under UK law, both naturalized and native-born citizens can be denationalized, 
but typically only if they have dual citizenship. As I have also mentioned, naturalized citizens 
who are single nationals can be denationalized if there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
they could acquire another nationality, but I leave aside this issue for now. Gibney believes 
that the distinction made between dual nationals and single nationals is illegitimate. As he 
writes, “If dual national citizens can commit the same crime but not be subject to the same 
penalty as single national citizens, then, it seems, they can rightly claim that they are being 
treated as second-class citizens” (Gibney 2011, 18). He anticipates the objection that some 
laws in liberal democratic shield may permissibly shield particular social groups from certain 
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penalties, because those penalties are believed to impose much higher penalties or hardship 
on those groups, in comparison to others (Gibney 2011, 19). One example is the imposition 
of larger fines for richer people, in order to make an impression upon them, and judges’ 
taking a person’s age and health into account while determining the length of their prison 
sentences (ibid). A similar justification seems to lie behind the practice of corporal 
punishment in Singapore, where only men can be caned as a penalty for a crime. This is 
because, during the colonial period in which they originated, women were widely considered 
to be naturally weaker and more delicate, with a much lower pain threshold than men. So it 
might be argued that the state does not treat dual nationals unequally, as the different policy 
that is extended to them simply reflects the fact that it imposes significantly less hardship on 
them than it would on someone without another country of citizenship.   
 
Gibney goes on to rejects this argument for two reasons. The first is that holding a second 
nationality does not obviously capture a relevant difference in the hardship of 
denationalization for individuals (2011, 19). In his words, “A person made stateless by 
denationalization but allowed to remain in the UK might find themselves in a far more 
favourable position in terms of the rights and protections available to them than a dual 
national who was suddenly forced to rely only on their citizenship of Haiti and Iraq or some 
other country with few resources and little infrastructure for the protection of human rights” 
(ibid).  The suggestion, here, is that people can suffer equivalent levels of hardship regardless 
of whether they become stateless. His second argument seems to be a restatement of the 
initial objection he makes. Gibney simply repeats that “the status of citizenship, as the 
grounding principle of state membership, simply ought to be a status which admits of no 
gradations or rankings. Citizenship worth its name entails equal standing amongst the 
members of political community” (ibid). The problem with denationalizing dual nationals 
and not single nationals is that, in making their citizenship less secure than that of their 
compatriots, it “marks them as lower in standing to their fellow citizens” and illiberally treats 
dual nationals as inferior citizens (Gibney 2011, 20).  
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Christian Barry and Luara Ferracioli disagree. They acknowledge that there are “no morally 
relevant differences between naturalized and non-naturalized citizens”, as withdrawing 
citizenship from one group would leave naturalized citizens vulnerable in exactly the same 
way as withdrawing citizenship from the other group (14). But this logic does not apply when 
it comes to people who would be rendered stateless by denationalization and those who 
would not, as the fact that one group would continue to enjoy the benefits of citizenship 
elsewhere is a “very relevant difference” between them and those who would become 
stateless (Barry and Ferracioli 14-5); it means that “the burdens of the first class of persons 
would be likely to bear as a result of denationalization would be very different from those 
likely to be borne by the second class of persons” (Barry and Ferracioli 15). Furthermore, 
against Gibney’s point about the impermissibility of hierarchies of citizenship, they note that 
there are already differences in the rights possessed by different classes of citizens (ibid). For 
example, the foreign-born children of some UK and US citizens are automatically entitled to 
citizenship in their parents’ country if the parent has resided in their country of citizenship 
for significant periods (ibid). They argue that this inequality does not seem unreasonable, as 
the “amount of time spent in the country appears a reasonably good proxy for determining 
whether the parents have located life plans there” (ibid).  
 
Here, there seem to be two points of contention between Gibney, and Barry and Ferracioli. 
The first is over whether the possession of dual nationality, or the lack thereof, is a suitable 
proxy for determining whether or not a person will have to endure significant hardship. The 
second, however, is more fundamental to the question at hand: is it true that citizenship 
ought to be a status that allows “no gradations or rankings”, as doing so would automatically 
express a statement of inferiority about the classes of citizens with fewer rights? Or is it 
actually the case that citizenship can admit these differences between different groups, so long 
as there is a “relevant reason” given? While I will briefly offer support for Barry and 
Ferracioli’s answer to the first question, I will concentrate on how the second disagreement 
between Gibney, and Barry and Ferracioli can be resolved. Chiefly, I argue distinctions in 
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rights between citizens are not uniformly stigmatizing in the way that Gibney suggests, but 
whether or not they are stigmatizing does not rely on the provision of relevant reasons, 
contrary to what Barry and Ferracioli mistakenly assume. I conclude that, in the case of 
denationalization, the distinction between dual and single nationals is stigmatizing, but to 
understand why, we must refer to the present social context: the widespread suspicion and 
antipathy towards Muslim citizens with a dual nationality. 
 
a. Is dual nationality a relevant difference? 
 
Following Barry and Ferracioli, I will now argue that the difference between dual and single 
nationals is relevant to whether or not a person can be permissibly denationalized. The fact 
that some stateless persons may be better-off than dual nationals who are stripped of one 
citizenship does not count against using dual nationality as a proxy for significantly less 
hardship. There are two reasons for this. One is that the existence of exceptions to the overall 
pattern do not usually count against the use of a particular marker as a proxy for something, 
as this would seem to be overly demanding. Consider, for example, the parallel that Gibney 
mentions: the fact that age is usually taken into consideration during sentencing. Greater 
leniency for older offenders is sometimes premised on the belief that a prison or jail sentence 
is perceived as presenting a greater physical and psychological toll on older inmates, who 
may be more vulnerable to aggression from younger inmates and less likely to adapt well to 
confinement (Steffensmeier and Motivans). Nevertheless, it remains possible that 
imprisonment could be objectively and subjectively worse for some younger offenders than it 
would be for some older offenders. An older offender who dealt well with conditions of 
confinement could be significantly better-off than a young offender who was highly 
claustrophobic. But the existence of such possibilities does not seem to render it 
impermissible for judges to take age into account. It seems sufficient for age to generally 
function as a reliable proxy for how much hardship a person may suffer, such that most older 
offenders are significantly more burdened by prison sentences than younger offenders. 
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Thus, the next question is whether or not statelessness does function as a reliable proxy for 
significant hardship. Acknowledging this does not commit us to disregarding the serious 
problems faced by many citizens of states who are unable to protect their human rights, and 
how the citizens of wealthy countries by-and-large have their rights more effectively 
protected than those of poorer countries. As the Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion 
observes, stateless persons “face challenges in all areas of life”, including “entering or 
completing schooling, accessing healthcare services for preventative medicine or to treat an 
injury or illness; finding gainful employment or signing a labour contract; buying or 
inheriting a house; registering a car or a business; obtaining a birth certificate, driving 
license, marriage certificate or even death certificate; opening a bank account or getting a 
loan; falling back on social security; and enjoying a pension” (29). This is largely due to the 
fact that many societies are organized around the assumption that all persons are citizens of 
some state, such that citizenship is the prerequisite for participation. At the same time, it is 
extremely difficult to obtain a passport or be issued any form of identity documentation if 
you are not the national of any country, which has directly resulted in many stateless persons 
having no proof that they exist, and no ability to identify themselves in everyday interactions 
with the state or private entities (ibid). Predictably, while international travel is “almost 
inconceivable”, free movement within the state of residence can also be challenging, as proof 
of identity cannot be given if the person is stopped by the police (Institute on Statelessness and 
Inclusion 30). This leads Kristy Belton to observe that “almost every right enumerated in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights – from the right to a nationality (Article 15) to 
various civil, political, social and economic  rights – is violated when one is stateless” (60). As 
matters stand, much like how age is a proxy for increased hardship during incarceration, we 
do have good reason to believe that statelessness does function as a reliable proxy for 
significant hardship, even if there may be cases where a stateless person is better-off than a 
non-stateless person. 
 
b. Social equality and “relevant differences” 
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I now turn to my main argument. Specifically, I will argue that a state policy can be 
stigmatizing even if it makes use of a relevant difference between two groups. The question of 
whether a policy makes use of a relevant difference between two groups can be pried apart 
from whether it is stigmatizing. Gibney’s claim that the exclusive denationalization of dual 
nationals treats them as inferior does not, at all, ride on the separate claim that the state 
makes an irrelevant distinction between dual and single nationals. 
 
Consider an example that I have referenced in Chapter Two. I have argued that the denial 
of political rights to guest workers is wrongful because it violates the requirements of social 
equality. It does so primarily by exacerbating social inequalities between guest workers and 
citizens, as their lack of political rights robs guest workers of the ability to protest against 
their ill-treatment. Notice, however, that this assertion does not rest on there being no relevant 
differences between guest workers and citizens, or guest workers and permanent residents, 
when it comes to ascertaining their bundle of rights.  
 
To posit an analogue for the present case: one potential relevant difference between guest 
workers and permanent residents, for the question of whether or not they should have the 
right to citizenship, might be that guest workers are, on the whole, less committed to 
becoming a member of the host state and having a say in shaping its policies. Suppose that it 
were true that guest workers generally viewed their stint as a temporary means of making 
money, and were not particularly invested in civic participation, and their lack of 
commitment would make the inability to vote significantly less burdensome for them than 
permanent residents. This difference in hardship between the two groups is surely relevant to 
the state’s decisions about what rights they ought to have. But it would be a relevant 
consideration that is defeated by the fact that barring them from citizenship expresses 
stigmatizing views about their moral worth. Of course, you may disagree with me, and say 
that denying the guest workers political rights is permissible because the workers by-and-
large have no interest in doing so. This does not detract from the point that the question of 
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whether a policy treats people differently for relevant reasons seems to be separate from 
whether or not the policy runs counter to social equality. It is also worth noting that 
stigmatizing policies can also be accompanied by a valid rationale; there is no necessary 
contradiction in this. It is at least plausible that the disproportionate police profiling of black 
people, for example, affects their social equality and is therefore wrongful by those standards, 
but it may nevertheless be guided by the valid rationale of protecting citizens from crime by 
targeting a group that disproportionately commits it. This is not to say that the use of 
relevant considerations has no bearing whatsoever on whether or not a policy violates the 
state’s duty to uphold equal worth. They often indicate policymakers’ lack of intent to 
demean, and this should influence our judgment insofar as such lack of intent is a necessary 
condition for a policy not to violate social equality. Nevertheless, as I have emphasized 
repeatedly throughout previous chapters, it is not a sufficient condition, as a policy can express 
a demeaning view even if even if there is no intention to do so. 
 
Secondly, in earlier chapters, I have already sought to disentangle the idea of insufficient 
justification from the idea of social inequality. The claim that an agent acts on irrelevant reasons 
seems “explanatorily misguided or incomplete”, as “it seems to focus on the wrong aspect of 
the treatment in question” (Shin 7). Suppose that a state decided to follow in the footsteps of 
Nazi Germany and promptly denationalized all the members of one ethnic group. Certainly, 
there is no doubt that the state acts on irrelevant reasons. There is no relevant difference 
between the members of that ethnic group and its other citizens that would justify such a 
decision. But it would seem very odd to focus our criticism of the state’s behaviour on the 
fact that the state has failed to sufficiently justify its actions. If I am correct about this, we 
would not primarily characterize our objections as disagreement about the types of 
considerations that can justify denationalization, or the condemnation of irrelevant 
behaviour, but as protests against the fact that the state’s actions wrongfully expresses its 
contempt for the ethnic group who has been singled out.  Thus, to re-iterate my argument: 
we can say that the distinction made between dual nationals and single nationals is 
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demeaning even if it picks out a relevant difference between the two. 
 
c. Why is it stigmatizing to denationalize dual nationals and not single nationals? 
 
If the relevant difference between dual nationals and single nationals does not disqualify it 
from violating the requirements of social equality, does this straightforwardly back up 
Gibney’s contention that that “the status of citizenship, as the grounding principle of state 
membership, simply ought to be a status which admits of no gradations or rankings”, and 
that “[c]itizenship worth its name entails equal standing amongst the members of political 
community” (2011, 19)? Yes and no. It does insofar as he does not need to prove that there 
are no relevant differences between dual and single nationals. Yet, at the same time, it is not 
obvious that the two assertions are equivalent; it remains entirely possible that citizenship can 
admit a degree of gradation without affecting equal standing amongst its members.  
 
Let us reconsider the example cited by Barry and Ferracioli. Does it offend against the 
principle of social equality for some foreign-born children to not be automatically entitled to 
citizenship in their parents’ country, if the parent has not resided in their country of 
citizenship for a sufficient period of time? I think it is worth looking at the exact policies in 
question. Under the United States’ law, a child born abroad to two U.S. citizen parents who 
are legally married automatically acquires U.S. citizenship at birth if one of the parents had a 
residence in the U.S. or one of its outlying possessions, before the child’s birth (Bureau of 
Consular Affairs). On the other hand, a child born abroad to one citizen and one alien parent 
who are legally married only automatically acquires citizenship if the U.S. citizen parent was 
physically present in the U.S or its outlying possessions for at least five years, and two after 
the age of fourteen (ibid). The answer seems to be no. In line with Barry and Ferracioli’s 
reasoning, it does not seem wrong for the automatic citizenship of children to rest on 
whether at least one of the parents has resided in the U.S. or its territories for a minimum 
period of time. Note, however, that my conclusion does not fully rest on whether the 
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residence period is an accurate proxy for whether the parents have located their life-plans 
elsewhere. Rather, no stigmatic beliefs are expressed by it, nor does the policy seem to worsen 
social inequalities between those families and families whose children are automatically 
granted citizenship. In other words, the policy expresses no judgment about the inferiority of 
these couples, or the children born to them. Gibney’s statement about distinctions in the 
rights possessed by different groups of citizens being inherently disrespectful seems overly 
forceful. 
 
I want to argue, in contrast, that the denationalization of citizens who are dual nationals is 
very different, and to see why, we need to delve briefly into the history of stigma against 
them, and its current grounds. I will show how, even if negative attitudes towards dual 
nationals have largely changed in recent years, that the marked hostility towards Muslim 
citizens with dual nationality remains alive and well, and it is precisely in view of this 
particular hostility that the denationalization of dual nationals is stigmatizing. 
 
Dual citizens in general have been viewed with immense disapproval. This was largely because 
citizenship and political loyalty to a single state was considered inseparable, leading 
politicians of previous centuries to view dual nationality as an “abhorrence of a natural 
order, the equivalent of bigamy” (Faist and Gerdes 3). During war in the 19th and early 20th 
centuries, policymakers feared that dual citizens who maintained exclusive loyalty to the 
country of original citizenship would exert “foreign” interference by the enemy (ibid). As 
Randall Hansen observes, “Once tantamount to treason, American administrations and the 
U.S. Congress viewed dual nationality with intense distaste during the Cold War” (179). 
More recently, in spite of a more open policy following the 1960s, Mexico’s 1998 decision to 
allow its citizens to hold dual U.S. citizenship re-inflamed Cold War anxieties of “foreign 
influence and shadowy fifth columns infiltrating domestic U.S. politics” (ibid). In yet another 
example, the generally liberal German constitutional court claimed in a 1974 ruling that 
dual nationality was an “evil that should be avoided or eliminated in the interests of states as 
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well as in the interests of the affected citizen” , because states “want to be secure in the duty 
of loyalty of their citizens – which extends if necessary as far as risking one’s life – and do not 
want to see it endangered by possible conflicts with a loyalty to a foreign state” (Aleinikoff 
and Klusmeyer 163).  
 
In recent times, however, the fear of “disloyalty” in dual citizens, on the whole, seems to 
have diminished. Thomas Faist and Jürgen Gerdes note that an “astonishing change” has 
taken place over the past few years, where an increasing number of policymakers no longer 
regard dual citizenship as a problem per se, such that more than half of the states in the world 
are now tolerant of some form or element of dual citizenship (3). There are now tens of 
millions of persons who reside in one state, and are citizens of it, but who are also subject to 
the call of another state that they are also citizens of (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 165). What 
could be the reasons for this change? Daiva Stasiulis and Darryl Ross observe that 
immigrant-receiving states have permitted dual citizenship so as to ease the integration of 
immigrants who might otherwise avoid naturalization, because of concerns about losing 
property and significant rights in their home countries, if forced to give up their original 
nationality (333). On the other hand, immigrant-sending states permit the retention of 
expatriates’ nationality as a means to strengthening membership ties with overseas citizens 
who are “key sources of foreign exchange, investment, markets, entrepreneurial initiatives, 
and even political representation abroad” (ibid). 
 
Faist and Gerdes also propose that the two most important factors that explain the increasing 
tolerance towards dual citizenship are the “changing relationships between individual 
nation-states”, and “altered relationships between states and citizens” (7-8). In the first place, 
previous bilateral and multilateral forms of international cooperation aimed to avoid 
instances of dual and multiple citizenships because interstate cooperation was considered 
necessary for enforcing the principle of one citizenship against other states’ competing 
military conscription claims (Faist and Gerdes 7). However, increasing numbers of nation-
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states have opted out of this interpretation simply because mandatory military service has 
largely been abolished, diminishing pressures on nation-states to cooperate in avoiding dual 
citizenship (Faist and Gerdes 7-8). At the same time, as a result of enhanced economic and 
political cooperation between democratic nation-states, coupled with the decreasing 
probability of interstate wars between democratic states, means that nation-states are no 
longer preoccupied with maintaining exclusive loyalty (Faist and Gerdes 8).  
 
In the second place, human rights norms have limited state discretion in granting dual 
citizenship. In particular, upon the ending of the Cold War, international discourse on 
nationality had “shifted away from the emphasis on state order and sovereignty to increased 
recognition of individual rights and interests to claim and change nationality” (Stasiulis and 
Ross 334). Under present circumstances, even states which adhere to the principle of 
avoiding dual citizenship as far as possible are led to grant certain exemptions, like when it is 
impossible or unreasonably difficult for naturalized citizens to renounce their previous 
citizenship (ibid). This is accompanied by developments in gender equality, where women 
are given the right to retain their old citizenship while also having access to naturalization, 
instead of automatically acquiring their husband’s upon marriage, and children can be given 
the citizenship of either parent, or accept dual citizenship, instead of only taking on their 
father’s (Faist and Gerdes 5). 
 
These developments might convince us that stigma against dual citizens no longer exists, and 
this seems to count against the possibility that making dual citizens vulnerable to 
denationalization stigmatizes them in some way. Indeed, from the perspective of individuals, 
multiple citizenship is generally viewed as a means of augmenting personal and familial 
advantage, broadening the geopolitical spaces in which various forms of capital, including 
state entitlements to public goods, can be accumulated (Stasiulis and Ross 333). However, 
while the “dual national” writ large is not a threatening figure, a particular group of dual 
nationals have come under intense scrutiny. In this day and age, while  the concept of 
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“loyalty” has become antiquated with regard to many dual nationals, there remain deep 
concerns about the loyalty of Muslim populations. Audrey Macklin states that the 
amendment to the British Nationality Act specifically targeted so-called “home-grown 
terrorists” who are birthright citizens of the United Kingdom; “[t]he message is sends is 
clearly directed at second-generation children of immigrants (especially Muslims) who likely 
possess UK citizenship as well as the citizenship of their immigrant parents” (Macklin 60).  It 
is no coincidence that the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act, which for the first time gave 
the British state the power to denationalize native born citizens with a second nationality, 
was passed in the wake of September 11, and the Immigration, Nationality and Asylum Act in 
2007, which significantly reduced the standards required by the Home Secretary to order the 
denationalization of individuals, was passed soon after the 2007 underground bombings in 
London (Gibney 2011, 5). Even if, in theory, any dual citizen can be denationalized, it seems 
obvious that Muslim dual citizens are the policy’s main targets. Similar concerns have been 
voiced about the proposed French policy to denationalize dual nationals. As one article 
states, “Many French citizens with dual citizenship from North African countries sense that 
they – not Franco-Germans or Franco-Americans, say – are the only dual citizens that 
lawmakers really have in mind (The Economist).  
 
What message, then, is sent to Muslim dual citizens? As Macklin trenchantly observes, “The 
law signals that for these dual nationals, UK citizenship remains tentative and subordinate to 
their “real” nationality, which aligns with the ethno-religious identity transmitted to their 
parents” (60). However, it is not only that Muslim citizens are feared to be disloyal and more 
committed to their ethno-religious identity, but that their Muslim identity is marked as 
inherently threatening and malignant. Stasiulis and Ross point out how their vulnerability is 
buffered by “ideological justification and visceral force” by the demonization of certain 
populations – chiefly, male Muslims and Arabs – by characterizing terrorism as an 
ideological struggle rooted in a clash between a “evil” Islamic civilization and a benign 
Western one (337). This plays into the commonplace portrayal of Muslims on Western 
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territories as a threat to the country. A YouGov poll in 2015, for example, found that 56% of 
Britons believed that the practice of Islam was a “major” or of “some” threat to Western 
liberal democracy (Rogers). As a result, it seems that Muslim citizens are placed far below in 
the “pecking order” amongst citizens of dual origin, who are considered to be of varying 
worth and “moral suitability” by the receiving state, which continues to exact serious 
consequences for their ability to access basic citizenship rights and entitlements (Stasiulis and 
Ross 337-8). As matters stand, these consequences already include states’ suspension of 
diplomatic protection and consular assistance with regard to male Muslim dual nationals 
who were subjected to illegal detention and alleged torture in foreign states (Stasiulis and 
Ross 330),when access to protective citizenship practices of the state where one resides and 
holds when diplomatic protection (Stasiulis and Ross 332) is believed to be a basic 
entitlement. One prolific example of this was the case of Maher Arar, Abdullah Almalki, 
Ahmed El Maati, and Muayyed Nurredin, all dual citizens of Canada and a Middle-Eastern 
country, who were detained abroad in countries with documented human rights abuses and 
tortured without diplomatic assistance from Canada (Stasiulis and Ross 341). It is also worth 
noting that Canadian intelligence has been suspected to be complicit in their detainment 
(Stasiulis and Ross 341). It is difficult not to see the denationalization of dual citizens as yet 
another instance where the citizenship rights of Muslim dual nationals are abrogated. Even if 
these denationalization policies do not explicitly single out Muslim dual nationals, and the 
denationalization of dual nationals could in theory apply to any dual citizen, I have tried to 
suggest that it is the belief that Muslim dual citizens are denationalizable simply because they 
are considered a danger to other citizens and perceived to be of less value than them, that has 
driven states to introduce the policy in the first place. Perhaps another case in point, 
unrelated to terrorism, is how the Home Office is considering stripping the citizenship of the 
ringleaders of the widely-publicized Rotherham sex abuse case, who are all British-Pakistanis 
perceived to be Muslims (Craig). While the actions of these criminals are deplorable, it 
should be pointed out that the revocation of citizenship has not been considered for other sex 
offenders. Tellingly, a headline in the Bristol Post reads “Foreign sex abusers to be stripped 
	   203 
of their UK citizenship and deported” even when the men in question are British dual 
nationals and not foreigners (Bristol Post). As a whole, it seems that the entitlement of Muslim 
citizens to equal citizenship with other (non-Muslim) British citizens is “provisional, 
precarious, and continually under surveillance” (Macklin 60). 
 
To wrap up this section, although Gibney is correct that the denationalization of dual 
nationals does express the inferiority of dual nationals, he leaves out a deeper analysis of the 
socio-political conditions behind this. It is not that distinctions amongst citizens are inherently 
demeaning, but that the distinction between dual and single nationals in this instance are 
demeaning because of the existing social meanings it reinforces about Muslim dual nationals. It 
reinforces widespread Islamophobic beliefs about the inherent illiberalism of Muslim citizens, 
and their hostility to “Western culture”, by casting them as enemy aliens, or permanent 
outsiders who are never “truly British”. It also suggests that they must be specially disciplined 
by placing their citizenship on shaky ground, through the availability of exceptional 
measures to expel them back to where they really belong, an option that remains off the table 




In this chapter, I first noted that national security may be vital to the state for two reasons: 
firstly, that it is the precondition for the state’s right to self-determination, and secondly, it is 
also necessary for the state’s ability to engage in reasonable planning. However, despite the 
importance of national security, I showed that current anti-terror efforts must be constrained 
by states’ duties to upholding social equality, as the “war on terror” does not seem to fall into 
Walzer’s definition of a “supreme emergency”, and it is not obvious that we must abandon 
our commitment to social equality as a last resort. Consequently, the state remains prohibited 
from utilizing security measures that would be demeaning or stigmatizing to particular 
groups. Finally, I showed that the denationalization of dual citizens, and not single citizens, 
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fails to meet this standard. While it is not true that “tiers” of citizenship, where different 
classes of citizens have different rights, are always stigmatizing, the denationalization of dual 
citizens is because it expresses disrespectful beliefs about Muslim citizens. We should not act as 
if the change to British immigration law is directed at all dual citizens, when it is clearly 
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Conclusion 
 
I will now revisit the claims I have made. In the Introduction, I set up my project as an 
alternative approach to the question of whether the state’s right to exclude persons from its 
territory, residence on its territory, or membership is compatible with the principle of moral 
equality. In the political sphere, the principle of moral equality is believed to place constraints 
on how states may exercise their power over citizens. Consequently, many have raised the 
question of how moral equality ought to limit states’ treatment of non-citizens in the realm of 
immigration. Notably, the most popular interpretation of moral equality’s demands is that it 
enjoins us not to subject non-citizens to arbitrary unequal treatment, and that the right to 
exclude violates this demand by preventing poorer non-citizens from accessing equal 
opportunities to wealthier citizens, and allowing their opportunities to be remain heavily 
influenced by their place of citizenship, which is regarded as a socially contingent feature. 
While this line of thought has been subject to rigorous scrutiny, I suggested that we can bypass 
these criticisms and reinvigorate the argument from moral equality by embarking on a 
relational egalitarian strategy that focuses on the social inequalities that the right to exclude may 
create. These inequalities may hold between fellow citizens, or between citizens and non-
citizens.  
 
In Part I, I established the conceptual groundwork for my claims in Part II.  In particular, I 
argued that the state has a duty to uphold social equality between all persons that it wields 
power over, whether they are citizens or non-citizens, or whether they are already present on 
the territory. Chapter One expanded on two limitations of the interpretation of moral 
equality identified in the Introduction. Firstly, I noted that appealing to the social contingency 
of citizenship does not go very far in challenging proponents of the right to exclude who 
ground their arguments in special relationships between citizens. Secondly, most protests 
about wrongful exclusion rarely use the social contingency of particular attributes as a basis 
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for complaint. Instead, they argue that their exclusion is demeaning or stigmatizing. This 
presented an interesting possibility: that states’ exercise of the right to exclude might be 
wrongful for the same reasons. Chapter Two built on this possibility by demonstrating that 
moral equality has a comparative element that requires social equality between persons, and that 
states are tasked with the duty to uphold social equality between persons subject to its power 
by refraining from creating or maintaining policies that express disrespect for their equal 
moral status, or foreseeably threaten to worsen the social inequalities between them. Taken 
together, these two chapters show that moral equality can impose a set of demands that are 
distinct from the prohibition on arbitrary unequal treatment.  
 
In Part II, I explored how the state’s duty to uphold the social equality of those subject to its 
power applies to three aspects of how the right to exclude is currently exercised. Drawing 
from the republican literature on immigration, Chapter Three argued that the state’s use of 
detention and deportation because it threatens the social equality of non-citizens by subjecting 
them to domination. More than this, however, it also harms the social equality of persons who 
are not presently subject to domination, such as minority citizens who “pass” as non-citizens to 
immigration enforcement officers, and to non-citizens who find that these experiences take a 
more permanent toll on their self-perception and how they relate to others. Chapters Four 
and Five are intended as companion chapters. Both have contended that states’ preference for 
highly-skilled migrants, and exclusion of low-skilled migrants, is a form of wrongful 
discrimination, in both the direct and indirect senses. While it wrongfully directly 
discriminates against low-skilled workers and reinforces demeaning stereotypes about them, it 
also wrongfully indirectly discriminates against female workers, and contributes to the existing 
stigma that female workers face. Lastly, Chapter Six shifted the spotlight to the exclusion of 
citizens, rather than non-citizens. There, I critiqued Britain’s current policy of stripping dual 
citizens of their citizenship, when they are perceived as threats to national security, for the 
reason that it expresses disrespect for Muslim citizens as a whole. 
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There are several further areas of research that my arguments could develop into, or make a 
contribution to. I conclude my thesis by briefly mentioning four of these. Firstly, I have 
refrained from framing my overall argument as a claim in support of open borders. Rather, my 
claim is a very qualified one: that acknowledging the state’s duty to uphold the social equality 
of those subject to its power places limitations on the right to exclude in those areas that I have 
identified. This leaves open the possibility that the state may continue to exercise the right to 
exclude, albeit in an extremely limited and qualified way. It is certainly not intended as an in 
principle objection to the right to exclude, as it only problematizes existing policies of exclusion. 
However, suppose that there is no way for states to effectively exercise the right to exclude 
without violating their duty to uphold social equality, as it turns out that all necessary modes of 
enforcement of the right to exclude express disrespect for, or worsen the social equality of 
some group in particular. It might be asked if our concern for social equality could, in fact, 
provide an indirect argument for open borders (as opposed to a more direct approach, like the 
claim that there is a human right to free movement). I am not certain that this argument 
could be made, as the violations of social equality I described are tied to context-specific 
historical and cultural meanings that do not necessarily apply to every case, and it seems at 
least plausible that some instances of immigration exclusion may not be disrespectful at all. 
Nevertheless, it is worth looking into. For example, we might not need to show that the right 
to exclude always harms social equality as a rule of thumb; it might simply be the case that it is 
too risky an exercise of power. 
 
This brings me to a closely related issue. As I have criticized states’ use of detention and 
deportation, as well as discriminatory selection policies, and their revocation of citizenship, it 
is an open question which alternative modes of exclusion states could permissibly employ. 
Consider the case of illegal immigrants. Suppose that states, in line with my suggestions, 
refrain from placing them in detention or deporting them, but still wish to significantly reduce 
the number of illegal immigrants located on their territory. Would it be permissible to use 
“soft” modes of power, such as financial incentives, to encourage illegal immigrants to leave? 
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For example, the former French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, promised financial incentives for 
illegal immigrants to leave France and return home. It is not clear what the moral status of 
these incentives is, and I think it is important to examine them, as they might enable states to 
exercise the right to exclude without impinging on social equality. Of course, they might also 
be harmful to social equality, and this would be a point scored in the favour of those who 
suspect my claims lead us to the open borders position. 
 
Thirdly, it might be asked how seriously we ought to take social equality. We may recognise 
that the comparative requirement of moral equality does exist, but assert that the non-
comparative requirement ought to take precedence. For example, it might be claimed that 
upholding the non-comparative requirement would have an overall negative impact on the 
state’s ability to protect the non-comparative rights of the persons subject to its power. Take, 
for example, the issue of national security. Even if the denationalization of dual citizens 
expressed disrespect for certain groups of citizens, wouldn’t it be foolishly counter-intuitive for 
states to risk the life and limb of its citizens for the sake of social equality alone? Alternatively, 
we need not appeal to rights at all. We might simply say that people can accept trade-offs 
between their social equality and other areas of well-being. One familiar argument is that 
guest worker programs ultimately benefit guest workers more than they harm them, as they are 
paid salaries above what they would receive in their home countries, and there are guest 
workers who would voluntarily subject themselves to disrespectful and exploitative policies for 
these financial returns. It may be viewed as overly paternalistic to deny them the opportunity.  
 
Finally, it may be pointed out that social equality cuts both ways. Even though I have focused 
exclusively on how social equality may constrain states’ exercise of the right to exclude, social 
equality may give us states reason to enforce it more strictly. Perhaps it could be shown that 
loosening immigration policies in the ways I have recommended might worsen social equality 
between persons in significant ways. Several versions of this argument have been made, both 
in the popular discourse and philosophical literature. One is that newly-arrived immigrants 
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may harbour deeply racist attitudes towards minority citizens, or sexist attitudes towards 
women. For example, the purported sexist attitudes of Muslim immigrants towards women in 
Europe has been a matter of controversy for some time, especially after the multiple cases of 
sexual assault faced by women in Cologne, Germany on New Year’s Eve by men who were 
“North African” or “Arab” in appearance. A second, more familiar argument is that the 
presence of immigrants, highly-skilled and low-skilled alike, may worsen the social equality of 
minority citizens – for example, by lowering their wages and pushing them into greater 
poverty. More empirical research is needed, in order to demonstrate that these are legitimate 
concerns and not figments of prejudice. If it can be shown that increased immigration does 
worsen social equality, we will be placed in a very difficult situation, as social equality may be 
harmed regardless of whether states adopt more or less permissive immigration policies. We will 
have to grapple with the question of whose social equality ought to be prioritized, in this case. 
One seemingly intuitive answer is that the social equality of citizens should take precedence, 
but I don’t think this is obvious. For example, we might choose to prioritise the social equality 
of the most vulnerable groups instead. 
 
These potential areas of research, alongside the contributions I have mentioned in the 
Introduction, underline the significance of my project. Above all, I have sought to convince 
the reader of the central importance of social equality in how we should think about the right 
to exclude, as well as the value of evaluating the current policies that have been introduced 
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